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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
The collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998 brought significant change to 
Indonesia's public sector. Education at primary and secondary levels, since 1 
January 2001, was administered at district level rather than in the previously 
centralised and bureaucratic manner. At the school level, ideas about school 
autonomy emerged and became popular. In particular the term ‘School Based 
Management’ (SBM) was seen as a panacea, and as a result the central 
government issued a regulation to implement the practice of SBM.  
This study analyses the dynamics of the SBM policy as it was being 
interpreted and implemented at the secondary school level in Indonesia. It 
examines SBM in the municipality of Mataram, Lombok, Indonesia. The study 
was approached in two ways: through document analysis of the Ministry of 
National Education decree number 044/U/2002 which legalized SBM; and by 
soliciting and interpreting the perspectives and practices of stakeholders at 
district and school levels through questionnaires, interviews, school site studies 
and document analyses. Altogether 83 respondents completed the questionnaires 
and 24 participated in interviews. Site studies were made to two schools. These 
approaches produced rich data on issues relating to SBM policy, devolved 
authority and community involvement. 
The study found that the SBM policy as stated in the decree lacked 
clarity. The decree was hastily introduced and emphasised structural changes at 
district and school levels without clarifying its underlying rationales or 
implementation guidelines. The decree did not choose a particular model of 
SBM. Instead, it imposed a uniform model regardless of school level, size, 
location, type of community or even the public and private nature of schools. 
x 
 The decree was not followed with any regulations established at the district level 
regarding SBM. Consequently, institutional capacity at the district level was not 
developed. Therefore previous paradigm and practices of management continued 
to remain. Information provided about SBM at the school level was not designed 
to give much detail. It was left to principals to inform school level stakeholders 
but the extent to which this happened depended on the principals’ discretion and 
level of knowledge about SBM.  
The devolved authority was not clear in the decree. What was suggested 
in the decree as authority that can be exercised by schools in SBM, was a 
practice that was already established. Without appropriate regulations at the 
district level, secondary schools were neither supported nor given flexibility. 
Mostly, schools practices had not changed with the introduction of the SBM.  
The decree did not differentiate between community involvements at the 
district from the school level. This made it possible for old practices to continue. 
Hence, Education Council and the School Committees’ members were hand-
picked and shoulder-tapped, based on bureaucrat preferences. Further, at school 
level, the committees’ roles were mainly to legitimize principals’ policies, 
particularly relating to school fees and budget.  
In short, a ‘new centralism’ was seen to be practised by the district 
government. At the school level the principal’s role become much more 
significant. School Based Management, while fulfilling the regulatory 
requirements, remains superficial in its impact and has failed to fulfil its original 
intention of improving the quality of Indonesian education. 
The study proposes a number of recommendations for SBM at the 
Indonesian secondary school level. First, the changing nature of regional 
xi 
 autonomy in Indonesia makes stipulating a new regulation for SBM at district 
level sensible. The local regulation should use clear statements, acknowledge 
diversity, differentiate between governance and management, and recognize 
community involvement. Second, improving institutional capacity at district and 
school levels is also necessary and urgent. Enhancing stakeholders’ 
understanding about SBM issues can take various forms. Third, establishing 
formula funding that is stipulated in the district budget will make previous 
practices by the school committee unnecessary. Finally, on-going support to 
schools in terms of SBM, from district and national government is needed and 
should be programmed to make the policy work and succeed. The study ends 
with suggestion for further research 
xii 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Aim of the study 
This thesis is about the implementation of an official decentralisation policy 
in education called school based management (SBM), popularly known in 
Indonesia as manajemen berbasis sekolah (MBS). The location of the study is 
Mataram municipality, a capital district of West Nusa Tenggara province in 
Indonesia.  The study critically analysed the regulation that established the SBM 
policy and examined stakeholders’ perceptions and responses to the policy at 
district and public secondary school levels. In particular, the study sought to 
identify and evaluate constraints and the adequacy of resources related to policy 
implementation, in order to inform policy makers at regional level about school 
governance issues. The study is important because since 2001, authority in 
education had been transferred to the district level, based on Law 22/1999 (later 
reviewed by Law 32/2004).  
In the following sections, I discuss the background to the study, outline the 
research questions, and provide an overview of the organisation of the thesis.  
1.2 Background of the study 
Indonesia’s schooling system was introduced by the Dutch as the colonial 
power and was managed in a centralised and bureaucratic manner. Three years of 
Japanese occupation during the World War II also maintained a centralised 
system. It is easy to understand how, from a colonial viewpoint, central control 
was necessary and advantageous. However, even after Indonesia’s independence 
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in 1945, right up to 2000, a centralized system of administration continued to be 
relied upon to manage the public education sector. 
The Asian financial crisis which started in June 1997 had a different 
impact in Indonesia, compared to other Asian countries. University students 
demonstrated around the country and public pressure led to the replacement of 
President Suharto, who had been in power for 32 years, in May 1998. It was form 
this point that the reform era in Indonesian politics begun.  
Within a year, the Indonesian parliament passed two new laws relating to 
regional autonomy: Law 22/1999 which involved devolution of political authority, 
and law 25/1999 which was about fiscal balance. Aspinall and Fealy (2003, p. 3) 
observed that these developments produced “one of the most radical 
decentralisation programs attempted anywhere in the world”. This is because 
within two years, significant authority was to be devolved to more than 360 district 
governments from the previously highly centralised control from the capital, 
Jakarta.  The introduction of new regulations regarding local government 
autonomy, which became effective in January 2001, also meant that policy 
decisions in the education sector (i.e., K-12) could now largely be made by the 
government at the district (Indonesian: kabupaten/kota) levels.   
Five months after Suharto stepped down, the World Bank released a report 
entitled Education in Indonesia: from crisis to recovery. It noted that the state of 
Indonesia’s education system was very poor, reflected in indicators such as a high 
drop out rate, a low school participation rate, and low student achievement. One of 
the suggestions in the report was to improve education through a decentralisation 
policy. As a consequence, the National Development Planning Agency of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Bappenas) together with Ministry of National Education 
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(MoNE), with funding by the World Bank, established several task forces to find 
ways to improve Indonesia’s education (Jalal & Musthafa, 2001).  
In July 2000, at a national seminar on education reform in the context of 
regional autonomy, the reports of these task forces were tabled, several ideas about 
educational change were highlighted (Kompas, 2000a). In particular, ideas about 
school governance at primary and secondary level, popularized as school based 
management (SBM), became a popular topic at the seminar. The proponents of 
SBM argued that to improve education during the autonomy era, Indonesia must 
adopt democratic, transparent, efficient by its citizens, and this could be achieved 
by adopting SBM as the model for administering schools. At the fourth 
Convention on Education at the national level, held in Jakarta in September 2000, 
SBM was further promoted and it became the sole choice for restructuring 
Indonesian schools. It was believed that SBM would improve the quality of 
education (Kompas, 2000f). Newspaper articles about SBM became widespread 
and school stakeholders such as teachers, parents, and community members hoped 
for an early implementation of the approach. 
The official move to SBM for Indonesian schools was not seen, however, 
until after the release of a Minister of National Education decree number 
044/U/2002, in April 2002, concerning school committees and education councils. 
The decree stated that each school had to establish a School Committee (SC), 
which is the Indonesian name for site council, consisting of the principal, 
representatives of parents, community members, and students as well as teachers. 
The decree also stipulated the various roles of the committee in its governing 
function. At the district level, an Educational Council (EC) had to be established 
with members and roles which were quite similar to a school committee, as stated 
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in the decree. The decree was also strengthened by legislation related to the new 
national education system (Law No. 20 of 2003), which was passed by the 
parliament in June 2003.   
These education reforms were being introduced while I was teaching at a 
state secondary school in rural Indonesia. Like many other Indonesian teachers, I 
felt the idea of SBM seemed appropriate to the realities of our situation. My initial 
response to the new educational decrees was one of excitement. As a teacher I was 
interested in the changes that were proposed.  In particular, I was interested in the 
shift of power from central government to district and then to school level 
jurisdictions. What was actually proposed? What was the rationale? What were the 
envisaged implications for schools? To what extent were districts and schools 
clear about the reforms and their implications? These and many more questions 
were asked by teachers such as myself. The questions, represented the 
considerable interest of the teachers and educators in Indonesia. In the relevance of 
the reforms, as a teacher, the SBM seemed to offer certain promises and 
possibilities, including that of improving educational quality. My interest in this 
reform agenda and subsequently this study, was to investigate the extent to which 
these promises were achieved. 
1.3 Research questions 
This study investigates the policy that relates to school based management 
and its practices as they operate in Indonesian state secondary schools. The study 
is intended to reveal the constraints and opportunities arising from the introduction 
of the SBM to the Indonesia education system particularly with reference to school 
governance at secondary school. The research questions of this study are:  
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Related to relevant regulations and issues at the national level 
1.  Are the policy regulations related to the SBM in Indonesia reliable and 
applicable? 
2. What is Indonesia’s model of SBM: its characteristics, goals and the 
reasons given by the central office for the adoption of the model? 
Related to SBM implementation at district level 
3. In what ways do district level stakeholders respond to education 
decentralisation, particularly to the SBM policy? 
4. What relationships developed between stakeholders in relation to the 
newly created education board, and what tensions, if any, arose? 
Related to the realities at state secondary school level 
5. To what extent do principals, teachers and school committee members 
understand SBM and what is their attitude to it? 
6.  To what extent do school committees play a role in school governance? 
7. What are the current constraints limiting successful implementation of the 
SBM at the school level? 
1.4 Significance of the study 
The value of the study is in its contribution to greater understanding of 
Indonesia’s education during the autonomy era. As well, the study will increase 
our knowledge about the early stages of implementation of SBM in a developing 
country. The study is of value to administrators, principals, teachers and parents 
who are concerned with the introduction and operation of SBM in Indonesia. More 
broadly, the study adds to the global discussion on decentralisation, education 
reform and SBM. 
1.5 Limitation 
A general limitation that may be associated with research of this kind is in 
relation to generalisability of its findings. That is, the particular nature of 
educational decentralisation and SBM in Indonesia probably cannot be generalised 
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to other countries’ contexts. Another limitation is that the nature of Indonesia’s 
educational decentralisation and SBM, particularly in Mataram, may reflect 
political considerations more than or equal to representative sampling, even of the 
local jurisdiction in Indonesian. 
1.6 Key terminology  
Some key terminologies used extensively in this thesis include: 
• School Base Management:  a model of administering schools in a public 
school system where there is significant devolution of authority, at least in 
personnel, budget and curriculum. 
• Regional autonomy: based on Law 22/1999, from 1 January 2001 district 
governments across Indonesia were given authority to manage public sectors 
from the previously centralised regime. 
• Education Council: a council at the district level, with particular roles and 
functions as stipulated in the MoNE decree, allowing for community 
involvement.   
• School Committee: The Indonesian name for the committee at the school level, 
replacing the BP3, will roles and functions quite similar to the council.  
 
1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
Subsequent chapters cover: (2) the Indonesian education context, (3) 
literature review, (4) methodology, (5-7) data analysis and interpretation, and (8) 
general discussion, conclusions and implications.  
Chapter 2 reviews schooling in Indonesia from the colonial era to current 
developments during the reform era, and explores historical and political factors 
that affected education. Chapter 3 discusses the international literature on 
educational decentralisation, particularly on school based management, to provide  
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some general theoretical framework to guide the research process. Chapter 4 
covers the research orientation, the data collection and analysis procedures used in 
this study.  
Chapters 5-7 analyse and interpret the data. Chapter 5 focuses on document 
analysis about school based management policy, particularly the MoNE decree 
number 044/U/2002 regarding educational council and school committee. The 
analysis examines the origin of the decree, its contents and appendices and related 
official documents. Chapter 6 examines stakeholders at the district level, and 
documents their understandings, attitudes and opinions about school based 
management; and the Education Council. Chapter 7 discussed the experiences of 
school based management at the school level, including the knowledge and beliefs, 
attitudes and opinions of the principals, teachers and school committee members in 
Mataram public secondary schools. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the major findings analysed in chapters 4-6 
and then discusses them in relation to the school governance reform agenda in 
Indonesian state secondary schools. The chapter concludes with recommendations 
for developing school based management at the national, district, and school 
levels, and also for future researchers.  
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Chapter 2 
INDONESIA’S EDUCATION:  
THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the historical and political developments of 
education in Indonesia from the colonial era to the present day, including the 
policies and practices of the past which were adapted by past regimes, and the 
latest developments in school governance.   
Education, as part of the public sector, cannot be separated from the state 
system and therefore the political culture will determine not only the process of 
policy development but also the content of policies in education (Wirt, Mitchell 
& Marshall, 1985). In the case of Indonesia, as will be shown, political power 
determines nearly everything in education. Before reviewing the practices that 
shaped the Indonesian education system from the time of Dutch rule, I will 
provide some basic facts about the country. 
2.2 Indonesia: basic facts 
  Indonesia is a new country in the Southeast Asia region which gained its 
independence in 1945.  It had a long history of colonization by the Dutch, 
starting in the Maluku islands in the seventeenth century, then gradually moving 
to other islands, and finally to Aceh which was completely occupied only in the 
early 20th century (Ricklefs, 2001). During World War II, the Japanese occupied 
the East Indies, which was the name given by the Dutch, and held the territory 
for three years from 1942. After independence, the history of Indonesia can be 
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divided into three periods, the Old Order under the leadership of Soekarno 
(1945-1965), the New Order when Soeharto was the president (1966-1998) and 
the Reform Era (from 1998 to the present day). 
Nowadays, Indonesia is important within the region in terms of size, 
strategic location and natural resources. It is the world’s fourth most populous 
country (230 million people in 2004) and the third largest democracy whose 
people can speak one national language, Bahasa Indonesia (a modified form of 
Malay). Most Indonesian people are Muslims (88%) but there are also other 
religions, such as Christianity (5%), Catholic (3%), Hinduism (2%), Buddhism 
(1%) and others (1%). The majority of Indonesian people live in Java (64%) 
where there are two major ethnic groups: the Javanese (over 70 million people) 
who live mainly in Central and East Java, and the Sundanese (more than 40 
million) who live in West Java (Clark et al., 1998). However, there are also more 
than 580 other ethnic groups within the nation who speak local languages and 
exhibit a diverse range of cultures. The members of these groups range from 
several hundreds to millions. 
Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago with more than 17,500 
islands bridging two continents, Asia and Australia. The geographical location of 
Indonesia is on the equator extending from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean and 
with a length of 5,110 kilometres (3,997 miles). The total area of Indonesia is 
nearly 2 million square kilometres, 81% of it is sea and the rest land. It has a 
diverse geography, ranging from swamp, tropical rain forest, to high mountain 
tops covered with ice. For the purposes of administration, Indonesia is divided 
into 33 provinces and more than 400 districts. 
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The tropical climate and active volcanoes have made Indonesian soil 
fertile, making it easy for plants to grow. Indonesia also has mineral resources 
such as oil, natural gas, gold, and copper, which provide offer economic 
opportunity. However, most Indonesians are poor. The GDP per capita in 2003 
was $ 940 a year and nearly 40 million of the workforce is underemployed or 
unemployed. 
The Indonesian education system is based on 6-3-3-4 school years. In 
other words, there are six years of primary, three years of junior secondary, three 
years of senior secondary and four years of college education. There is an 
Islamic schooling system, secular schooling and out-of-school education (Figure 
2.1 shows the structure). More than 40 million students are enrolled in school, 
61% percent of them in primary schools, 18% in junior secondary, 11% in senior   
secondary, and 6% in tertiary education (Purwadi & Muljoatmodjo, 2000: p. 50).  
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  Figure 2.1. Indonesian Education System 
       Note: paths indicated by         are not prerequisites for 
      access to a higher level of education. 
     (source: Purwadi and Muljoatmodjo, 2000: p. 89) 
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2.3 Indonesia’s education: historical perspective  
Looking at Indonesia’s education from an historical perspective helps to 
explain some enduring features. Some issues, problems and weaknesses from the 
past still survive and their lasting nature makes them difficult to solve. The 
reasons are not always educational, but have their origins in political struggles. 
This background will provide a context and reasons for the complexities of 
educational policy. 
2.3.1 Education in the Dutch colonial period (c 1840s – 1942) 
According to Clark et al. (1998), prior to colonisation there was no 
formal schooling in Indonesia. Indonesian families and communities educated 
their young mainly through informal apprenticeships. There was also some 
informal education based on several religions for the purpose of spreading the 
beliefs of Hinduism, Buddhism and then Islam through the pesantren (Islamic 
boarding school). Christianity arrived mainly with colonial missionaries (Jalal & 
Musthafa, 2001). Then the Dutch colonial government established formal 
schools for European and Eurasian (European-Indonesian heritage) children and 
descendants of local chiefs and princes (Clark et al., 1998).  
Formal education for the masses started in 1848 when the Dutch colonial 
government realised that to maximise the harvesting of Indonesia natural 
resources it would be cheaper to employ educated native people rather than 
Dutch workers (Lee, 1995). Therefore from that time, enrolment numbers rose 
and formal schooling became more widespread. In 1901, this educational 
development was strengthened by what was called the ethical policy (ethische 
politiek) developed by the Netherlands government (van der Veur, 1969; Lee, 
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1995). The policy stated that the Dutch colonial government had a responsibility 
to improve the social and economic situation of the indigenous population. 
According to Lee (1995) the main reason for this policy was to counter a Pan-
Islamic movement which was, at the time, gaining ground. Fearing this 
development the Dutch colonial government, needed to (Lee, 1995, p. 5):  
…create a new Indonesian elite, Dutch educated and secular in 
outlook, whose leadership would help lead to a close cultural 
understanding of the two nations. 
The effect of this policy meant that the number of local people who participated 
in education rose astronomically (Clark et al., 1998; van der Veur, 1969) and the 
school system became more complicated (Djajadiningrat, n.d.).  
Colonial regimes design education systems according to the needs of the 
rulers, and not necessarily to meet the needs of the colonised, and the situation 
was no different here. The content of formal schooling was organised by the 
Dutch for purposes of control, with the colonial government administering 
education in a centralised and bureaucratic manner in line with colonial 
purposes. 
Djajadiningrat (n.d.) states that two kinds of school systems were 
developed: oriental education and occidental education. Oriental education was 
mainly for native people most of them would spend three years in a village 
primary school funded by native princes, and the local language would be the 
language of instruction. Only students who came from noble families stayed for 
two more years of primary schooling. The occidental education system ranged 
from schools for the descendants of Europeans to schools for an “eastern 
foreigners” group (some Arabs and Indians but mostly Chinese) and in them the 
Dutch language was used for teaching. Later, native people who came from 
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advantaged backgrounds could enrol in an occidental primary school. The 
different education systems reflected the colonial government’s discriminatory 
policy, which placed European groups at the top, eastern foreigners in the middle 
and native Indonesians at the bottom of the structure of colonial society. In 
addition Clark et al., (1998) found that as the levels of education became higher, 
the number of native people who participated became smaller. 
The secondary school in the oriental education sector ended after three 
years of lower secondary schooling in the MULO (Meet Uitgebreid Lager 
Onderwijs), while the occidental education system continued to a higher level. 
There were two types of secondary education: a general secondary school and a 
vocational secondary school. In all these schools the language for teaching and 
communication was Dutch. According to Djajadiningrat (n.d.) general secondary 
schooling existed in three forms: Lyceum, HBS and AMS.  The Lyceum was a 
six year general secondary school exclusively for European students, and its 
curriculum prepared graduates for higher education. The HBS (Hogere 
Burgelijjke School or Citizens High School) was similar to the Lyceum but all 
groups of students could enrol. The AMS (Algemene Middlebare School or 
General Secondary School) provided three years of study for students who 
passed a lower secondary school, such as from the MULO, which all groups of 
students could enter. All general secondary school graduates could continue to 
higher education, particularly in the Netherlands, and there they could become 
lawyers, doctors or engineers. For students who took vocational secondary 
schools there were several types available. These trained students to become 
government officials, primary school teachers and agricultural workers.  
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In 1912 Muhammadiyah, originally a social Islamic organisation, started 
offering education outside the colonial system. In 1922, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro 
established a network of schools called Taman Siswa (garden of pupils). Both the 
Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah developed modern educational methods as an 
alternative system for the indigenous people. They supplied primary and 
secondary schooling and teacher training (Jalal & Musthafa, 2001). The 
curriculum content of these schools was drawn from both European schools and 
Indonesian culture. 
One of the results of the Dutch formal education system was the 
emergence of indigenous political leaders who developed ideas about 
independence which went beyond what the Dutch intended. The idea of 
Indonesia as a unified country leading to nationhood became inevitable. In 1928 
the representatives of almost every ethnic group gathered for the first conference 
of Indonesian Youth, and this became a milestone in the development of 
nationalism. The motto “one country, one people, one language” became widely 
accepted (Clark et al., 1998).  
2.3.2 Education under Japanese Occupation (1942-1945) 
In March 1942, in the middle of World War II, Japanese military forces 
invaded Indonesia and rapidly occupied the entire Dutch colonial territory, 
replacing the Dutch as the colonial government until the end of the war in 
August 1945. The ending of the war brought hope to the Indonesian people that 
independence might now be achieved (Jalal & Musthafa, 2001).  
During the Japanese occupation, the elitist and complicated Dutch 
colonial education system was abolished. The Japanese established a 
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standardized school system: six years primary, three years lower secondary and 
three years upper secondary (Lee, 1995). All children could enrol without 
discrimination by race or family background. The Japanese also introduced 
different kinds of lower secondary schools consisting of academic, vocational 
and technical schools. The three year upper secondary schools were quite similar 
to the Dutch system, but the Japanese introduced Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian 
language) at all levels of education as the language of instruction. However,  the 
Japanese language was also a required subject. Indonesian also became the 
official language of the administration. Although Bahasa Indonesia had been 
declared in the youth pledge as the unofficial national language in 1928, it was 
Japanese rule which introduced a communal language which changed the nature 
of Indonesian education (Lee, 1995;  Jalal & Musthafa, 2001) 
There were similarities between both the Dutch and the Japanese 
education systems in terms of a centralised administration and the aims of formal 
education. To assist their occupation, the Japanese established top-down control 
from a central office in Jakarta. All people involved in the education system had 
to be trained in what was called Kemakmuran Bersama Asia Timur Raya 
(Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere), intended to promote Japan’s interests 
during World War II (Poerbakawatja, 1970). As a result, students at all levels of 
education were trained in physical and military skills. Moreover, school 
activities involved largely indoctrination rather than academic subject matter, 
and freedom of speech and thinking were forbidden (Poerbakawatja, 1970; Lee, 
1995). 
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2.3.3 Education under the Old Order (1945-1965) 
Indonesia as an independent nation-state was created on 17 August 1945 
and proclaimed by Soekarno and Hatta, both Dutch educated, and elected as 
president and vice-president of Indonesia respectively. Soekarno governed the 
new republic for a twenty year period, and this has been named the Old Order. 
However, the Dutch government tried to reclaim Indonesia as its colony after the 
departure of the Japanese. This led to confrontation with the Dutch and to four 
years of sporadic warfare called the Indonesian Revolution, which was fought to 
defend the new republic (Ricklefs, 2001). 
From the beginning of its independence, Indonesia’s national leaders 
understood the importance of education to maintain and strengthen the unity of 
the new nation-state. Shortly after independence was proclaimed, Dewantoro as 
education minister revoked all the regulations established by the Japanese and 
drew up guidelines which consisted mostly of provisions with a political rather 
than an education purpose (Lee, 1995). However during the Revolution some 
parts of Indonesia remained under Dutch control and there the schools, following 
the previous colonial education system, were opened as a sign of Dutch 
sovereignty. In other parts of the country, where the new republic ruled, 
schooling was supported by the community and individuals who could read and 
write volunteered as teachers (Poerbakawatja, 1970; Clark et. al., 1998).  
However during the revolution, many school age students preferred to join the 
fighting (Poerbakawatja, 1970; Lee, 1995). 
In 1950 the Indonesian government drew up the first education law, Law 
4/1950. Under it, the state ideology, Pancasila, became the fundamental basis of 
Indonesian education (article 4). Pancasila consisted of five principles: Believe 
 
 
18
in one and only one God; A just and civilized humanity; The unity of Indonesia; 
Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and 
Social justice for all Indonesian people. Bahasa Indonesia became the language 
of instruction (article 5). The law also incorporated egalitarian principles such as 
a compulsory primary school system funded by the state. The school system was 
similar to the Japanese system in that it was standardized and governed from the 
centre by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) in Jakarta 
(Poerbakawatja, 1970; Lee, 1995). However the law did not regulate Islamic 
schools, which were already established and which also provided schooling from 
primary to secondary levels. Most of the curriculum content of the Islamic 
schools which were controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was similar 
to that of the secular schools.  
In the 1950s, with signs of peace, there was a marked development of 
formal education and a substantial rise in school enrolments. The primary school 
population rose to 11 million students (Jalal & Musthafa, 2001) whereas in both 
previous colonial eras (Dutch and Japanese) only about 2.5 million students 
participated (Poerbakawatja, 1970). To administer the increasing number of 
students and because of criticism that education was too centralized, the 
government drew up a decentralisation plan with a Peraturan Pemerintah 
(Government Regulation) or PP 65/1951. This stated that primary schooling was 
to be devolved to provincial governments. The Ministry of Home Affairs was to 
supply men, money and materials (3M) and the MoEC was to supply technical 
guidance for the curriculum, textbooks, teaching methods, assessment and school 
supervision (Lee, 1995, p. 78). Later, the administration of junior and senior 
secondary schools was transferred to the MoEC provincial office (Kantor 
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Wilayah). The conduct of schooling then involved three ministries, the MoHA 
(primary schools), the MoEC (junior and senior secondary schools) and the 
MoRA (Islamic schools). 
The teacher’s union or PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, 
Teachers Association of the Republic of Indonesia) opposed the devolution of 
the regulations to the provincial level and demanded that responsibility be 
returned to the MoEC. The reason, according to Lee (1995, p. 78), was because 
the provincial governments 
...were staffed by officials with little teaching experience or 
appreciation of educational matters, and might not therefore 
understand the real needs of school and the teacher. 
Insufficient funds for school operational costs, and the salary delays later 
experienced by the teachers, provided a demonstration of the neglect and 
incompetence of local staff (Lee, 1995). 
The rapid development of education needed to be funded but the new 
republic did not have sufficient funds. One solution was to depend on 
community support and require parents to pay a school tuition fee. The MoEC 
released a decree number 58438/Kab concerning Panitia Pembantu 
Pemeliharaan Sekolah (committee for school maintenance and assistance) to 
make that article 28 in Law 4/1950 which stipulated community support to the 
school, to be more operational and detailed (Poerbakawatja, 1970). Later, the 
name of this new committee was changed to one which matched that of parent-
teacher-organisations in the United States. Translated into Indonesian it became 
Persatuan Orang Tua Murid dan Guru (POMG). The decree stated that the 
POMG was the only body which could collect money from parents. Principals 
and teachers were not to become officially involved.  However, Poerbakawatja 
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(1970) states that the intention not to involve the principal was difficult to 
maintain, and the POMG became the principals’ instrument. In addition, in order 
to make the work of the POMG easier,  the role of principals was widened and 
the principal became the person who in practice collected money from parents. 
This sometimes occurred regardless of parents’ economic background 
(Poerbakawatja, 1970).  Reports show that money gathered from parents by the 
POMG was “paying a major share of the upkeep of schools including the 
allowance of teachers” (Lee, 1995, p.  171). 
The first general election in 1955 resulted in a parliament which engaged 
in a constitutional dispute which led to a crisis in 1957. Backed by the military, 
President Soekarno released a decree to abolish parliament in July 1959 and 
restored the old constitution (Ricklefs, 2001). A month later the president  
declared Manipol or Manifesto Politik (Political Manifesto) which called for: 
revival of the spirit of the Revolution, for social justice and for 
‘retooling’ of the institutions and organisations of the nation in the 
name of ongoing revolution.  
Feith (1963) writes that the impact of Manipol was felt across Indonesia 
and especially affected civil servants including teachers. Indoctrination became 
the major ‘retooling’ programme supported by the army. The performance of 
state employees was assessed by their wearing a uniform, taking part in a flag 
ceremony, and following their superiors without objection. 
The ‘retooling’ program systematically changed the direction of 
education to political purposes and restricted freedom of thinking (Tilaar, 2000). 
The policy was managed by Prijono, the education minister, and this led to 
demoralization within the administration of the MoEC (Lee, 1995).  One of the 
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legacies from the Old Order era, still practised today is the flag raising 
ceremony. Jazadi (2003, p. 36-37) describes the ceremony: 
This takes place for about an hour or so in the morning (lesson hours 
1 and 2), every Monday, at the beginning of the working week The 
ceremony takes place in the school yard (all schools –the public ones 
certainly have- are supposed to have one) where students, teachers, 
principal and all other staff will gather in a military fashion. The 
principal or an appointed teacher is the inspector of ceremony who 
addresses the audience and leads the moment of silence to pray for 
the national heroes. Classes are appointed in turn to be ceremony 
executives, consisting of one ceremony commander, class or year 
leaders, readers of the nation’s text (the “1945 Basic Constitution”, 
the “1928 Youth Pledge” and “Pancasila”, the State Ideology). The 
last two are followed by all participants in chorus. Then a song leader 
leads the singing of the national anthem and one or two national 
struggle songs, as well as song dedicated to teachers called “Teacher 
Hymn”. Finally, a prayer reader prays for God’s blessing for all the 
audience and the nation. The ceremony is made so sacred that, most 
particularly during the singing of the national anthem and when flag 
is raised, everyone has to focus on the flag and salute it. Anyone who 
comes late or accidentally passes by has to stop and join the 
ceremony. Failing to do so may be considered ideologically 
subversive and so endangers the perpetrator. 
Another event of this time was the continuous conflict with the Dutch 
over West Papua. The Dutch lecturers and teachers who had stayed on after 
independence were sent back home. The availability of international aid, mostly 
from the US, allowed many Indonesian students to study overseas. When they 
returned they become the powerful architects of Indonesia’s future.  
2.3.4 Education under the New Order (1966-1998) 
A failed coup by the Communist Party led to a Javanese army general 
gaining power. General Soeharto become president in 1966 and ruled for 32 
years. This period has come to be called the New Order. The new government 
inherited conditions of turmoil such as triple digit inflation, political instability 
and even the likelihood of civil war. To heal the nation, the New Order 
government produced a five year development plan called Repelita (rencana 
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pembangunan lima tahun or five years development plans). Repelita was 
managed by a number of economists, planners and engineers who were US 
educated and “who have emphasized rationality (e.g. in trade and monetary 
policy), efficiency and economic development (growth)” (Nielsen, 2003, p. 404) 
as a way of achieving economic stability. Supported by foreign loans and 
investment from Western countries, and following the 1973 oil boom, 
Indonesia’s economic development grew rapidly.  From the beginning of the 
implementation of the Repelita in the late 1960s until the late 1980s, Indonesia’s 
economic growth was at the rate of approximately 8% per year (Jalal & 
Musthopa, 2001).    
However, maintaining political stability to assure economic growth 
meant that the government had to rely on security measures in many situations. 
The emphasis on security was controlled centrally from Jakarta by the military 
and the bureaucracy and affected every state agency at all levels of government. 
The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) adopted a special policy called dwi fungsi 
(dual functions). This meant that the role of the armed forces extended beyond 
defence to development. In practice, military personnel were appointed to 
civilian positions at all levels of government and parliament. Active military men 
became ministers, governors, directors-general in every ministry, and chief 
executives of state-owned companies and heads of district governments. Having 
civilian positions made it easy for the military to maintain stability in civil 
agencies. The state bureaucracy, consisting of civil servants, became part of the 
political machinery rather than rendering service to the community. In general 
elections state employees were expected to be loyal to the ruling party, which 
was Golkar, which had to win at all cost.  
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This kind of situation produced a “bureaucratic authoritarian state” 
(Nielsen, 2003) and the only choice for government was heavy intervention. 
Countries such as Indonesia, experiencing late industrialization, often adopt this 
kind of government in order to maintain stability. The national education system 
suffered once more and the change from the Old Order was that as a tool of 
control it was used in a more sophisticated way. Nielsen (2003, p. 407-408) 
concludes that during the New Order the main characteristics in Indonesian 
education were: 
• an emphasis on rapid growth and quantitative expansion as indicators 
of quality improvement; 
• excessive power and control at the central office level; 
• a slant towards national security issues and unquestioning loyalty  to 
the state ideology 
• excessive reliance on external resources (funds, technology and 
expertise); and 
• the promotion of interagency fragmentation and competition 
As a result, the poor performance of education was widespread, and 
appeared at every level. There are several issues based on Nielsen’s first three 
points which I would like to discuss particularly with reference to state 
secondary schools. 
Emphasis on rapid growth and quantitative expansion 
During the three decades of the New Order, the financial position 
changed. The availability of money from exporting oil and gas made it possible 
to build thousands of schools. Duflo (2004) notes that during 1974-1978 more 
than 61 thousand primary schools were built based on the Inpres policy 
(instruksi presiden, presidential instruction) which stated that there should be one 
primary school in every village. According to Leigh (1999) expenditure on these 
primary schools alone drained one third of the Inpres budget. As a result primary 
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schooling enrolments rose by 37% (to become 95%) in the 25 year period from 
1969. Participation rates in higher schooling also rose significantly to 58% for 
junior secondary schooling and 35% for secondary school (Purwadi & 
Muljoatmodjo, 2000).   
School expansion was followed by the recruitment of new teachers at all 
levels of schooling. They were appointed as government employees. By the 
1990s the total number of teachers reached nearly 2 million. There was 
continuing success in terms of quantitative improvement relating to teachers. 
Nielsen (2003, p. 404) reports indicators such as: “the numbers of years of pre-
service training, the number of teachers upgraded, the numbers of teacher study 
groups formed”. At the secondary school level, teacher professional 
development, a policy initiative by central government formed what was called 
the Pemantapan Kerja Guru (PKG, or strengthening the work of teachers). Thair 
and Treagust (2003: p 202) write that:  
by any measure, the PKG project was an extremely ambitious 
undertaking, establishing an extensive network of teachers-trainers 
and overcoming the logistical obstacles associated with operating in a 
developing country so geographically and culturally diverse 
However, this rapid growth and quantitative expansion was not 
necessarily relevant to quality. What was called a school, according to Leigh, 
(1999, p. 38) was “basically a cement floor with brick wall, shuttered windows 
and a tiled roof”, and classrooms condition “tend to be very basic, with old 
furniture, drab walls, little lighting, poor air circulation and only minimal 
resources” (White, 1997, p. 91). More than half of the school buildings erected 
by the Inpres programme were poorly constructed and after twenty years were 
damaged and nearly half had even collapsed (Kompas, 2004).  
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In addition to teacher quality, other problems which arose were the 
relevance of teachers’ academic background to the subjects they taught, uneven 
distribution between urban and rural area, and inadequate salaries. Many projects 
dedicated to enhancing teachers’ quality did not work because they were 
irrelevant to the need, tutors were inadequately and inappropriately trained, and 
under-funding made the effort unsustainable (Nielsen, 2003; Thair and Treagust, 
2003). 
Another problematic arose with the school final examination (years 6, 9 
and 12). According to Umar (2004), before 1969 these school examinations were 
conducted centrally in a strict manner and with high standards which resulted in 
few students passing. The US-trained educational bureaucrats changed this 
system. They introduced a final examination in which decisions about which 
students should pass was handed over to the school. It was argued that only the 
teachers knew the quality of their students’ performance. The immediate result of 
this policy was that the percentage of students who passed rose to nearly 100% 
in every school. This occurred in every part of the country because teachers and 
principals used the opportunity, but they were also pressed by their superiors in 
the district and provincial education office to follow an “unwritten policy” which 
was to pass any students regardless of their academic achievement (Bintoro, 
2004, personal communication). To illustrate, at secondary level, studies by 
Tilaar (1992) and Suryadi (1998) showed that, except for civics and Indonesian 
subjects, students’ results were far below standard, which was 6 for a range of 0 
to 10. However, regardless of these poor results, nationally an average of 98% of 
secondary school students passed the exam, and in some provinces the pass rate 
even reached 100%. This was the practice followed for 30 years in order to 
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demonstrate that the education system had succeeded in terms of quantitative 
achievements. In fact it has had a bad impact on Indonesia’s younger generation 
who, according to Tilaar (1992, p.140), have been mis-educated by the system. 
Excessive Bureaucratic Centralization 
Schooling is a significant part of the public sector managed by the state in 
most countries.  Smith (2003) writes that in Third World countries bureaucracy 
is the most powerful institution and even represents the power itself. In the fifty 
years of Indonesian independence, the bureaucratic environment has become the 
main inhibitor of Indonesian education (Lee, 1995; Beeby 1979). Nielsen (2003, 
p. 403) claims that during the New Order bureaucratic pressure to achieve 
quantitative goals: 
begins in Jakarta at offices of the Directors General and other civil 
servants but is not limited to the central bureaucracy. In fact, the 
environmental press of the bureaucracy radiates to all levels of public 
institutions –regional and local educational offices, institutions of 
higher education, and even the school and classroom. It affects the 
way supervisors oversee schools, lecturers organize instruction, and 
the teachers conduct their lesson. It characterizes the culture of the 
educational system from top to bottom.  
 The idea of centralised administration, as a legacy from the colonial era, 
is taken for granted. Centralised administration was relevant for the colonial 
government to maintain the status quo and establish maximum control over all 
education practices throughout the country. What subsequently happened, 
however, was that from the 1970s the New Order government practised 
bureaucratic-centralistic administration in education which proved even more 
restrictive than the previous practices (Beeby, 1979; Darmaningtyas, 1999a).  
The Ministry of Education and Culture has taken control over all matters, 
including detailed decisions regarding education. Appointing principals and 
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teachers, managing in-service training for teachers, establishing curriculum, 
students’ textbooks, budget allocation for every school, to name a few examples, 
are all administered and decided by the ministry office in Jakarta. Nielsen (2003, 
p. 405) argues that “this ‘one size fits all’ mentality caters to bureaucratic 
efficiency and central control, but leads to many serious misfits at the local 
level”.1  
 Centralised administration has a direct impact on the curriculum. 
According to Umar (2004) another effect of the influence of the returning US-
educated bureaucrats was that the new curriculum produced in 1968 had a 
detailed and rigid structure.  The 1968 school curriculum documents were 
modified three times during the New Order era, in 1975, 1984 and 1994. The 
curriculum for all schools in Indonesia stipulates frameworks and syllabuses in 
all subjects. The excessive bureaucratic centralization is shown in the compiling 
and content of the curriculum documents.  
 Jazadi (2003, p. 40) claims that in the construction of the curriculum, 
there was no representation and involvement of stakeholders and no consultation 
with interest groups. The process was regarded as central office business, to be 
managed by the Centre for Curriculum Development MoEC in Jakarta, and 
conducted in a superficial bureaucratic manner which in fact was exploitative. 
An academic, Darjowidjojo (in Jazadi, 2003, p. 40) writes of his experience 
when appointed by the central office as a curriculum reviewer: 
The invitation that I received was for me to become involved in 
preparing teaching materials for the English subject for secondary 
school. It stated that I would stay for five days in Puncak [in West 
                                                 
1 For instance, when I was appointed as a state secondary school teacher in Lombok in 1993 by 
the MoEC office in Jakarta, the school where I worked already had four chemistry teachers, 
whereas the school only needed three. Other state secondary schools in the same district did not 
have a chemistry teacher, though they had asked for one for quite some years. 
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Java, 40 minutes by car from Jakarta, a resort region]. This took place 
in the 1980s. However, on the second night of my participation, all 
team members were asked to gather for a closing ceremony. I was so 
surprised. I thought I had not even started working. How could this 
program be closed? Our honorarium fee was for five days, but the 
work was only two days. From this experience, I had the impression 
that the way we [Indonesian bureaucrats] worked was simply to aim 
to produce something so that it could have a name, so that people 
could refer to something.  
White (1997, p. 88) finds that what is called curriculum in Indonesian 
schools “is more a scope and sequence that lists goals and topics for the 
particular course, with a content outline”. Her impression is correct. Take for 
example the 1984 curriculum which is the most rigid curriculum in Indonesia’s 
education history. The documents cover all subject areas which it is compulsory 
to teach. The GBPP (garis-garis besar program pengajaran, the basic guide 
lines for teaching program) provides the basic guidelines. The GBPP consists of 
ten sections which are “curricular objectives, general instructional objectives, 
topics, sub-topics, levels, semester, teaching methods, resources, evaluation and 
notes” (Kopong, 1995). All these sections were determined by the Centre for 
Curriculum Development, but for teaching purposes the teachers have to make 
satuan pelajaran (unit lessons) as a preparation for instruction in the classroom. 
Kopong found that most teachers never prepared these. Teachers are reluctant to 
make unit lessons as part of their work, because the GBPP is very detailed and 
they only have to follow it.  
Another issue which needs to be addressed is the density of the subject 
and lesson content. It is compulsory for year 10 and 11 secondary school 
students to learn 14 subject matters in 42 lesson hours a week. Drost (Kompas, 
1998) states the lesson hours are the heaviest in the world. He argues that this 
came from the legacy of Dutch colonisation, although nowadays the general 
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trend elsewhere is to lessen study time. For example, the Netherlands has 35 
hours study time a week, while Germany and Australia only have 30 hours a 
week. The result in Indonesia is “a reliance on transferring knowledge rather 
than critical thinking and problem solving” (White, 1997, p.  89). 
 Another impact of the bureaucratic-centralistic approach is that though 
each state school welcomes community participation in education, this is done 
only in terms of free labour and supply of funds which are carefully managed by 
the principal. A study by Cohen (2001) found that community participation is 
based on regulations incorporating the ‘one size fits all’ method regardless of 
school level and size, and the type of community they served within a multi-
diverse Indonesian society. Although the government recognises community 
participation in education, it maintains the right to say how communities can 
participate. 
   A vehicle to accommodate community participation at the school level 
is called BP3 (acronym for Badan Pembantu Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan or 
educational assistance body). The BP3 is another name for an earlier body 
established under the Old Order as the POMG. Based on the MoEC decree 
number 17/O/197 (Satori, 2001), the POMG was abolished and the BP3 has 
responsibility for community participation such as establishing relationships and 
cooperation, representing parents in school activities, and collecting 
subscriptions from parents (Cohen, 2001; Sidi, 2001). The members of the BP3 
are the school principal (as supervisor), teachers’ representative, parents’ 
representative and community members. However, because the principal has 
most power in the school, people who join the BP3 (parents, teachers and 
community members) are selected and appointed by him/her. Then, as Cohen 
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(2001, p. 73) points out, “the role of BP3, in most cases, has become one of 
establishing fees that parents are to pay for their children to participate in 
school”. One of the reasons for this situation is that the normal financing patterns 
given by the government, especially at the secondary school level, are far from 
adequate to cover even basic expenditures such as paper and ink, water, 
electricity, chalk/marker, building maintenance and salaries for non-permanent 
teachers (Clark, et al., 1998; Yonezawa and Muta, 2001).  A study by Supriadi 
(2003) found the interesting fact that money from parents through the BP3 for 
some state secondary schools in large cities could be higher than total funds from 
government in a similar period. Moreover the principal (with some of the 
teachers) controls the school budget of which money from parents forms a 
substantial part, but the school usually doesn’t report the use of these funds, or 
make a transparent financial report to parents. According to Cohen (2001, p. 74) 
this kind of activity “becomes corrupted in actual implementation”. 
Emphasis on national security and loyalty to the state 
 Another ambitious goal during the New Order was nation and character 
building. The emphasis on national security and loyalty to the state was 
addressed in a more systematic and sophisticated way than in any other period in 
Indonesia’s history. According to Jalal and Musthafa (2001, p. 8) this situation 
resulted in “education as an instrument for national economic development by 
way of indoctrination, which resulted in superficial uniformity”. 
 Every student from year 3 to year 12 has to learn a compulsory subject 
for 2 hours each a week called PMP (acronym for Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, 
or Pancasila Moral Education), designed to make a student become  a 
 
 
31
Pancasilais person. The subject aims “to mould the thoughts, attitudes and 
behaviour of the students in accordance with Pancasila (the State Ideology), 
UUD 1945 (the National Basic Constitution), GBHN (State Guidelines)” (Jazadi, 
2003, p. 45). Starting in the late 1970s, the government instructed all government 
agencies such as state schools to conduct a program based on Pancasila as 
upgrading for their employees, and it become a ritual for new teachers and new 
students. The upgrading for newcomers involves at least two weeks of intensive 
induction into how to implement Pancasila in daily life. The induction is a one-
way process and consists of vague ideas drawn from state ideology. For new 
teachers, their probationary period was not assessed on competence in teaching 
and classroom management but on their understanding and attitude toward 
Pancasila (Nielsen, 2003).  
 Darmaningtyas (1999b) argues that this kind of policy contains 
militaristic overtones, where uniformity is required across Indonesia. At the 
secondary school level, public or private, students had to wear a uniform of the 
same design and colour, that is a white (top) and a grey trousers without 
exception. 
 From the government’s point of view all of these things were seen as 
generating order, equality and unity across Indonesia. It also made it easier for 
administrators from the central office to implement order at the school level. In 
return, they had unquestioned power to manage subordinates. Differences were 
considered and dismissed as coming from dissidents and any difficulties, 
particularly associated with government employees, would jeopardise their 
future.   
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2.3.5 Education in the Reform era (1998 – to present) 
 Asia’s financial crisis in 1997 had a disastrous effect on the Indonesian 
economy. In 1998, GDP fell by 12%, economic growth also declined by 15% 
and inflation rose to around 80% (Thomas et. al., 2004: 55-56). This resulted in 
public anger and demonstrations by university students which finally made 
Suharto step down as president. In the post-Suharto, era called the Reform Era, 
Indonesia has had four presidents, B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrachman 
Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004) and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono who won office in 2004.  
During the early years of the Reform Era the state system changed. In 
particular it moved from an emphasis on centralisation to decentralisation. In the 
education sector, as Supriadi (2003) notes, change was greater than any other 
period since Indonesia’s independence. Education was no longer fully controlled 
from Jakarta. The poor performance of students across Indonesia brought an 
awareness that the central control of schools should be kept to a minimum. It was 
this situation which led to seeking a better model for the management of schools, 
and the movement for school based management (SBM) appeared to offer a 
solution. There were other significant changes, such as giving the mandate for 
the standards for final examinations back to the central office in Jakarta, the 
introduction of a competence based curriculum, and a new education law which 
was  aligned with the provision of the autonomy law. I will discuss each of these 
issues below. 
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The Autonomy Law and it consequences 
According to Surakhmad (2002, p. 6), during Habibie’s administration, 
because of  “deep seated concerns, panic and fear regarding the potential and real 
threat of disintegration that was militantly voiced by several  regions since the 
early 90s” [italics in original] the government, in response to this threat brought 
forward an autonomy law. Without any significant change by parliament from 
the document prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Rasyid, 2003) the 
document provides for regional autonomy (Law 22/1999). Other legislation 
concerning fiscal balance (Law 25/1999) was prepared by the Ministry of 
Finance. Both laws took effect on 1 January 2001, and gave authority and 
funding to district governments to manage public sectors.   
 According to Jalal and Musthofa (2001) this kind of decentralization 
giving power to the district level rather than the provincial level, was a pattern 
under previous legislation during the New Order. The Law 5/1974, for instance, 
sets out the structure of the political administrative system at two levels: 
provincial and district, and also covers its functions and tasks. Another example 
is that in 1995 the government released a regulation, PP 8/1995, concerning 
autonomy in which one district in each province became a model of district 
government. Neither effort worked because the centralisation model established 
by the New Order was so pervasive and there was no legislation which clearly 
stated that central and provincial government had to devolve power to the district 
level.  
 However, Law 22/1999 is more advanced in that it eliminates the 
hierarchical structure from central government to provincial and district level. 
The head of a district has a responsibility only to the local parliament; the 
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provincial government cannot direct the district anymore. Relationships with the 
central government relate to subsidies and supervision. The law is revolutionary 
and the decentralisation is ambitious in comparison with the previous system. 
Hofman and Kaiser (2002) describe the decentralisation phenomena in Indonesia 
as “Big Bang”. District governments will be given authority over public sectors 
such as health, education and culture, agriculture, communication, public works, 
industry, trade, capital investment, environment, land, cooperatives and 
manpower affairs (Jalal & Musthafa, 2001). To implement their authority the 
district governments have two sources. Firstly, there is a subsidy from central 
government which comes in a block grant. This consists of a general subsidy (to 
support the function of the district government) and a special subsidy (given to 
finance certain programmes). Second, the law also permits district governments 
to establish local taxes based on the exploitation of natural resources, trade and 
services to providing internal revenue (Indriyanto, 2003a). The level of internal 
revenue coming from oil, mining, and forest logging determines whether a 
district is rich or poor. The rich districts have more flexibility to fund programs 
in order to service their people.  
 In May 2000 the government issued a further regulation, PP 25/2000, 
(Government of Republic of Indonesia, 2000) based on the autonomy law in 
order to specify more closely the tasks to be delivered to the district level. The 
central government holds authority in the education sector for (PP 25/2000 
article 2 verse 10): 
• setting standards for all age student achievement (i.e., competencies), setting the 
national curriculum and setting national examination/assessment system, as well 
as issuing instructions on these; 
• specifying standards for learning materials; 
• determining requirements for achievement and use of academic titles; 
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• determining a grade/set of standards for educational operational costs; 
• determining requirements for admission, transfer, certification for students from 
all age groups; and 
• organizing and developing higher education, distance education and 
international schools. 
The Provincial Government holds the authority to (article 3 verse 10):  
• determine policy on student selection and acceptance with regards to equity 
issues. That is, policy regarding minority students, students from poor families 
and remote areas;  
• contribute to provision of main study books/educational materials for 
kindergarten, primary, secondary and special education;  
• assist in higher education management, except things related to curriculum, 
accreditation and appointment of academic staff;  
• consider the opening and closure of colleges; and  
• manage "special schools" and training centres, including teacher training 
institutions. 
 
However, Indriyanto (2003a, p. 6) argues that even the decentralization 
already stipulated and practised in the public sector including education, “is not a 
guarantee that there is a clear-cut division of labour between the central 
government and district, and provincial government”. The role of provincial 
governments is to represent the central government, but in practice the law states 
that the district government is an autonomous body and cannot be controlled by 
the provincial government (Madya, 2002).  
The changes are not only about a shift of power, but they “also change 
the whole set of management and organization arrangement in district level” 
(Indriyanto, 2003a, p. 3). According to Surakhmad (2002) the consequences of 
the autonomy law and the regulation PP 25/2000 are that each district has at least 
117 tasks transferred from the central and provincial office. Public service is still 
far from achieving the goal of improving efficiency and effectiveness.  
A study of education services in three districts from three different 
provinces (East Borneo, Yogyakarta and East Java) by Usman (2002) found that 
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autonomy had a different meaning in every district. Where districts had rich 
natural resources, autonomy for the local government meant they had the means 
to implement their plans, but the situation was very different in poor districts.  
Sagala’s (2003) study in two districts in West Java found that an inevitable 
development in the autonomy era is that local government becomes ‘the new 
centre’ with similarities to previous attitudes and practices (i.e. centralistic and 
bureaucratic characteristics) when dealing with the schools. A similar 
phenomena was also found by Soewartoyo (2002; 2003) who conducted study in 
two municipalities in West Nusa Tenggara and North Sulawesi provinces.  
Inadequate numbers of skilled personnel combined with lack of specific 
management skills led education services in the autonomy era to become more 
problematic (World Bank, 2004). As a result, managing education in many 
districts results not in empowering schools but rather imposing top-down 
approaches and unprofessionalism (Sagala, 2003; Usman 2002) 
School Based Management  
According to Jalal and Musthafa (2001), school based management was 
triggered by the World Bank report, Education in Indonesia: from crisis to 
recovery released in 1998. The report highlights the poor performance of 
Indonesian education. One of the suggestions for improvement was to give 
schools more autonomy to manage themselves. Following this, several task 
forces were formed by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) 
and the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and supported by the World 
Bank. The brief for the Task Forces was to find ways to improve Indonesian 
education, and this included a search for a school based management (SBM) 
model for Indonesian schools. Similar efforts were conducted by BPPN 
 
 
37
(acronym for Badan Pertimbangan Pendidikan National or Board of 
Consideration on National Education) and the West Java Education provincial 
office. All of these efforts showed that the idea of SBM was becoming popular 
and this gave a momentum to a change of school governance. 
Several SBM models were implemented in pilot projects. Examples 
include Rintisan-MBS (SBM pioneering implementation) and MPMBS 
(manajemen peningkatan mutu berbasis sekolah or school base quality 
improvement management). In April 2002 the MoNE formulated a regulation 
setting the scene for the SBM model to be adopted by Indonesian schools. This 
regulation (the MoNE decree No. 044/U/2002) required every district to 
establish an independent body called an educational council, and a school 
committee at school level with authority, roles and responsibilities different from 
the former BP3. I will discuss each of these efforts below. The MoNE decree 
will be analysed further in Chapter 5.   
The Bappenas and the MoNE Task Forces. The Task Forces were 
powerful builders of opinion about the future shape of the Indonesian education 
system. Backed financially by the World Bank and worked on by the “forty best 
brains”, who were top Indonesian education academics, school based 
management (SBM) became part of the national discourse on education (Jalal & 
Musthafa, 2001). Recommendations from the Task Forces were widely reported 
in the press, and SBM became a popular choice for reform (Kompas, 2000a; 
2000b). When the Task Forces had completed their deliberations, the results 
were published  as,  Education Reform in the Context of Regional Autonomy: 
The Case of Indonesia. This contained their recommendations about school 
governance. Two chapters in the book provide frameworks for SBM developed 
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by two different Task Forces. Chapter two, “Decentralization of Education and 
School Based Management” was written by a task force which conducted 
research in West Sumatra. This was based on the SBM framework from 
Edmonton, Canada2. Based on this research the particular Task Force advised 
that to implement SBM, there should be an independent body at district level 
called  the School Board and a School Committee should be created at school 
level. The functions of the School Board are described as: strategic planning, 
policy development, programme planning, programme delivery support, 
monitoring, evaluation, advocacy, funding, budgeting, coordination, social 
development, and communication and liaison (Jalal & Musthafa, 2001). 
Suggestions for the framework of the School Committee are set out in Jalal and 
Musthafa (2001, p. 30-31) as follows: 
1. formulate school policy to encourage the development of 
education in the area served by the school; 
2. SC must approve school plans for the year before submitting 
these loans to the Dinas (District Office of Education); 
3. help determine the minimum service standards and provide input 
for amendment of the curriculum; 
4. contribute to school budget planning; 
5. raise alternative funding and resources to improve the quality of 
the school; 
6. monitor school quality, appraising the impacts of education in the 
school, including directly viewing teachers teach in the 
classrooms; 
7. help determine the criteria for enrolling new students, based on 
input from school board; 
8. recommend the appointment and dismissal of the principal, 
teachers, and administrative personnel 
9. help resolve conflict among students related to education, 
empowering the community to prevent students from committing 
negative acts outside school hours; and 
10. increase liaison with the community to enhance awareness and 
responsibility; establish cooperation with third parties. 
                                                 
2 This is not a coincidence since research was collaborated and the funding was coming from  
CIDA (Canada International Development Agency). 
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Another SBM framework was prepared by the education financing task 
force and is described in chapter 3 of the book. This task force conducted 
research in three provinces (West Sumatra, West Kalimantan and West Java) 
with the focus on establishing a model for the decentralization of finance. The 
task force identified two roles: a) The role of the school; at the school level the 
principal is the main actor in school administration and s/he has been given 
significant authority particularly in finance and personnel management; b) The 
role of the community (non-school and non-government) and they also use the 
terms ‘school board’ and ‘school committee’ to represent the community. For the 
school board they propose that its responsibilities should include teacher 
selection, audit of school performance, selection of new student entrants, 
reception of subsidies and allocation of the subsidy to schools. The main role for 
the school committee would be implementing policies prepared by school 
boards.  
The BPPN. In 1999 the BPPN also supported by the World Bank, 
published School Based Management. The book explains the strategic 
implementation stages for SBM divided into short (1-3 years), medium (4-6 
years) and long (7-10) term. In the long term, the BPPN proposed a new body in 
each school instead of the BP3 to be called a School Council to consist of 
community figures, the principal, teacher representatives, parent representatives, 
education bureaucrats, and the business sector. The responsibility of the School 
Council would be the selection of principals, managing money coming from 
parents, controlling school finance, taking part in curriculum and textbook 
selection, and helping and controlling the teaching and learning process 
(Mulyasa, 2003). 
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West Java Education provincial office. Another proposal for the SBM 
framework came from the Education Office of West Java. This office published 
a report, Pedoman Implementasi Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah di Jawa Barat (A 
School Based Management Implementation Guide for West Java). It was 
prepared by academics from the Indonesian Education University (UPI) in 
Bandung, and was intended as a model particularly for West Java schools. 
Similar to the BPPN, it proposed a School Council, and insisted “that SBM 
without the school council is not SBM at all” (Satori et al., 2001, p. 5). Like the 
BPPN, the West Java model is more detailed and comprehensive though the 
authority of the school council is similar to that in the BPPN model. 
The Rintisan MBS. In 1999, UNESCO and UNICEF co-operated with 
the Indonesian MoNE  to commence a project called Creating Learning 
Communities for Children (CLCC). This was targeted at primary schools in the 
rural regions of some provinces. To improve school effectiveness, the project 
was based on what it called three pillars: a) the openness of school principal 
management; b) active, creative, effective and joyful learning; and c) community 
participation. The main activity of this project was capacity building with 
training for all stakeholders (principal, teachers, education district officials, 
parents and community members). The schools which participated in the project 
were given a small amount of money, with stakeholders having agreed to finance 
the programmes proposed in school plans (Taruna, 2001).  
After two years, the success of this project in some elementary schools 
particularly in Central Java, was remarkable. Recognition came from national 
and international observers who confirmed that SBM could work in Indonesian 
schools. This success has led to similar projects across Indonesia, funded by 
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other donors. MBE or managing basic education, funded by USAID, and REDIP 
by JICA (Japan International Cooperation agency) unfortunately came up with 
less encouraging results (The World Bank, 2004). 
Taruna (2001) states that project organisation at the local level does not 
change the school structure. The project is “merely doing something that is not 
fully optimized”. He concludes that the main inhibitor stopping schools from 
adopting SBM is the bureaucratic environment which does not want schools to 
become independent (Taruna, 2003) 
The MPMBS. Umaedy (1999), a senior bureaucrat at the MoNE central 
office, states that there are two factors which led education quality improvement 
under the New Order to fail. He attributes failure to the fact that the previous 
practices were input oriented and the strategy was macro-oriented. The former 
factor is based on the assumption that if every input for education such as 
textbooks, teacher training and buildings are available at school level this will 
automatically result in the outcome that is intended. The latter is about education 
management which, when heavily controlled by a central bureaucracy, results in 
serious misfits at the school level.  
The MoNE also proposed a project based on effective school theory 
which emphasises processes in education to make schools creative and 
autonomous. Unlike the Rintisan MBS, the MPMBS project focuses on junior 
high and secondary schools across Indonesia. For the first phase in 1999, 700 
schools participated in the project, with training for school principals regarding 
strategic management conducted by the provincial educational offices. A school 
which wanted to join a project had to submit a proposal with the school plan to 
the central office, and if accepted, it received a block grant under a scheme called 
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BOMM (bantuan operasional manajemen mutu, quality improvement 
operational assistance). The BOMM is intended to be like ‘seed money’ to cover 
a portion of the total operational cost (Indriyanto, 2003b) of a quality 
improvement program. 
 There are two reports available related to these efforts which came from 
the central office. One report is about case studies in a state secondary school in 
Surabaya, East Java (Subijanto, 2000), and the other is a monitoring report of 
this project in 232 state junior secondary schools in 24 provinces (MoNE, 2001). 
Both reports outlined the schools’ goals as stated in their vision statements, 
which were mostly about the enhancement of the academic achievements of their 
students. What is interesting in both reports is that to achieve these goals schools 
relied on extra teaching activities for students who would face national 
examinations. Such activities had been regularly conducted and funded by the 
school (Subijanto, 2000; MoNE, 2001). This option was chosen because most 
principals found it difficult to understand the MPMBS and even harder to write a 
plan to improve school quality (MoNE, 2001). Moreover, the bureaucratic 
environment in the school has meant that transparency was not easily 
incorporated in the implementation process (MoNE, 2001). Subijanto (2000) 
found that parents, teachers and school staff said that only the principal knew 
about the programme. The training which had been given to the principal was 
intended to transfer the knowledge and involve other parties in the school, but 
unfortunately this has increased the principal’s bargaining position in school 
more than prior to the project.  
In addition, MoNE (2001) also criticises the MPMBS which was 
designed and executed in the central office in the Reform Era. This programme 
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was still being practised indiscriminately in Indonesian schools producing wide 
variety in its implementation. The point that the project should be a transition 
model to school based management was missed.  
Others Development in the reform era 
 Some significant changes in the Indonesian education system took place 
in the Reform Era. Regarding the final examination, the mandate to graduate 
students (year 9 and 12) which was given to school in 1968, was pulled back to 
central office. The MoNE stipulated that students can continue their education at 
the upper level only if their mark was not below the threshold number in three 
subjects (Indonesian, English and Mathematics). In 2003 when the policy began, 
there was some resistance to the threshold mark, which was 3 for a range of 0 to 
10. However, when in 2004 the threshold level to pass school was raised to 4.0, 
there were many demonstrations and lobbying in opposition to the policy. The 
fear that many students could not pass the exam in 2004 eventually did not 
happen, because the central government used a conversion table in order to raise 
the score and this resulted in more students scoring above the threshold level 
(Sihombing, 2004). Further, the MoNE was also allowing re-examination till 
2005 in order to give many more students another chance to pass the exam. 
However starting in 2006, the threshold trend was rising and no remedial 
examinations were available anymore. This made final examinations to be 
perceived as a ‘killing ground’ for students (Kompas, 2006a). Some critics 
observe that imposing this kind of method is unfair because of the multi diversity 
of infrastructure and quality of Indonesian schools (Rosyid, 2006). However, the 
MoNE believes that the examination is the best method to improve educational 
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quality because it pushes students and teachers to work harder, compared to 
nearly thirty years practice where students could pass whatever their result were. 
 The central government also introduced a competence based curriculum 
(KBK) in 2004. The construction of this curriculum was significantly different 
from the previous system, because it involved consultations with stakeholders, 
pilot-testing in some schools, and some training for teachers and principals. The 
central office promised that the new curriculum framework would give more 
flexibility to teachers. However, an early implementation study clearly showed 
that most Indonesian schools were not ready for the KBK. Also the infrastructure 
to support the programme was inadequate. There were also criticism that the 
curriculum content appeared to be un-changed; the only change being in the 
organisation of the syllabus. The MoNE retracted the policy and stipulated a new 
curriculum, called Kurikulum 2006, a revised version of the KBK which was 
suggested by a new body, the National Education Standardisation Board.  
 In the Reform era, the Indonesian parliament had passed two new laws 
regarding education. First, the education system law (Law 20/2003) which, 
unlike previous laws, introduced changes from the use of a centralistic paradigm; 
and the teachers law (Law 14/2005) which was proposed for five years by the 
PGRI. Both laws have an ambitious agenda which in fact is difficult to reach. 
The Law 20/2003 for instance, stated explicitly that the education sector must 
have 20% of proportion in the national budget. Five years after the Law was 
introduced, the stipulated education budget had never reached 10% of the total 
budget. The teacher law states that Indonesian teachers should have a bachelor 
degree (or at least four years study at tertiary level) and promises to double the 
salary if teachers also pass certification examination. Currently, with more than 
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2.7 million teachers, only 35% have undergraduate degrees, which means that to 
retrain the rest of the teachers is a huge task due to the large numbers and diverse 
locations (Kompas, 2006b). 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the historical development of the Indonesian 
education system. The administrative centralization of the education system was 
a legacy from Dutch colonialism. This centralised system was changed after the 
New Order had ended. In terms of school governance, a policy of 
decentralisation was introduced following a search for alternative governance 
models, resulting in the adoption of school based management. However, the 
SBM which has been adopted is not standard. Instead, several configurations of 
the SBM model have been tried in Indonesian schools. 
The next chapter will provide a literature review related to educational 
decentralisation and school based management issues in an international context. 
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Chapter 3 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter is a review of the international literature on educational 
decentralisation and school based management. The chapter explores the reasons for 
devolving authority in education and its consequential impacts, and includes 
experiences of school governance in developed and developing countries. As well, 
the chapter addresses issues of power and authority levels in decentralisation.   
3.2 Educational decentralisation framework 
   Daun (2002, p. 75) states that policy of the educational decentralisation 
“has become the most commonly implemented restructuring policy”. It can be 
identified in both developed and developing countries (Bulock and Thomas, 1997; 
Abu-Duhou, 1999; Fullan and Watson, 2000). This policy has been initiated by 
democratic governments, such as in Australia and the United States (Murphy and 
Beck, 1995), autocratic military regimes, such as in Argentina and Chile (Fiske, 
1996, Schieffelbein and Schieffelbein, 2000), and even by a country with a rigid 
centralisation ideology like China (Hawkins, 2000). 
The implementation of educational decentralisation varies in term of scale. It 
happens at a district level in Edmonton, Canada (Brown, 1990) and Chicago, USA 
(Bryk, Sebring, Kerbow, Rollow, and Easton, 1998); at the state level in Victoria, 
Australia  (Abu-Duhou, 1999) and Kentucky, USA (Lindle, 1996);  and at the 
nationwide level in the United Kingdom (England and Wales) (Bulock and Thomas, 
1997) and New Zealand (Wylie, 1995). 
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Consequently, the many varieties of the policy make it difficult to generalise 
about it. However, in general terms, decentralisation is about the shifting of 
authority and responsibility from one level of government to a lower one. 
Nevertheless the term decentralisation does not have an exact single meaning that is 
easily understood by all who practice it. So it is helpful to explain the concept by 
considering four dimensions of emphasis: (1) degree of transfer, (2) breadth of 
transfer, (3) location of transfer, and (4) functions transferred.   
3.2.1 Degree of transfer 
In the literature on educational decentralisation policy, the degree of transfer 
within public institutions is categorized into at least three types, namely 
deconcentration, delegation, and devolution (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983; 
Fiske, 1996; Abu Duhou, 1999; McGinn and Welsh, 1999; Daun 2002). First, 
according to Abu-Duhou (1999, p. 24-25) deconcentration is “the handing over [of] 
some amount of administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels within 
central government ministries and agencies, and it is shifting of the workloads from 
centrally located officials to staff or office of the national capital or centre”. This is 
the weakest form of degree of power transfer (Fiske, 1996), because the centre 
doesn’t devolve power. As McGinn and Welsh (1999, p. 18) note, “deconcentration 
reforms shift authority for implementation of rules, but not for making them”.  
Deconcentration is usually supported by financial grants and local governments 
have to plan and implement programs and projects which are adjusted to local 
condition, based on the guidelines laid down by the central office. In Indonesia, 
most public sectors including education prior to the reform era, have been practising 
this kind decentralization which has made provincial governments more powerful 
than district governments. 
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Second, delegation refers to the transfer of decision-making authority and 
managerial responsibility for certain functions or tasks from a higher to lower level 
which remain indirectly controlled by a central government (Rondinelli et al., 
1983). Usually delegation takes place for certain narrow functions of government 
service with a relatively broad responsibility that is often conducted outside the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Similarly to deconcentration, in delegated arrangements the 
full responsibility remain in the hands of the central government, and if it wishes it 
can pull back its authority and responsibility (Fiske, 1996).  
Third, as defined by Rondinelli et al. (1983, p. 24) devolution is “the 
creation or strengthening –financially or legally- of sub-national units of 
governments, the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of 
the central government”. This means, devolution is the far-reaching form of 
decentralisation, and the one in which most transfer of power is involved. It is 
intended to be permanent and cannot be withdrawn without some legal justification 
(Brown, 1990; McGinn and Welsh, 1999). In addition, devolution involves greater 
political and fiscal decentralization compared to deconcentration and delegation 
which usually emphasises administrative decentralization. This means that with 
devolution, local governments with recognized geographical boundaries can 
exercise their authority more widely and significantly, thereby limiting the national 
governments role to a supervisory one in certain aspects. Fiske (1996, p. 20) points 
out that devolution named as political decentralization is the most complex option 
because it “involves a multitude of stakeholders, both inside and outside the 
government, all of whom will have interests to protect or pursue”.  
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3.2.2 Breath of transfer 
Commitments by national governments to decentralize a range of their 
public sectors vary. In some cases the transfer of powers is limited to a few 
government bodies. In others, nearly all public sectors are involved. For example, in 
Morocco decentralization is limited to the education sector (Cohen, 2004, personal 
communication). In Chile, in addition to education, the health sector also 
experienced decentralization (Burki, Perry & Dillinger, 1999). Meanwhile, in 
Malawi, according to Davies, Harber and Dzimadzi (2003), the civil service at local 
levels administers up to six different sectors. Meanwhile, the decentralization that 
was introduced in Indonesia during the reform era was massive, involving nearly all 
public sectors at the district level, except for the monetary and fiscal sectors, 
defence and security, foreign politics, justice and religion, which remained in the 
hands of the central government in the capital (Jalal and Musthafa, 2001). 
3.2.3 Location of transfer 
 The transfer of authority in education can take place at several sub-national 
levels. The possible locations of sub-national authorities include states, provinces or 
regions; districts, municipalities or counties; sub-districts, villages or schools. In 
Table 3.1 Daun (2002) summarizes the possible levels of decentralization in 
education in countries that have implemented the policy. 
In the case of New Zealand, one goal of its decentralisation policy was to 
eliminate the middle management level to ensure that central government was 
linked directly with the school (Wylie, 1995; Fiske, 1996). Whereas in Victoria, 
Australia, education remains under the jurisdiction of the state government. 
Consequently, the location of transfer is at the state level  (Abu-Duhou, 1999). In 
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another situation, Davies et al. (2003) observed that in Malawi, the transfer of 
power in education is from the central government to the district level. By contrast, 
Caldwell (1994) gives an example of centralization occurring from the schools level 
back to the district level in California in the 1980s, because of financial constraints. 
 Table 3.1. Baselines and Levels of Decentralization and Centralization 
                               
  (Source: Daun, 2002, p. 76) 
3.2.4 Functions transferred 
Regarding the transfer of functions there are a numbers of possibilities, 
including giving all function to schools or sharing each function with separate levels 
of government. Such functions as personnel management, testing, procurement, 
curriculum, student management, financing, training, to name a few, are performed 
by government institutions.  A study by Rideout and Ural (1993) as in Table 3.2, 
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shows the distribution of functions in ten developed and developing countries, as 
this relates to decision making with regard to certain functions.  
This table indicates that some decisions are still exercised significantly at the 
central government level. Examples included school organisational structure, 
minimum requirements and official languages used in teaching, and some others. 
On the other hand, management functions such as discipline and teachers evaluation 
are significantly undertaken at the school level. 
Table 3.2. Location of Decisions by Category of Decision  
Category Central % 
Regional 
% 
District 
% 
Local 
% 
Governance 
     Policy 
 
90 
 
40 
 
10 
 
10 
     Planning 90 40 10 30 
     Implementation 80 30 50 40 
School Organization 
     Structure 
 
90 
 
10 
 
10 
 
0 
     Minimum Requirements 90 10 0 0 
Financing 
     Recurrent 
 
80 
 
50 
 
30 
 
50 
     Development 90 40 30 60 
Training: 
     In-service 
 
80 
 
50 
 
20 
 
30 
     Pre-service 70 50 10 0 
     Management 60 40 60 50 
     Qualification Standards 90 20 0 0 
Curriculum: 
     Subjects 
 
90 
 
30 
 
0 
 
0 
     Content 90 20 10 20 
     Textbooks 80 20 10 30 
     Textbook Provision 70 30 20 40 
     Language Policy 100 20 10 0 
     Instructional Methods 70 30 20 20 
     Evaluation of Teachers 60 50 60 70 
Monitoring: 
     Accreditation 
 
70 
 
30 
 
0 
 
20 
     Examinations 70 30 30 90 
     Pupil Promotion 70 0 30 70 
     Discipline 10 10 30 90 
     Data Systems 60 50 50 60 
     School Evaluation 90 40 40 30 
Research 
     Needs 
 
90 
 
30 
 
10 
 
20 
     Conduct 80 50 20 20 
     Implementation 60 20 30 10 
Note: Shared responsibilities account for rows adding up to more than 100% 
 (Source: Rideout and Ural, 1993, p. 108) 
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3.2.5 Power and authority 
According to Daun (2002) there is a paradox when central governments 
decentralise certain powers. This is because decentralisation and other restructuring 
developments are always initiated from above. On the one hand it seems logical for 
power to be located at the top level government, but on the other hand, it can also 
make sense for power to be given to lower levels. But it is the concepts of power 
and authority which are at the heart of decentralisation, if the transferring of power 
is to make sense. Weber, in his classic sociological analysis of power, notes that 
besides power there two other important concepts: authority and legitimacy. 
Power, in simple terms, refers to the ability to do something or to have control 
over people and activities. When “power is granted by consent” (Nieuwenhuis, 
2004, p. 4) it is what we call authority. In terms of public organisations, consent is 
obtained through a range of means, such as constitutions, legislation, regulation or 
decrees that enable people who hold positions to have a justification for their 
authority. When this happens, it is called legitimacy.  Moreover Nieuwenhuis (2004, 
p. 4) writes that “legitimate power may thus be seen as the ability to exert influence 
in the organisation beyond authority, which is derived from position”. 
Undoubtedly, the formulation of legislation or regulation about 
decentralisation generally arises from a political struggle at all levels of 
government. Often, the stipulated regulation is outlined to stakeholders as the 
framework which will “constrain and shape decisions and behaviours of [the] 
organisation’s members” (McGinn and Nash, 1999, p. 17). Wirt, Mitchell and 
Marshal (1985) further notes that the political culture in a country influences the 
process of policy development as well as the content and quality of educational 
policies. Consequently, the nature of a regulation that allocates power to certain 
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levels but not to others, reflects the social reality of power within the society. 
Gershberg (1999) proposes that there are two strategic choices in terms of 
legislating an educational reform process. These are shown in Table 3.3. The table 
depicts a situation with high legislative involvement where a certain legal 
framework is processed, involving political procedures, and a low legislative 
involvement where change in schools is not based on specific legislations (e.g. 
Nicaragua).  
Table 3.3. Initial strategic dichotomy faced in education reform 
                  Emphasizes Disadvantages 
High 
legislative 
involvement 
- consistency 
- comprehensiveness 
- clean sense of final outcomes 
- may maximize opposition 
- builds in unforeseen problems 
- prevents learning by doing 
- enforces a one-size-fits-all 
   approach 
- subsequent changes may be 
  costly 
- may emphasize pork-barrel 
   politics (i.e. government 
   funding for projects designed 
   to win votes) 
Low 
legislative 
involvement 
 
- operational viability 
- local responsiveness 
- learning by doing 
- subsequent changes may be 
   less costly 
- putting reform in the hands of 
  education officials 
- reform vulnerable to reversal 
   or abandonment 
- may create confusion or lack of  
   transparency 
-  scandal/mistakes can doom  
    entire reform 
(adapted from Gershberg, 1999, p. 64) 
The forms of power and authority which are formulated in terms of 
decentralisation regulations often have potential for creating conflicts, confusions 
and misunderstandings. According to Daun (2002, p. 80) this is because of “(i) the 
unclear definition on who decides what; and (ii) the interpretation of the new rules”. 
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In agreement, Elmore (In Daun, 2002) in the United States and Wylie (1995) in 
New Zealand both noted that ambiguity is often seen regarding the responsibility 
and authority of various levels of governance. Consequently, Wylie (1995) and 
Fulan and Watson (2000) suggest that to avoid confusion and tension at the 
implementation stage, it is desirable that there is clarity in the formulation of rules, 
regulations and decision-making authority. 
3.3 Reasons for decentralisation  
According to McGinn and Welsh (1999), education in most countries the past 
traditionally conducted in a decentralized way and administered locally. With 
population growth and urbanization, strengthened by nationalism and economic 
competition and particularly “in the pursuit of improved quality and higher 
efficiency through standardization, most education systems became more 
centralized” (McGinn and Welsh, 1999, p. 25). In the case of developing countries, 
most governments had already inherited centralised education systems which were 
usually taken for granted.  
However, within the education sector, particularly since the 1980s, 
decentralisation policy became a global phenomenon. For many developed 
countries, this can be seen in one respect as a kind of return to an earlier past. 
Undoubtedly, the decentralisation movement had its own local purposes. Fiske 
(1996), explains that for the following countries the principal intentions included: 
Spain’s attempt to cure regional problems; Brazil’s effort to promote local 
autonomy; India’s to foster democracy and New Zealand’s to eliminate the middle 
management level.  Another writer, Lauglo (1995), suggests that the reasons for 
decentralising the education sector are based on two broad categories: political, and 
quality and efficiency. Daun (2002) adds that there are three main sources of 
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decentralisation: the free market philosophy, political-participatory philosophy and 
organization theory. Relating to the school-based management movement, Caldwell 
(1994) proposes five reasons: (a) efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of 
public services; (b) ideology that embraces a faith in the market mechanism in the 
public as well as the private sector; (c) equity in the allocation of scarce resources; 
(d) a broad societal valuing of empowerment of the community; and (e) findings in 
the research on school effectiveness and school improvement.  
In the next five sub-sections, Caldwell’s classifications for decentralisation are 
further explored. While the categories are presented discretely, in reality they are 
interrelated.  
3.3.1 Efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public service  
The changing of the world situation, mainly in the Northern hemisphere, after 
World War II, led to public dissatisfaction in education (McGinn and Welsh, 1998; 
Daun, 2002). It became clear that large bureaucratic organisations which were 
administering public education did not have the capacity to maintain quality because 
of the high rate of student enrolment (McGinn and Welsh, 1998), and “tended to be 
inefficient and unresponsive to changing circumstances” (Bray, 2000, p. 8).  At the 
same time, the private sector had shown successful examples with its restructuring 
efforts, devolving authority to lower levels, retaining strategic decisions at the 
central levels, and being  more client-centred in their operations. 
 The changes above had led to the adoption of efficiency and effectiveness 
principles in running public institutions.  In the education sector, school-based 
management policy became associated with the efficiency and effective use of 
public resources. According to Caldwell (1994), besides the effects of recession or 
financial crisis, mismanagement of public money has in the past been the main 
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reason why SBM policy was so tempting for central governments. Moreover, it is 
believed that practising SBM will reduce significant government spending on public 
education systems, which in turn will reduce public debt. This was the case in the 
state of Victoria, Australia, where a restructuring policy has reduced central office 
staff considerably and schools are directly given nearly 90% of their operational 
costs. 
There are also other rationales. It is argued that local people know better and 
are able to be more responsive to their own needs. Locating authority locally seems 
more efficient, compared with decisions from central governments which often miss 
their targets and take a longer time to implement. People who work in local schools, 
or who live locally, the argument goes, will efficiently gather information relevant 
for their own purposes, ranging from pedagogical to school infrastructural issues. 
This kind of information is more reliable and will lead to effective decision-making 
by school stakeholders in terms of public service delivery.   
Decentralized decision making happens with greater regard for outputs rather 
than inputs. Often such organisational behaviour is accompanied by a framework 
from central authority, which allows freedom to be given to local stakeholders to 
choose how and where to allocate resources. Certainly this policy orientation has the 
potential to lead to empowerment of local capacity to accept responsibility, and be 
aware and careful in decision making. 
3.3.2 The market mechanism 
 Within the sphere of education, the market mechanism is understood in a 
particular way. According to Ball (1990), there are five elements: parental choice, 
competition, diversity, funding and organisation. With a centralised policy system, 
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it is common to see the imposition of mandatory pupil entrance to a specific public 
school or state-approved school in a designated area. Such a policy requires parents 
to send their children to the nearest school in the area. Under a market economy 
policy, parents are given power of choice, permitting them to decide which 
educational institution their children should attend. Under such a policy, parents are 
described as consumers, implying that they have a personal interest and stake in 
their children’s education. As consumers, it is also assumed that parents will also 
have much more information relevant to their children’s interests and abilities. 
Consequently, one does not have to be a professional to find suitable schools for 
one’s children (McGinn and Welsh, 1999).  
 A consequential effect of parental choice is competition between schools. 
Each educational institution will compete to attract as many students it can enrol, 
not only in order to survive, but to satisfy its consumers. Within a market economic 
policy, student enrolment is not merely a function of physical and economic access, 
but it also includes perceptions about quality and relevance. Managing perception 
becomes a key role as schools become much more public relations friendly; more 
aware of the value of positive press publicity; and learns to record and highlight 
their activities and achievements better. It is hoped by its advocates, that 
competition between schools, aiming to attract students far from their own locations 
will benefit consumers as well as the nation. 
 Another significant aspect to note in a market economy policy relates to the 
availability of diversity. According to McGinn and Welsh (1999, p. 44) in 
educational terms there are three conditions that make markets exist: 1) there is 
variety in the quality and content of education provided; 2) consumers are informed 
about options; and 3) consumers are able to choose among the options. In contrast, 
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if all schools are giving the same service and are using the same national 
curriculum, then there is no market. Moreover, options are also available whenever 
another school is very expensive or is located very far from students’ homes.  
 One of the main characteristics of the market mechanism is that the funding 
allocated to schools is based on numbers of students enrolled. The concept of a 
‘voucher system’, originating  from Milton Friedman, may be implemented, where 
“each person would be given a non-transferable education voucher to be used to buy 
education from amongst competing institutions which would then depend on these 
vouchers for their income” (Lauglo, 1995, p. 20) . It may also include parents 
having the opportunity to use the voucher to send their children to private schools, 
whenever they are willing to pay the difference. Undoubtedly, this system 
strengthens parents’ bargaining position, while making schools depend heavily on 
parental choice. The system also makes the schools’ ability to deliver overall 
service, retain staff, acquire facilities and equipment, linked to their ability to attract 
consumers, otherwise they will not survive. 
The final issue for schools in a market mechanism relates to them as 
organisations.  The income schools generate via enrolled students becomes the 
actual budget figures, over which schools have authority. As a result, schools are 
likely to become more responsible for using the budget according to their needs. 
Often, these range from recruiting teaching and administrative staff, to paying for 
maintenance costs and needed equipment. Such a situation promotes change to 
schools as organisations. It also makes the school principal’s role more like that of a 
chief executive officer in the business sector. 
The explanation above is characteristic of economic rationalism and the 
coalition of market liberals and conservatives, sometimes also known as the ‘New 
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Right’ (Ball, 1990; Caldwell, 1994; Marginson, 1993). Several developed countries 
have implemented aspects of the New Right agenda in one form or another. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, under the conservative governments led by Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major, new education legislation was introduced that produced a 
shift in educational authority, such as “local management of schools, grant 
maintained schools, the virtual privatisation of the inspectorate, and national testing 
of students with the public release of ‘league tables’ enabling parents to compare 
schools on outcomes for students” (Caldwell, 1994, p. 5305).  The introduction of 
school global budgets in the state of Victoria, Australia, by a Liberal government in 
1992 (Abu-Duhou, 1998);  radical decentralisation to school level in New Zealand 
with ‘Tomorrow Schools’ in late 1980s (Wylie, 1995); or the implementation of a 
school-based budgeting project in Alberta, Canada (Brown, 1990), had all shown 
that the New Right ideology was influential in public policy thinking.   
 In the United States, decentralisation was widely practiced during the 
Reagan presidency in the 1980s, and was strengthened and popularised with the 
work of Chubb and Moe (1990). They claim that schools run by professionals are 
necessarily a form of tyranny, and when schools are directed through democratic 
means, this is essentially coercive. Instead, “the market is claimed to be the best 
way to use information about what people want and what satisfies them” (McGinn 
and Welsh, 1999, p. 43). These ideas contributed to the emergence of the ‘charter 
school’ system in various American states.  
 However despite claims by proponents of the market mechanism of 
improved efficiency, effectiveness and quality of education, critics point to some 
negative effects of the policy. For instance, from research in the United Kingdom, 
Ball (1990) found that an emphasis on parental choice based on school performance 
 60
has led schools to attract more able students by strengthen ‘superficial’ impression 
management. Less motivated and less able students tended to be enrolled in schools 
which are labelled as lower in quality because middle class parents exploited this 
situation for their own purposes. With differentiation of students’ ability come 
issues of social class inequality. 
 Another critic, Lauglo (1995) argues that the basic principle of the market 
mechanism is to rely on survival and expansion of the providers to make sure that 
efficient quality services are always delivered. In reality, when “the most 
competitive schools have no surplus of places or if they choose not to respond to 
demand by increasing their supply, the net result may be to reinforce inequalities in 
selectiveness among the existing schools, thus reinforcing status hierarchies among 
them” (p. 21).  
3.3.3 Equity in the allocation of scarce resources  
 The practice of public school systems where uniformity is widespread 
basically reflects equality rather than equity. This is because in a centralized system, 
“education improved in quality as a direct result of the ability to standardize the 
content and provision of education” (McGinn and Welsh, 1998, p. 24). However, 
the unique learning needs of individual students also cannot be fulfilled by a market 
driven system. In addition, students with different characteristics such as minority 
groups are not served better in the public school system that emphasise equality. 
Equity arguments can also be made with respect to policies that are intended to 
close the gaps with education services between city and rural, rich and poor, male 
and female, as well as differences between ethnic minority and indigenous people 
and mainstream groups.  
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One practice that has been implemented is the provision of additional budget 
measures which take into consideration particular characteristics of students. When 
a school has students from ethnic minority groups for instance, the state gives the 
students through the school a bigger allocation than is given to the mainstream 
students. In this way, the school practices positive discrimination. 
3.3.4 Empowerment of the school community  
Daun (2002) argues that from a de-institutionalist perspective, a big centralised 
and bureaucratic public service institution such as the school, is repressive, 
inflexible, rule-bound and undemocratic. Whereas when, through decentralization 
policy, a school and its local community are empowered, this allows for community 
“participation in organizational and political life”. Ultimately this can be “seen not 
only as instrumental but also as a value in itself” (p. 73). 
Participation by a local community in a particular state school is the popular 
justification for decentralising in the SBM form. However, Bray (2000) points out 
that participation or involvement tend to be weaker forms of arrangements than 
partnerships. This is because “partnership implies more active and committed 
involvement. Partners share responsibility for a joint activity, whereas participants 
may merely co-operate in someone else’s activity” (p. 5). 
The school partner which is the community has, according to Wolf (1997 in 
Bray, 2000) four characteristics, which are: 1) a network of shared interests and 
concerns; 2) a symbolic or physical base; 3) extension beyond the narrowly-defined 
household; and 4) something that distinguishes it from other similar groups. People 
who are grouped in a school community range from the principal, teachers, school 
administration staff, students, parents, alumni, individuals who live nearby the 
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school’s location, representative of religious organizations, commercial bodies, 
NGOs, and so on. In the case of elementary schools, geographical communities 
have relatively more influence compared to secondary schools. This is because 
students of the former mostly come from an immediate catchment or enrolment 
area, whereas in the latter the students usually come from kilometres away and also 
may be from more diverse backgrounds. In terms of school based management 
policy, partnerships allow for optional or mandatory policy options, where a range 
of possible devolved authority measure can be exercised. Further explanations 
regarding this will be given in the next section.  
 The proponents of community involvement in education argue that there are 
several outcomes from it. According to Bray (2000) these include shared 
experiences and expertise, where each party can give their knowledge and skills to 
solve the task. There is also mutual support, especially when obstacles emerge and 
partners can provide each other with support. Moreover, as a division of labour, 
some specific jobs will be accomplished best by one party and others can finish the 
rest. Community involvement may also result in increased resources, whereas as 
group the community is bigger than the sum of all parts in terms of human, material 
and financial resources. Further, community involvement involves an increased 
sense of ownership, because people who take part in participatory decision making 
tend to feel a greater sense of belonging to any resolution they are involved in. This 
also means an extended reach, where each party can bring their voice and 
experiences to extend initiatives. An increased effectiveness can be achieved as a 
result of each party bringing their own perspectives with good information about 
local conditions and situations, which enriches each other’s knowledge, thereby 
leading to good and accurate decision-making. Lastly, in evaluation and monitoring, 
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involving many parties will complement others’ effort to evaluate and monitor 
progress thereby providing wider suggestion for adjustments and improvements.  
 Partnerships may also experience negative consequences such as self 
interest, factionalism, and capability problems. Self interest, for instance, is the 
main motive in partnerships and when parties who are involved are not fully aware 
of the interests of others, issues of quality may be compromised. Factionalism 
emerges when one party becomes a majority and prefers to advance its own agenda 
at the expense of others. Often, when partners are incapable of resolving conflicts 
satisfactorily, the partnership breaks down.  
 Empowering the school community became more evident in many countries. 
For example in the United States, Caldwell (1994) writes that in Dade County, 
Florida, devolving power from state governments to district and then to school 
levels has been pursued because of the importance given to teacher involvement in 
decision making. In New Zealand, school boards were re-empowered with the 
structural reform in 1989, when parents were given new responsibilities. This trend 
towards greater empowerment has also been evident in developing countries in 
Africa, Asia and Central America (Bray, 2000).  
3.3.5 Research on school effectiveness and school improvement  
Since the 1960s several education reform efforts, mainly in the Western world, 
have been implemented in order to increase educational quality. The reforms have 
included changes of curriculum and syllabus, new teaching methods in the 
classroom and adding more teaching resources to schools. As noted by Fullan 
(1991) these initiatives have not often achieved what was intended. One explanation 
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for this has been that the reforms have not been based on careful research about 
schools and their interactions.  
Abu-Duhou (1999) observes that in the 1980s, research on school effectiveness 
and improvement was about effective school reforms. Cheng (1996, p. 43) for 
example, points out that “to improve education quality, it is necessary to jump from 
the classroom teaching level to school organization level, and reform the structural 
system and management style of schools”. From the beginning, the school based 
management approach has had its scientific justification. 
Furthermore in the United States, according to Caldwell (1994), there were 
two research reports that influenced the direction of school reforms. The first one 
was a report from the National Governors’ Association in 1986 entitled Time for 
Results. The second one was a book written by two researchers, Chubb and Moe, 
published by the Brooking Institution in 1990, entitled Politics, Markets and 
America’s Schools. Those publications undoubtedly recommended significant ways 
to change schools based on research their authors saw as appropriate. 
3.4 School Based Management 
Ainley and MacKenzie (2002, p. 1) write that in the last thirty years 
“decentralization of decision making, increasing local authority and enhanced 
autonomy of schools have been common features of the reorganization of public 
education”.  This movement in North America, and by UNESCO, was labeled as 
school based management (see for example Brown, 1990; Leithwood and Menzies, 
1998; Abu-Duhou, 1999). Meanwhile in the UK, it is more commonly known as the 
Local Management of Schools (LMS) (Bullock and Thomas, 1997). The 
terminology describing the policy is varied. Murphy and Beck (1995) have 
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identified other terms, including school-site autonomy, school-site management, 
school-centered management, decentralized management, school-based budgeting, 
and shared governance.  
Like decentralisation, the characteristics of school based management 
(SBM) and issues related to it can also vary depending on different perspective. 
Beck and Murphy (1998, p 359) for instance, claim that SBM is “a complex 
phenomenon that may be implemented in a variety of ways”. Several other writers 
have already categorised SBM (Murphy and Beck, 1995; Leithwood and Menzies, 
1998) and have identified key central elements, which are discussed in the sections 
which follow. They include definition and models, emerging formal structures, and 
effects of SBM particularly regard to students learning. 
3.4.1 Definitions and resources transferred  
From their extensive research on school based management in North 
America, Murphy and Beck (1995, p.13) conclude that many definitions of it 
emphasise “a major shift in the locus of decision-making responsibilities and 
alterations in the members of the decision making cast”. Similarly, in perspective 
from an Asian country, Cheng (1996, p. 44) defines school based management as 
follows: 
that the school management tasks are set according to the 
characteristics and needs of the school itself and therefore school 
members (including board of directors, supervisor, principal, 
teachers, parents and students, etc.) have a much greater autonomy 
and responsibility for the use of resources to solve problems and 
carry out effective education activities, for the long-term 
development of the school. 
Another definition comes from Cadwell and Spinks (1988, p. 5) who see SBM as:  
a school in a system of education to which there has been 
decentralised a significant amount of authority and responsibility 
to make decisions related to the allocation of resources  within 
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centrally-determined framework of goals, policies, standards and 
accountabilities.   
The definitions above show that in schools which practice SBM policy, 
transfer of authority takes place, giving school’s some degree of decision making. 
In other words, autonomy is based on stipulated regulations. This is different from 
independent, private or non-state schools which are not supported regularly by 
public funds (Caldwell, 1998). These latter schools operate as self-governing 
schools. 
The range of resources that are devolved to SBM can also vary. Wohlstettter 
and Odden (1992) list at least three areas that schools minimally have authority 
over: budget, curriculum and personnel. More broadly, Caldwell and Spinks (1988, 
p. 5) explain that SBM authority can involve: 
knowledge (decentralisation of decisions related to curriculum, 
including decisions related to the goals or ends of schooling); 
technology (decentralisation of decisions related to the means of 
teaching and learning); power (decentralisation of authority to make 
decisions); material (decentralisation of decisions related to the use 
of facilities, supplies and equipment); people (decentralisation of 
decisions related to the allocation of people in matters related to 
teaching and learning); time (decentralisation of decisions related to 
the allocation of time); and finance (decentralisation of decisions 
related to the allocation of money). 
In addition, Bulock and Thomas (1997, p. 7) suggest there are four further powers 
that a public school can exercise:  
(i) admissions: decentralisation of decisions over which pupils are to be 
admitted to the school; (ii) assessment: decentralisation of decisions over 
how pupils are to be assessed; (iii) information: decentralisation of 
decisions over the selection of data to be published about the school's 
performance; (iv) funding: decentralisation of decisions over the setting 
of fees for the admission of pupils. 
It appears that prior to the SBM movement, public schools in most countries 
were rigidly controlled, without much scope for those in leadership in governance 
roles to exercise full responsibility. 
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However, many empirical studies about SBM have shown that the authority 
transferred to schools is often restricted. To illustrate, Wohlstetter and Odden 
(1992, p. 532) conclude, following a review of several research projects, that  “in 
sum, even where decision-making authority appears to have been delegated, the 
degree of real authority given to the site is often remarkably limited”. In addition, a 
study by Meuret and Scheerens (in Leithwood and Menzies, 1998, p. 325) based on 
decisions at school level in public school systems in 14 countries, show that 
percentage of decision making approximate proportions to illustrate: “Ireland and 
New Zealand, greater than 70%; Sweden, 48%; Austria, Denmark, Finland, and 
Portugal, 38% to 41%; Belgium, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, and United 
States, 25% to 33%; and Switzerland, 10%.” One of the explanations for this 
situation comes from Wohlstetter and Odden (1992), who suggest that where a 
district sees the school as its subordinate then that makes any authority relationship 
difficult to change. The implementation of decentralization in the form of SBM 
“appeared to be strongly influenced by districts politics”. This is in fact not 
surprising, because the nature of the public school system is one of resistance to 
even minimal change, even with a decentralised policy.    
3.4.2 Site council and SBM models 
 Murphy and Beck (1998, p. 14) noted that a “central feature of SBM is the 
site council”. While site councils vary in composition and responsibilities, most 
writers agree that it is within a site council that school stakeholders such as 
principals, teachers, parents, community members and students do participate in 
decision making.   
 The site council is a form of community involvement in school governance, 
based on regulation, with elected but voluntary membership. Certainly the intention 
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behind site councils is to implement democratic participatory decision making. Rose 
(2003) differentiates community participation in schools as ranging from genuine 
participation to pseudo-participation. Rose (2003, p. 47) writes that: 
genuine participation, implying the ability to take part in real 
decision making and governance, where all members have equal 
power to determine the outcome of decision and share in a joint 
activity…’pseudo participation’ is, at best a consultative process 
whereby citizens are merely kept informed of developments at the 
school level, and are expected to accept decisions that have already 
been made. 
McGinn and Welsh (1999) illustrate participation as a series of steps. The lower 
steps refer to exercising authority about building maintenance, then authority 
relating to budgets, then transferred authority to make budgets (which involves 
hiring and firing personnel). The final step relates to authority over curriculum 
decision making.  
A study by Rentoul and Rosanowski (2000) offers a useful map of the site 
council continuum from advisory role to governing role (from informing, to 
influencing, co-determining and finally determining). Shown as Figure 3.1 the 
conceptual map of the site council is modelled on the experiences of countries such 
as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United States and several in Europe.  One 
example, in the beginning of SBM implementation in Alberta, Canada, there were 
no site councils (Caldwell, 1994), but then in the 1990s site councils were 
established, although they generally played an advisory role to the principal. 
A number of models have also emerged from empirical studies on school 
based management.  Wohlstetter and Odden (1992), and Murphy and Beck (1995) 
propose three models, based on who has control over decision making: 
administrative control (the principal is dominant in terms of power and control), 
professional control (teachers are dominant), community control 
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(parents/community members are dominant). Leithwood and Menzies (1998) 
propose a model they call balanced control, where parents and teachers are equally 
dominant.   
Figure 3.1. The site council role map in several countries 
Optional 
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      Ontario 
              ACT              England & Wales 
 
                Chicago 
Mandatory 
  (adapted from Rentoul and Rosanowski, 2000, p. 36) 
School based management modelled on administrative control strengthens 
the principal’s role to be more accountable. In particular, the principal has to serve 
the students well with efficient use of school resources as these relate to the budget, 
personnel and curriculum. Edmonton district in Alberta, Canada is a good example 
of this model, which, according to its proponents, increases school responsiveness, 
accountability and effectiveness (Brown, 1990).  
In the professional control model of SBM, the basic assumption is that 
teachers as professionals know better and they are the ones with the most relevant 
knowledge of students. In addition, it is argued that this model increases 
participation.  Because teachers make their own decisions about school business, 
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this model increases employee involvement, thereby improving efficiency, 
effectiveness and better results (Leithwood and Menzies, 1998). Wohlstetter and 
Odden (1992) noted that in Los Angeles, California, this model of SBM emerged 
because half of the composition of site councils was reserved for teachers and the 
council had discretion to make decisions.  
 A community controlled model of SBM exists when parents and community 
members are the majority on a site council. This model works well as governing 
body when its roles are clearly defined by regulations. This can lead to increased 
accountability to the community and greater costumer satisfaction. As its name 
implies, in this model it is community people not professional in schools who are in 
control.  The model promotes the preferences and values of parents in terms of what 
they think are best for their children. McGinn and Welsh (1999, p. 32) argue that 
this model “signals a loss of public confidence in professional expertise”. Since 
1989, New Zealand’s education reform has adopted this model of SBM. For 
secondary schools, SBM extended the existing roles of its governing body, but for 
primary schools SBM was a really significant change (Wylie, 1995). Boards of 
trustees in New Zealand, the name given to the site council, have five elected parent 
representatives, one teacher representative (elected), the principal and one student 
for high schools, as stipulated by the Education Act (Wylie, 1995). Somewhat 
similarly, in Chicago, USA, the majority of the local school council should be 6 
parents and 2 community representatives, out of total 11-12 members (Leithwood 
and Menzies, 1998). 
 The balance control model is intended “to make better use of teachers’ 
knowledge for key decision making in the school, as well as to be more accountable 
to parents and the local community” (Leithwood and Menzies, 1998, p. 331). Both 
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parents and teachers have equal numbers on the site council, with decision making 
powers regarding the budget, personnel and curriculum. This model requires that 
parents and the local community act as partners with the school. The model also 
calls teachers to be responsive to the values of the communities in which schools 
reside. 
One negative aspect of site councils, Bray (2003, p. 37) suggests, is that they 
“in many cases lack expertise and understanding of their responsibilities”. Bray 
argues that this is because members are volunteers. Furthermore, in developing 
countries, site councils are generally made up of people who mainly come from elite 
sections of the community, do not always have concerns for disadvantaged groups, 
and sometimes take school resources for their own purposes (Bray, 2003). 
3.4.3 Strategies to make SBM successful 
 In his thorough research on the impact of school based management 
particularly on learning outcomes in four countries, namely the United States, 
Britain, China (Hong Kong) and Australia, Caldwell (1998) describes an interesting 
result. In Hong Kong, what emerged about SBM relate to student learning issue was 
a “rich conceptualisation and sophisticated analysis” (p. 6); which in Australia, 
according to Caldwell, this is not particularly measured. Meanwhile in America and 
Britain, what much of the research reports show is not encouraging in terms of 
student learning. As Leithwood and Menzies (1998, p. 340) illustrate, “… [the] little 
research based evidence that does exist suggest that the effects on students are just 
as likely to be negative as positive. There is an awesome gap between the rhetoric 
and the reality of SBM’s contribution to student growth…”.  Empirical studies 
mainly in the United States, reviewed by Fullan and Watson (2000), compared 
schools that adopted SBM policy with schools which actually practiced it. The 
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authors concluded that “SBM is an amorphous umbrella concept which is treated as 
an end in itself” (p. 455). Similar findings were also identified in Britain resulting 
from the implementation of local management schools (see Whittey and Power, 
1997).  
Unlike the above explanations, several writers (Caldwell, 1998; Leithwood 
and Menzies, 1998; Fullan and Watson, 2000) argue that when related to student 
learning, the analysis should move beyond school based management issues. As 
Caldwell (p. 17) puts it: 
[t]he explanatory model is confirmation of what research 
elsewhere has shown, namely, that decentralisation of decision-
making in planning and resource allocation does not, of and in 
itself, result in improved learning for students. There is no direct 
cause-and-effect link between the two. What the model does 
suggest, however, is that if the linkages are made in an appropriate 
way, then an indirect effect is realised through action in the 
personnel and professional domain and also in the curriculum 
domain. 
Fullan and Watson (2000) argue that in order to make improvements in 
schools happen the conditions which enable changes to be made must not taken for 
granted. The authors offer what they describe as collaborative culture or 
professional learning communities as important pre-conditions. Based on Newman 
and Wehlage’s research, Fullan and Watson (2000, p. 456) point out  that  
successful schools have teachers and principals who “(1) formed a professional 
learning community, that (2) focussed on student work (assessment), and (3) change 
their instructional practice (pedagogy and support for learning in the classroom) 
accordingly in order to get better results.”  This is somewhat similar to what 
Caldwell (1998) and Leithwood and Menzies (1998) propose to improve student 
learning called with backward mapping from Elmore’s idea (Figure 3.2). The 
proposed concepts show that any kind of reform has firstly to put emphasis on 
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school core business: teaching and learning. Then, what really happens in school 
should be communicated to parents and communities to engage them in terms of 
caring for students and playing a more active role with regard to it (Fullan and 
Watson, 2000).   
Figure 3.2. Backward mapping from student outcomes: an illustration 
                   
                    (source: Caldwell,  1998, p. 30) 
Furthermore, because SBM is a kind of decentralisation of authority from a 
superior body, which may be a district office, some roles might be significant in 
order to make good effect. Bryk et al., (1998) study about SBM practice in Chicago 
argue that there are four elements that districts can play as external school bodies 
supporting schools: maintain decentralization, provide for local capacity building, 
establish rigorous external accountability, and stimulate access to innovation.  
The district office has to play a part in maintaining decentralization. On the 
issue of capacity building, Fullan and Watson (2000, p. 459) write that “here the 
investment is in policies, training, professional development, ongoing support, etc., 
in order to develop the capacity of schools and communities to pursue and sustain 
improvement at the local level within a national context of policies”. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that decentralisation is complex in its 
conceptualisation, design and implementation. In terms of public education, issues 
of power and authority have become salient in definition and interpretation. The 
reasons for moving to a decentralisation mode varies, and in Indonesia what has 
happened locally cannot be divorced from a consideration of the international 
discourse. As shown in the previous chapter, it was in fact, donor agencies that 
initially suggested educational decentralisation for Indonesia.  
 As varied as the decentralisation concepts, school based management is also 
varied and complex. However, there is some consensus, such as devolved authority 
to the school level and the establishment of site councils or similar local bodies. It is 
apparent that when policy makers choose a particular model, this often reflects their 
interests and hopes for changes to the school system. As outlined, an SBM policy 
needs consistent support from the central and district levels, and capability 
preparation at the local level if it is to be a successful governance model. 
In the next chapter, the research methodology is discussed. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapters have discussed Indonesian education and the 
literature review discussed aspects relating to school based management. This 
chapter discusses the methodology used to examine SBM initiatives in a region 
in Indonesia. In order to identify and analyse the policy and practices of school 
based management in Indonesian secondary schools this research used 
qualitative inquiry. With specific reference to the Municipal city of Mataram in 
Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara province, the researcher used a case study 
approach.   
 Several methods of collecting data and analysing it were undertaken. 
Document analysis of national, district and school level materials was 
undertaken. Questionnaires were given to school stakeholders. Interviews were 
carried out at district and school levels. 
4.2 Research orientation and methods 
 According to Cumming (1994) nearly all research projects in educational 
settings can be grouped into three categories of orientation: descriptive, 
interpretive and ideological. The orientation of research is a philosophical basis 
where the researcher identifies the project; formulates research problems and 
chooses his/her approach to that with a specific theory and methods. The 
research orientation of this study is interpretive.  
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With this particular orientation, the researcher’s job was “attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to 
them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 3). Further, as Patton (2002, p. 39) argues, 
the interpretive study “takes place in real world settings and the researcher does 
not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest”. The aim of this study 
was to interpret school based management (SBM) phenomena at state secondary 
schools in Indonesia, together with a specific case study located in Mataram, 
Lombok. In order to achieve that, the study had to include an analysis of the 
national policies that established SBM. The study examined the context of the 
policies within their public institutional settings. In addition, the opinions and 
expectations of district and school level stakeholders were sought, to identify the 
realities of the situations where SBM was actually implemented. 
Schwandt (2000, p. 193) writes that in an interpretive study “it is possible 
to understand the subjective meaning of action (grasping the actor’s beliefs, 
desires, and so on) yet to do so in an objective manner”. However the biases, 
values and judgement of the researcher cannot be denied and as a result a 
researcher has to state matters explicitly (Creswell, 1994).  In an interpretive 
study, both the researcher and participants roles are undoubtedly prominent. This 
is particularly so when the researcher has acquired an insider status with the 
participants and then tries to interpret their experience (Schwandt, 2000). 
Therefore, the researcher acknowledges that while this study was conducted with 
theoretical rigour and standard data analysis procedures, it is still his 
interpretation of data that was collected from various sources and in various 
forms. Moreover, the researcher also had a personal motivation to improve 
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Indonesian SBM, and it is possible that this may have unknowingly been allowed 
to influence his interpretations of the data to some extent. 
A case study approach was used in this study because it fits with the 
characteristic of interpretive inquiry (Anderson, 1998). Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998, p. 3), for instance, point out that “qualitative research is multi methods in 
focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic to its subject matter”. This approach 
also leads to a better understanding of the phenomena, through the use of diverse 
methods to collect data and by conducting the study in a relatively short period 
of time. 
4.3 Case study  
Cresswell (1998, p. 61) defines the case study as “an exploration of a 
‘bounded system’ or a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-
depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context”. 
The term ‘bounded system’ or a case relates to the context and scope within 
which the researcher locates the case to be studied. Usually it is up to the 
researcher to decide the circumstances of what is called “a case” in a case study 
(Cresswell, 1998).  The case itself, however, can be more than one site – it 
depends on the researcher to establish his/her unit of analysis (Yin, 1994). 
School based management practices at state secondary schools in Mataram, 
Indonesia, is the phenomenon and the unit of analysis in this study. Although a 
study might take place on several sites, it can be counted as a single 
phenomenon. This fits with Stake’s (2000, p. 437) clasification on the nature of 
the case which can be identified as a ‘collective case study’. Moreover, Stakes 
(2000, p. 437) argues further as follows: 
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Individual cases in the collection may or may not be known in 
advance to manifest some common characteristics. They may 
be similar or dissimilar, redundancy and variety each important. 
They are chosen because it is believed that understanding them 
will lead to better understanding, perhaps better theorising, 
about a still larger collection of cases. 
 A case study approach is also useful in terms of gathering data for 
analysis which can be both quantitative and qualitative (Yin, 1994; Stake, 2000). 
Based on arguments by several authors (Yin, 1994; Cresswell, 1998; Anderson, 
1998) this research used several empirical data sources such as documentation, 
interviews and direct observations in addition to a questionnaire survey. These 
various sources of rich empirical data are then analysed as a methodological 
triangulation.  
 The study was concerned with understanding school based management 
in one location. As Yin (1994, p. 10) states, a case study research “does not 
represent a ‘sample’, and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization)...the goal is to do a ‘generalizing’ and not a ‘particularizing’ 
analysis”. Again, the study will inform an evaluation about policy and practices 
related to state secondary school context in Indonesia, which can be used to 
guide decision-making and improve education for the future. 
4.3.1 Case study location 
The field research took place in the Municipal City (kota) of Mataram. 
Located in Lombok Island, east of Bali, Mataram is the capital city of West Nusa 
Tenggara Province which is located in the eastern part of Indonesia. The 
municipal is relatively small with a total area of 61,30 square kilometres and has 
a high population density of 5,261 per km2 (Soewartoyo, 2002:10).  
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 There are three sub-municipals (kecamatan) in Mataram: Ampenan, 
Mataram and Cakranegara. There were seven state general secondary schools 
(years 10–12) across Mataram at the time of the study. Two of them were less 
than 2 years old, and each sub-municipality has at least two secondary schools. 
This study investigated school based management policies at district level and 
school levels across all sub-municipalilties using questionnaires, interviews and 
site studies. 
 State secondary schooling across Indonesia is relatively similar in terms 
of infrastructure and staffing because of the standard provisions of the education 
system prior to the Reform era. All schools were managed centrally from the 
central office in Jakarta. So, in this study a degree of generalisation is possible 
with regard to Indonesian secondary schools generally  
 Permission to conduct the study was obtained from government agencies 
in Mataram. Through the Head of Mataram Regional Planning Development 
Board (Bappeda) and the Head of The Mataram National Education district 
office, courtesy letters with copies of the research proposal were sent seeking 
permission. These offices responded with recommendations and a permission 
letter. The researcher personally visited five out of seven state secondary schools 
in Mataram and questionnaires were distributed through each school principal. 
Copies of permission letters were also given to interview participants at school 
and district levels.  
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4.4 Data collection  
4.4.1 Documentation 
According to Hodder (2000, p. 704) documents are important in 
qualitative research because “access can be easy and low cost, … the information 
provided may differ from and may not available in spoken form, and … texts 
endure and thus give historical insight”. Atkinson and Coffey (2004, p. 59) state 
that “documentary materials should be regarded as data in their own right. They 
often enshrine a distinctively documentary version of social reality. They have 
their own conventions that inform their production and circulation”. Similarly, 
Miller (1997) argues that “Texts are one aspect of sense-making activities 
through [which] we construct, sustain, contest and change our senses of social 
reality”. In short, official public documents are important to analyse because they 
mirror power relations and create reality in the society.   
In this case study, public documents were one of the data sources used. 
Documents were important because SBM was a new concept in Indonesia, and 
documents provided the formal frameworks of SBM. The documents used  in 
this research were regulations, policy statements, and guidelines.  
A primary documentary data for this study was the Ministry of National 
Education decree number 044/U/2002 (MoNE, 2002). This decree established 
the Education Councils in each district and School Committees in each school. 
When the decree was released, it was intended to change the nature of the 
governance of schools from the systems of the previous era. The decree was 
based on the legislation about regional autonomy, Law 22/1999, which stipulated 
that education be devolved to the district level. Furthermore, Government 
regulation (PP 25/2000) also stipulated the specific functions of the central and 
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provincial offices pertaining to educational services. To make the public more 
knowledgeable about the decree, the Ministry also distributed certain guideline 
materials. All of these documents are in the public domain and are available 
throughout government education offices, schools, or even on the internet. 
In the middle of 2003, the Indonesian House of Representatives passed a 
new education law (Law 20/2003 titled the National Education System). From 
this law regulations pertaining to community participation in Education Councils 
and School Committees were promulgated. In addition, the government and the 
House also approved a new autonomy law in 2004. This was Law 32/2004 which 
replaced Law 22/1999. However, there is no substantial change in terms of 
educational decentralisation in the new autonomy law (Malik, 2005). 
The other primary documentary data sources used in the study were the 
Mataram mayor’s decrees about the education council and principals’ decrees 
concerning school committees.  These documents proved useful for analysing 
developments at district and school levels. 
4.4.2 Questionnaire  
A questionnaire survey was used in this study. An advantage of the 
questionnaire is that it can be used to gather data in a relatively short period of 
time. Moreover, it can gather straightforward and factual information from 
participants (Anderson, 1998). In this study, the questionnaire was used to 
collect information regarding participants knowledge, experiences and attitudes. 
The data was subjected to further analysis. There were three kinds of participants 
who were involved in the questionnaire survey: principals, teachers and school 
committee members.  
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The questionnaire was first designed and written in English, then 
translated into Indonesian, so that all participants were able to understand it. The 
design of the questionnaire followed suggestions by Anderson (1998, p. 177) that 
“questions about age, gender…can be threatening and are generally best asked at 
the end rather than the beginning”. Also, in order to make participants interested 
and more at ease, the researcher used important ‘warm-up questions’ first.  
Before the questionnaire was distributed, the researcher pilot tested it 
with several teachers. The intention here was to “identify ambiguities in the 
instruction…clarify the wording [of] question…and [be] alert to unanticipated 
answers” (Anderson, 1998, p.179). As a result, some changes were made to the 
questionnaire. 
There were 21 questions divided into three sections. The first section, 
containing six questions, dealt with the sources of information about SBM, 
experiences with the SBM policy, perceptions about devolved authority to the 
schools under the SBM policy, and experience of being involved in SBM 
training were asked. The six questions in the first section covered the topics 
listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Focus of questionnaire in the first section 
Q1 Sources of information about SBM 
Q2 Enough information about SBM policy 
Q3 Participation in SBM training 
Q4 Kinds of authority devolved to school 
Q5 Authority devolved in terms of budgeting 
Q6 Authority devolved in terms of staff 
Q7 Authority devolved in terms of curriculum 
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Table 4.2. Focus of questionnaire in the second section 
Q8 Kinds of community participation in school 
Q10 Is SBM good for your school ? 
Q11 Good thing about SBM  
Q12 Impact of SBM at school 
Q13 Change of workload because of SBM  
 
Table 4.3. Questionnaire, Section 2, Q9 
A School committee is an independent body 
B School committee members appointed by principal 
C Role of school committee compared to BP3 
D Approval school budget is needed from school committee 
E School committee has right to supervise school 
 
Table 4.4. Questionnaire, Section 2, Q14 
A SBM makes school management more open and effective 
B SBM pursues democratic decisions in school 
C SBM involves community in school decision making 
D SBM enhances school and community relationship 
E SBM  improves effective teaching-learning in school 
F SBM improves student learning 
G SBM gives teacher more freedom  
In the second section, seven questions asked about participants’ 
perceptions, knowledge and experiences regarding parents/community 
participation, and school committee and its impact on participants and school 
(Table 4.2). Question nine (Q9) gathered opinions regarding the school 
committee and is summarised in Table 4.3 with the answer being ‘Yes, No or 
Don’t Know’. The last question in this section (Q14) asked about participants’ 
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attitudes toward SBM (Agree, Not Sure and Disagree) as shown in Table 4.4.  In 
Q10, Q11 and Q 13 spaces for additional comment were supplied.  
In the last section, eight questions dealing with basic issues such as 
gender, age group, and education background. However there were slightly 
different questions for each groups of participants. For teachers, the 
questionnaire asked about their teaching experiences, subjects, class taught and 
job position. Principals were asked about their length of time in the position and 
how long at their present school. School committee members were asked about 
their involvement in BP3, how long they had been committee members and 
which groups they represented. Table 4.5 summarised the last section of the 
questionnaire. 
Table 4.5. Focus of questionnaire in the third section  
1 Sex 
2 Age 
3 Principal: total years as principal 
Teachers:  total years teaching 
Committee: members of BP3 previously 
4 Principal: years in the present school as principal 
Teacher: teaching in what curriculum area  
Committee: how long has been as committee member  
5 Highest education qualification 
7 Teacher: what class do you teach 
Committee: which representative group do you represent 
8 Teacher: job position in the school  
 
The questionnaires were distributed by the principals to all general state 
secondary schools in Mataram who already had graduated students (5 out of 7). 
Then the principals distributed teachers’ questionnaire to the available teachers 
in the schools. Some principals allocated school committee’s questionnaires, 
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while others just gave addresses to the researcher to initiate contact. 
Questionnaires for principals were completed by themselves. The distribution 
was as follows: One questionnaire for each principal (100% returned); 15 
questionnaires for teachers in each school (76% returned); and 7 questionnaires 
for school committee members in every school (60% returned). They were 
relatively good return rates and in some measures they represented state 
secondary school stakeholders in Mataram well (Table 4.6) 
 Table 4.6. Distribution of returned questionnaire 
Schools SMAN 1 SMAN 2 SMAN 3 SMAN 4 SMAN 5 Total
Principal 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Teachers 10 13 9 14 11 57 
Committee 4 6 3 2 6 21 
Notes:   SMAN is abbreviate of sekolah menengah atas negeri (state general secondary 
school); a number shows an official name of the school (the lowest number is 
the oldest school in the area). 
4.4.3 Interviews 
As a data collection method, the interview is most commonly used in 
qualitative research (Creswell, 1998). Anderson (1998, p. 100) writes that an 
interview is a “specialized form of communication between people for a specific  
purpose associated with some agreed subject matter”. However, as Fontana and 
Frey (2000) explain, interviews can take many forms and have various uses. This 
study  used a key informant interview type (Anderson, 1998) where verbal 
interchange between researcher and participant occurred.  
The interview was conducted after the researcher had collected the 
completed questionnaires from participants. The interview helped to elaborate on 
some issues which arose from the questionnaires and also for checking and 
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triangulation of data. The participants for the interview were differentiated into 
two groups: district and school levels. At the district level, interviews involved 
key persons who had a stake in education in Mataram and included education 
district officials, members of district parliament in an education portfolio, 
supervisors, members of the education council and teacher unions. At the school 
level, the interview participants were principals, teachers and school committee 
members.  Table 4.7 summarises the number and types of participants in 
interview sessions. 
Table 4.7. Interview Sessions 
District level School level 
Education official 1 Principal 4 
Member of parlianment 1 Teacher 6 
Supervisor 2 School Committee 4 
Education Council 3   
Teacher unions 2   
Official from major 
office  
1   
Total 10 Total 14 
   
The interview process was standard. First, the researcher asked each 
participant to agree to be interviewed. Second, a place for the interview was 
located and then the participants were shown the recommendation and 
permission letters from the district government. Most of the participants 
preferred to be interviewed in their homes, which probably made them feel more 
relaxed, secure and informal. Each time, the intention of the interview was 
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explained, and a consent form was provided for them to sign, if they agreed. 
Consistently, all agreed to participate and to share their thinking. All interviews 
were audio-tape recorded.  
To guide the interview, the researcher provided an outline of the ten 
questions to be asked of the respondents. This was intended to keep the interview 
sessions on track. The focus of the questions was to gather as much information 
as possible regarding school based management policies and practices in state 
secondary schools in Mataram. Accordingly, this interview was an elaboration of 
issues that were already considered in the questionnaires. The interview 
questions are shown in Appendix 2. 
Question 1 of the interview guide was designed to gather knowledge and 
experience regarding school based management. Question 2 sought the 
participants’ opinions regarding what specific areas can be devolved to schools. 
The concern is with participants’ aspirations and what power issues they thought 
most important. Question 3 was designed to explore quality issues facing 
Indonesia’s education system. Question 4 related to the role changes that 
occurred in the education district office since the introduction of SBM. 
Questions 5 and 6 focused on community involvements that become 
central to SBM. Question 7 was particularly designed to ask respondents at 
school level about their experiences of implementing the ministry decree.  
Question 8 sought participants’ opinion and attitudes regarding the school 
committee. For instance, did they think it was a sufficient and fair arrangement? 
The last two questions asked respondents about their experiences and reflections 
on how SBM might be improved. 
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4.4.4 Site Studies 
A triangulation of data was also obtained via site studies. Two out of the 
five state secondary schools which became the sample of this study were chosen 
from different sub-municipal (kecamatan). The site studies were conducted in 
the last month of the fieldwork research (January 2004). The schools were 
allocated two weeks each for data collection to occur on site. 
At each school, the researcher met with the school principal to ask 
permission and to explain the intention of the site studies. Both principals agreed 
to participate. The site studies included observations during school meetings, and 
informal talks with the principals, teachers and school committee members. 
Because school committee members were rarely found in the school, the 
researcher went to their homes to gather data. 
4.5 Data Analysis procedures  
4.5.1 Preparing the data for analysis 
Primary data for the document analyses were public documents, some of 
which were already in English while others were translated to English from  
Indonesian. Questionnaire data were tabulated in order to make it easy to 
analyse. Additional comments by respondents were translated into English. The 
audio-recorded data from interviews were transcribed (in Indonesian), and were 
translated into English. As a process, the researcher first analyzed the 
documents, followed by regulations about SBM, and then fieldwork notes.  
4.5.2 Regulation at national level 
The analysis and discussion about regulations at national level pertained 
to the Ministry of National Education decree number 044/U/2002. This included 
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analysis of the reasons for and the preamble of the decree. The content of the 
policy and its explanations in the decree appendixes, guidelines and other 
publications from the central office were critically examined. To put the policy 
in perspective, the researcher used data from the literature review in the analysis, 
particularly to answer the first two research questions.   
4.5.3 Field data    
Data from the fieldwork was divided into district and school levels. Data 
gathered from the district level, including regulations, transcripts of interviews 
with stakeholders at district level (members of parliament, education district 
officers, education council members, teacher union representative, and 
supervisors) were analysed. At the school level the analysis included examining 
the decree that stipulated school committee arrangements, and returned 
questionnaires and transcripts of interviews with stakeholders at the school level 
(principals, teachers, and school committee members). Methods of document 
analyses that were used at the national level were also used at the district and 
school levels.  
Interview data from both levels was transcribed. It was then loaded onto 
NVivo (a computer program for qualitative data analysis). In order to identify 
and contextualise comments in the discussion, coding was used in the Nvivo 
(called document attribute) programme to show levels (either district or school), 
respondent’s position (district official, supervisor, member of parliament, unions, 
education council member, principal, teacher, or school committee), sex, 
ethnicity (Sasak [native people of Lombok], Javanese, Balinese or Bima), and 
sequence number of interview respondents.  
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Data obtained from the questionnaire wase tabulated using Microsoft Excel. 
Several respondents gave additional comments in the questionnaire to explain 
and emphasise their answers. The comments were then transcribed and loaded 
into NVivo using coding as for the interviews. To differentiate these from the 
interview data, the researcher used code ‘Q’ for questionnaire and ‘I’ for 
interview followed with a dash and number. So, a code of Q-35 means a 
questionnaire’s response from respondent number 35 on my list. 
The analysis and discussion in Chapter 6 shows the realities and 
complexities about school based management in state secondary school from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives at district level. Document and interview analyses 
were the main sources for this chapter. For chapter 7, the researcher brought 
together document analyses, questionnaire and interview data to illustrate school 
based management at the school level from stakeholders’ views and practices. 
Site studies observation in two schools generally confirmed what stakeholders 
had commented and answered in the interview.  
4.6 Trustworthiness 
 In a qualitative study Lincoln and Guba (Cresswell, 1998, p. 197) 
maintains that to establish trustworthiness, the research has to be credible, 
transferable, dependable and confirmable. These terms imply validity and 
reliability. Validity means that the researcher actually investigates something 
that matches what is being looked for, and this is research interpretability 
(internal validity) and research generalisability (external validity) on 
applicability to a larger population. On the other hand, reliability of the research 
deals with consistency of research results, which include consistency in terms of 
collection, analysis and interpretation of data (internal reliability and possibility) 
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to gain the same results if research procedures are conducted in other contexts 
(external reliability). 
 In order to achieve trustworthiness, the present research used a 
triangulation procedure in terms of methods of data collection and its analysis. 
The triangulation method was used by the researcher with showed the transcript 
of interviews to some respondents before data analysis for checking and 
additional comments.  In addition, the triangulation method was also used for 
site studies and document analysis to provide a necessary context for the policy 
investigation and impact assessments in the location of the case study.  
4.7 Ethical issues 
In order to protect the individuals who participated in this study, 
appropriate ethical requirements were followed. In this way the research 
participants could be assured of their privacy, anonymity and the confidentiality 
of their responses. It was pointed out to them that data which was collected from 
fieldwork was placed in a safe and secure location at all times. The study 
addressed these ethical issues and followed the standard procedures of the ethical 
sub-committee of the Faculty of Education, Victoria University of Wellington, 
New Zealand. 
4.8 Conclusion  
  This chapter discussed the methodological aspects of the study. A 
framework was presented, followed by a discussion on the case study. 
Descriptions of data collection, analysis and management were given. The 
chapter ended with a discussion on trustworthiness and ethics. In chapter 5, the 
documents analyses of SBM regulations will be discussed.  
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Chapter 5 
POLICY  AT  THE  NATIONAL  LEVEL 
5.1 Introduction 
 The implementation of school based management policy is to 
support school autonomy in order to increase education quality 
in accordance to national and international standards (Fajar, 
2004).  
 The excerpt above of a speech by A. Malik Fajar, the Minister of 
National Education, on the National Education Day (2 May 2004) demonstrates 
the view that school based management policy is a panacea to improve 
educational quality. Such a perspective created high expectations right from the 
beginning when SBM was considered, until it became official policy. This could 
provide us with an indication to expect whether what is proposed by the Minister 
is inevitable or just another rhetoric for political convenience. 
 This chapter analyses the Minister of National Education of the Republic 
of Indonesia’s decree (Kepmendiknas) number 044/U/2002, which was stipulated 
as the legal basis for implementation of school based management. The analysis 
focuses on several aspects of the decree, such as the main content (the body of 
regulation), the elucidation and the related official materials that served as the 
guidelines for the decree’s implementation.  
The focus of the decree was the establishment of new ‘governing bodies’ 
at the district and school levels. This chapter therefore analyses the establishment 
of the ‘education council’ and ‘school committee’, as the two new institutions: 
what they are, how they were established, what their roles, functions and 
authorities are, and the potential effects of their establishment on education stake 
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holders. Related documents regarding this will also be analysed because they 
formed the bases for the rationale and conceptualisations of SBM as envisaged in 
the decree. 
 All of the documents are analysed in two ways. First, data from the 
literature reviews was used to explain and understand the decree from a wider 
perspective. Where consensus was found in the literature, it is used to examine 
certain issues in the decree. Second, the decree’s formulation, wording and 
elucidation are reviewed and critically analysed in an attempt to identify the 
exact meanings, contexts and intentions of the designer and writer on various 
issues such as power relations, transfer of authority, institutional composition 
and arrangements. 
5.2 The Decree 
In this section, the decree’s origins, including background and rationale 
for enactment, are analysed. This covers the main contents, appendices and other 
related materials. All the materials used include documents published by the 
Ministry of National Education (MoNE) in Jakarta and other materials regarded 
as public documents, available from various sources in various forms. The copy 
of the decree is readily available and can be found in schools or district offices in 
printed form, and is is also available in electronic format (soft copy format) from 
the MoNE’s website. 
5.2.1 Origin of the decree 
The Kepmendiknas 044/U/2002 was one of the most awaited decrees in 
the history of Indonesia’s education. Officially the decree was released on 2 
April 2002, signed by A. Malik Fajar, the then Minister of National Education 
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(MoNE, 2002). The history of the decree, however, can be traced back nearly 
three and a half years previously, when the World Bank published a report about 
the performance of Indonesia’s education (see section 2.3.5 under sub-heading 
School Based Management). The possibility of greater school autonomy was 
further explored by the government which formed several task forces following 
the World Bank report.  
Upon publication of the Task Forces’ progress report in early July 2000, 
the public perception was positive. It appeared that the general public had 
welcomed and supported the idea of school based management (Kompas, 
2000a). In their final report, the Task Forces wrote explicitly about the school 
based management implementation (Jalal and Mustafa, 2001, p. 126), as follows: 
laws and regulations need to be prepared to support the idea of school 
decentralization in the form of school-based management. Currently, 
Laws No. 22/1999 and Law 25/2000 only support the general idea of 
decentralization from central to local government. Furthermore, 
government regulation (PP) No. 25/2000 does not clearly specify the 
government role in public school management. To guarantee the 
application of school decentralization that promotes the quality 
education, it is necessary to describe the complete strategy of school 
decentralization in other forms of legal documents. 
From then on,  the Task Forces recommendations became the blue print 
for Indonesia’s educational reform after the political reform in 1998, having 
formed the major part of Law no. 25/2000 concerning the National Development 
Programme in the section on educational development for the autonomy era 
(Rizali, 2004, personal communication). That law explicitly mentioned that the 
policy of regional autonomy at district level required the establishment of an 
education council and at school level a school committee. Both institutions were 
to operate as governance entities at both levels (Tim Pengembangan, 2000).  
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The first public pressure on the MoNE to design a decree came just two 
months after a progress report seminar by the Task Forces. It happened when 
delegates of the Indonesian National Convention on Education asked Yahya 
Muhaimin, the Minister at that time, to implement school based management and 
to release regulations regarding such a change (Kompas, 2000c). The Minister’s 
positive response invited further pressure and interest from the press (see for 
example Kompas, 2000e; 2000f;), education practitioners and experts, and also 
from individuals who were involved in a pilot project about school autonomy 
(see section 2.3.5 under sub-heading The Rintisan MBS). 
Following the Minister’s response, several high ranking officials of the 
MoNE began leaking information about the decree. Ace Suryadi as a head of the 
facilitation unit of the MoNE for Educational Decentralisation, for example, was 
reported as saying that a school based management decree cannot proceed 
without specific regulations to change patterns of school subsidy, budget, and 
control mechanisms (Kompas, 2000d). In another example, according to Indra 
Djati Sidi, the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education of the 
MoNE, a school can select and appoint its own principal and teachers (Kompas, 
2001b). In a further example, Fasli Jalal, another high official at the MoNE, was 
reported as saying that schools would receive grants giving them flexibility to 
use the funds for their own purposes (Kompas, 2001a).  
Explanations from several MoNE officials at this time indicated that the 
construction of school based management in Indonesia would be similar to SBM 
models from developed countries. This implied that a school was to be given 
authority over budgeting and personnel, and a bulk funding policy implemented 
These promises were obviously a significant policy leap from the previous 
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practice of rigid centralism, and resulted in high expectations by the general 
public.  
However the decree itself, as mandated by the Law 25/2000, was not 
signed for two years. Firstly, there was some concern as to why it took so long to 
become official policy when there was huge public support and some pilot 
project initiatives had proved relatively successful. This was because, in terms of 
regulation, the decree could be made effectively active only by the minister’s 
approval and imposed without consultation with the legislative body or the 
general public. Secondly, all of the leaked information by high ranking officials 
was missing from the final decree’s content. It could have been that debates and 
disagreement during the formulation of the decree could not be resolved. The 
policy makers realised how complex and sensitive the issues were, especially as 
some delegated authority in the educational sector had already been given to 
district government as a consequences of the autonomy law. It seems likely that 
the idea of school autonomy was too radical and there was considerable 
resistance and disbelief on the part of officials at the central office with regard to 
adopting school based management ideas within the Indonesian schooling 
system. 
5.2.2 Contents of the decree 
The preamble to the decree states that the reason for the regulation is to 
facilitate society’s participation in education, and the decree is needed to create a 
new institutional structure. So the decree was intended to set up a new kind of 
organisation, and formed the legal basis for doing this. The contents of the 
decree are very short, consisting of only four articles as shown in Table 5.1 
(MoNE, 2002; my translation).   
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Table 5.1. Contents of the MoNE decree number 044/U/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 1 
(1) In each district is formed an Education Council, as an initiative 
from the society and/or the district government. 
 
(2) In each education institution or group of education institutions is 
formed a School Committee as an initiative from the society, 
educational institution and/or the district government. 
 
Article 2 
The formation of the Education Council and School Committee are to 
use the guide line for formation of Education Council and School 
Committee as attached in the Appendix I and II of this decree. 
 
Article 3 
With effect of this decree, then the decree of Ministry of Education 
and Culture No 0293/U/1993 of 1993 regarding the formation of 
Board of Education Assistance is abolished. 
 
Article 4 
This decree is effective on the date stipulated. 
The first article deals with the formation of a new organisation in every 
district1 and educational institution. The second article gives suggestions about 
how to form those organisations. The third article mentions stipulations about a 
specific decree in the past which is no longer valid. The last article outlines when 
the decree is to come into force. 
 In paragraph (1) of Article 1, there are two aspects which are mentioned 
explicitly: the creation of the new organisation at district level, and who can 
establish it.  For the former, there is no other explanation available about this 
new institution, its functions, tasks, role, and authority, even who the client of 
the education council is. The only clear aspect is the name of the organisation. 
Although in the next section, there is mention of the guidelines that can be used 
                                                 
1 The Indonesian word for district can mean either kabupaten or kota. In simple terms, kabupaten 
means an autonomous administrative government area where more than 50% of their  population 
lives in rural areas and work as farmers; kota means municipality where more than 50% of the 
people work in service sectors. 
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to form the organisation, the details are not stated explicitly in the body of the 
decree. This can be taken to mean that there are no clear legal consequences for 
the parties who are involved.  
For the latter part of paragraph (1), the decree states that a new 
organisation has to be formed. However, it does not specify who is responsible 
for establishing the organisation. It could be either by the district government or 
by the society, and also possibly by both of them. This latter situation can occur 
in a district that has more than one education council, and can result in a problem 
of legitimacy. In addition the term society, as used, is also problematic, because 
its meaning is legally unclear. The decree does not give specific and clear 
meanings about who can be involved to constitute the new body. Without that, 
the formulation of responsibilities can lead to tensions between society and the 
district government. On one hand the new organisation may want to facilitate 
societal participation in education, but on the other hand the district government 
has a legal right to be involved and to steer the change process. 
Regarding paragraph (2) of the article 1, there may also be a legal 
complexity here. Firstly, by using the term “educational institution”, the decree 
is imposing a uniform model of a new organisation. Regardless of their status, 
either state or private schools, or schooling levels have to establish a school 
committee. Later, appearing in the decree’s appendix, the obligation to establish 
a new organisation also extends to pre-school education (kindergarten), out-of-
school education, and even to institutions in the Islamic schooling system, either 
public or private Islamic schools. This kind of one-size-fits-all policy is 
remarkable, because denying school status in the reality of diverse situations 
shows that the designers did not have empathy with the complexities and may 
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not have given careful enough thought to institutional arrangements. It seems the 
decree wants to swallow all kinds of societal participation at the school level in a 
monolithic form of institution. In this respect, the decree is crossing into the 
spheres of other ministry interventions (particularly the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, which controls and manages the Islamic school system). This is unusual 
because the decree is the lowest regulation that can be promulgated by the 
central government, yet it has been portrayed as having far-reaching 
implications. 
In other countries, like New Zealand (Wyle, 1995) or Australia (Abu-
Duhou, 1999), structural change in school organisations can only take place in 
public schools where the government supports these institutions with public 
funds. Private schools in Indonesia are minimally supported by the government 
(see for example Bangay, 2005), but the decree does not acknowledge this 
differentiation between private and public schools.  
Furthermore, in terms of who has responsibility to establish a school 
committee, paragraph 2 of the decree is problematic. For instance, three parties 
have a right to constitute the school committee. It could be formed by the 
society, the educational institution or the district government respectively. 
Furthermore, establishing a committee can also be achieved through a 
combination of two or more parties of the three parties cooperating together. 
Obviously, it opens up the possibility of a competition that can lead also to a 
legitimacy problem, when more than one school committee is formed in one 
school. The consequences can be confusing, as when, for example, a district 
government introduces a decree which imposes a school committee for every 
private school at secondary level. The private school cannot refuse the school 
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committee regulation imposed on it because the district government has the 
capacity and legitimacy to implement the decree.  
In Article 2 another peculiar aspect is also evident. It mentions that when 
a party wants to establish an education council and school committee it can refer 
to the decree’s appendices. The term “can be used”2 in the article shows that this 
decree is a “hesitant regulation”. This means that each party does not have any 
obligation to follow this decree and its appendices, therefore they can establish 
the new organisation in their own ways. So while it is probable that one party 
might establish a school committee with clear, detailed and appropriate 
processes, it is also possible that a party with power can establish  a committee 
for its own purposes.  
The wording of the second article exposes the real political will of the 
central government for the SBM implementation. It seems that the policy makers 
in the central office do not fully support the ideas of school autonomy and local 
educational governance. The central office documents implicitly acknowledge 
that the decree can be bypassed if district or school stakeholders intend not to 
comply. The decree itself therefore states an explicit loop hole which could be 
used by those with reservations about SBM.  
However, the last two articles in the decree have clearer meanings and 
are more straightforward. No other interpretations will follow regarding the legal 
base of BP3 (board of educational assistance) in each school, which, under 
article 3, has to be abolished.  The intention to explicitly put an end to the BP3 
regulation is to ensure that only one organisation is to facilitate societal 
                                                 
2 Translated from Indonesian’s “bisa digunakan”, which means voluntary to be used if one 
thinks it is useful.  
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participation at the school level, and this organisation is the school committee. In 
this way, any unwanted competitions or conflicts between the school committee 
and the BP3 are eliminated. This change also signalled that the rules of the game 
have also changed and that practices under the BP3 are no longer accepted. 
In general, the first two articles which are the important parts of the 
decree, are ambiguous. They do not have clear meanings and their underlying 
rationale has not been explained, thereby creating potential confusion due to 
possible multiple interpretations during implementation. This lack of clarity is a 
serious weakness. 
The decree reflects the inability of the central government, in particular 
the MoNE, to position the education sector in the right place, within the context 
of the autonomy law (Law 22/99). The changes also demanded that the central 
office changed its role from being an implementer of policy to being a regulator. 
In the autonomy era, the central office does not have any experience or clear 
ideas regarding these changes (Malik, 2004; World Bank, 2004).  
5.2.3 The decree’s appendices 
In contrast to the content of the decree, which is brief, the appendices are 
much more detailed regarding the education council and the school committee. 
As stated in the previous section, such a situation has led to the assumption that 
the policy makers themselves are uncertain about the new organisations that have 
to be established in every district and school around the country. Other 
interpretations are possible. For instance, it may be that the MoNE does not want 
to impose a regulation which may intervene with district authorities. At the same 
time, by introducing the decree, a degree of technical and legal guidance is 
provided to school and district governments which do not have the capacity to 
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formulate such regulations. Again, it must be stated that according to Article 2, 
the provisions of the appendices are not compulsory for education authorities. 
There are two appendices that accompany the decree. The first outlines 
guidelines for establishing education councils and the second guidelines for 
starting school committees. While the appendices relate to organisations at 
different levels (district and school) and for different purposes, both are 
remarkably similar in structure and content. Both appendices have eight sub-
sections: (I) definition, name and scope; (II) positions and characteristics; (III) 
aims; (IV) roles and functions; (V) organisation; (VI) formation; (VII) 
arrangement inter-organisation; and (VIII) closing. The contents of the 
appendices of this decree are shown in Appendix 3. In the following sections, the 
appendices are further analysed. 
Education Council 
 The first section of appendix I defines the Education Council as “a body 
which provides a place for societal participation in order to improve quality, 
equity and efficiency of educational management in a district”. The phrase 
“provides a place” implies that this new organisation is to create space and 
opportunity for members of the public to participate particularly in educational 
matters. Further, it is also expected that any contributions should be useful and 
should lead to educational excellence. It appears that the education council is 
expected to have a direct role in improving quality when this is a primary task 
for the government itself. This means there is a hidden agenda embedded in the 
formulation of the decree, which is to make the general public take some 
responsibility for tasks that belong to the educational bureaucracy.  
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From the third section on the aims of the Education Council, several things 
seem clear although also open to question. Firstly, the three stated objectives 
seem to merely serve to provide a greater clarity of definition for the education 
council. The document stipulates that educational quality can be reached when 
the council facilitates and channels societal aspirations and initiatives through 
policy and programmes. In relation to equity, the document states that the 
council can achieve this by “increasing responsibility and active participation 
from all layers of society in education implementation”. In relation to efficiency 
the document encourages, “creating ambience and condition for transparency, 
accountable, and democratic”.  On the one hand, the document seems to state 
objectives that encourage education councils to undertake certain tasks, but on 
the other hand the policy is not responsive to public needs and dynamics because 
agendas from elements of the society are not included or are not easily 
facilitated.  
Secondly, critical analysis of the objectives of Education Councils, as 
stated  in the third section is important to ascertain the extent of potential success 
for the new body. However, this is difficult because the objectives in the 
appendices are normatively written and difficult to operationalize and assess. 
 In the fourth section, roles and functions are outlined. Roles for the 
council include it being an advisory agency, supporting agency, controlling 
agency and mediator. Except for the supporting and controlling functions, the 
other roles are standard ones. However, in relation to the council’s second role 
“as a supporting agency in terms of financial, thinking and labour in educational 
implementation”, this appears to miss the point for establishing education 
councils. This is because the supporting role referred to in the decree is not a role 
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that is to be played by the council, but rather it is an executive’s role (belongs to 
a district government). In other words, it seems that the decree has intended to 
swap government obligations relating to a core issue (education funding) to the 
Education Council. Further, if the council is to play a supporting role, without 
further legal guidelines on what this means, then it would seem that the decree is 
just to make Education Councils act as charities to fund educational activities in 
the district.  
 There seems to be a misfit between the espoused controlling agency role 
of the Education Council, “in terms of transparency and accountability of 
educational implementation and outcome,” and the nature and location of this 
kind of organisation. This is because as shown in the listed functions of the 
council, none particularly gives the council the right ‘to control or manage’ 
educational implementation and outcome (World Bank, 2004, p. 9). Again, this 
is another ambiguous section of the decree which can result in tensions and 
possibly create confusion in the field. 
 The appendices stipulate that the education council conducts cooperative 
work with local government and parliament, and encourages parents’ 
involvement to improve educational quality. The stipulations are, however, too 
broad and not sufficiently focused. According to Malik (2004) none of these 
tasks are clearly stated. Take the first function for instance, which states that an 
Education Council’s role is to increase “society’s attention and commitment for 
quality educational implementation”. The terms “attention” and “commitment” 
are difficult as yardsticks, particularly when these relate to “quality educational 
implementation” which is a never ending process. Thus, in reality it is difficult to 
perform tasks such as those stipulated when the audience is society at large. It 
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therefore seems that these functions are immeasurable, making it impossible to 
gauge the success or failure of the council. 
 A closer scrutiny of the council’s list of roles and functions reveals that 
there is no mention of the authority. Without a clear authority, it is impossible 
for the council to make decisions and recommendations that are binding for 
interrelated institutions such as the local government and parliament.  
 The fifth section is titled organisation, which seems inconsistent with the 
decree. As stipulated, the council is to give input and advice, and made 
recommendation to the local government/parliament, but in reality members of 
the bureaucracy and local parliament can become members of the council, which 
can have up to 5 people. In addition, sub-section V.2.c points out explicitly that 
the “Chairman position is not to be held by local government and parliament 
Elements”. So, the functions stated above are impractical because the officers of 
the council are already part of the organisation (Purwono, 2003). When 
members’ involvement does not allow them to become a chairman, it is a clear 
indication from the decree’s designers that the council is to have members from 
the executive or legislative, as long as they are not officially steering the 
organisation.  
 The appendices on the forming of Educational Councils seem to favour 
the holders of power, which is the local government. The stipulations give 
authority to the local government to manage the selection process, and establish 
the decree that is to be signed by the head of district. In this way any opposition 
is silenced, while simultaneously ensuring that the council becomes subordinate 
to the bureaucracy.  
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In the seventh section regarding inter-organisation arrangements, as 
shown in part B and C of the Appendix 3, the Education Council’s relationships 
with other organisations at district level are presented. These diagrams are 
important because they show a clear vision of what is intended. It seems that the 
intention in creating Education Councils is to create a body for governance at the 
district level. However, the local parliament is already in existence. It would be 
clear if, in the structural arrangements, the clients for the Education Council are 
shown. As it stands now, it is unclear which institutions really are the clients of 
Education Councils. It is unclear if the client is the local parliament (legislative) 
or the local government (executive) (Malik, 2004). Having two clients to serve is 
problematic and can lead to confusion for the council itself. When the council’s 
client is the legislative, then the council has to support the work of the local 
parliament, as a supervisory role. Such a role, as an advisory agency to the local 
parliament makes sense, unlike a relationship with the executive. 
Both parts B and C of the appendices do not clearly positioned the 
relationship of the council that has to be taken and others at the district level. The 
relationship between the council and legislative offices is satisfactorily 
identified, but not with the executive. In parts B, the council deals with the head 
of district, the mayor; but in parts C it is suggested to district education office. In 
the local context, a relationship with government is not the same as with the head 
of a district education office. Consequently, if the education council is to work 
properly its relationships must be clearly stated. 
 In the closing section of the appendices, it stipulates that the council 
“can be regulated” by legislation. Again, the phrase ‘can’ implies that this is not 
mandatory and can be ignored. Moreover, to subject the council to regulation 
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through legislation is inconsistent with educational management under SBM. 
This is because the council is part of governance and not management with the 
local government having full authority.  
 School Committee 
 As previously stated, the standard treatment given to the Education 
Council and the School Committee is not a coincidence. The decree’s treatment 
for both institutions is similar in terms of structure, content and even wording. 
This is a “cut and paste” approach to drafting regulation and seems rather 
simplistic.  
 In the first paragraph of section one, the definition of School Committee 
is as follows (MoNE, 2002; cited from appendices II of the decree):  
an autonomous body which provides a place for societal 
participation to increase quality, equity and efficiency of 
educational management in each educational institution which is 
involved  in pre-school education, schooling system or out-of-
school education. 
Similar to the definition of Education Councils, the one for School Committees 
also emphasizes several aspects of educational management at the school level. 
In addition, the decree appendix states that the School Committee is a required 
body to be established not only for schools but also for pre-schools and out-of-
school education institutions. This means that educational institutions at any 
level, in any system and of any status must establish a school committee. This 
requirement implies that when institutions establish a school committee, they can 
be regarded as practising school based management. The belief is that the school 
committee is autonomous and will facilitate community aspirations and practice 
transparency, accountability and democratic management. The decrees impresses 
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on the public that the era of the BP3, where the focus has been on collecting 
funds from parents, is over.  
 However, in the third paragraph of first section, the decree stipulates that 
the BP3 which already exists in schools “can be widened in its functions, roles 
and membership according to these guidelines”. Again, this statement is 
inconsistent with what is stipulated in Article 3 of the decree where it is stated 
explicitly that the BP3 regulation in school is has been abolished. 
 Regarding its roles and functions from the perspective of SBM, the 
School Committee is seen principally as an advisory council. In this regard, the 
committee has a mediation role between the government (executive) and the 
school community.  So, when disputes arise between the school and community, 
these are directly handed over to the government, by-passing the principal and 
the education district office.   
There appears to be a close relationship between the school committee as 
a supporting agency (third role) and a fund raising agency (sixth function). 
Under the previous BP3 system, collecting funds was the only real role. Under 
the decree this close dual role is still ambiguous at the school level. How can the 
committee that gives financial support not be given authority as well? Like the 
Education Council guidelines, the guidelines on school committee do not 
mention anything about authority. Consequently, it seems that the intention of 
the decree’s designers regarding financial support to the school is similar to the 
thinking and practice of the previous system. In the case of state secondary 
schools, as mentioned in section 2.3.5, the sum of parent’s financial contribution 
as ‘tuition fees’ to the school is considerable. Very often, for the ‘favourite’ 
school in the capital city area, the parental funding contribution is higher than all 
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of the government subsidy (concurrent budget) in the same budget period. The 
decree does not clarify the committee’s roles, even as these relate to parental 
fund raising or other financial matters. This may also be interpreted as another 
hidden agenda that is embedded in the decree from the central government to 
hide incapability to support school operations adequately. Unlike school based 
management policy initiatives in other countries, the decree in Indonesia has not 
provided national standards for school funding or finance in general. 
In the section on organisation, the decree documents state that the 
“chairman position is not assumed by the school principal”. This statement is 
inconsistent with the statement on membership of the School Committee which, 
by default, does not list the school principal as eligible for membership. It could 
be that the principal of the school is automatically a member of the school 
committee. However the designers of the decree did not write this in the 
appendix. Similarly, the decree provides for parents to be members of the 
committee, but there are no guarantees or obligations for parents to be involved 
on it.   
As with the Education Council, the principal dominates in the 
establishment of the School Committee; thereby advancing his own agendas at 
the school level. This can be seen with the mechanism to elect members of the 
school committee (sixth section), recruitment procedures giving the principal a 
special position of privilege to agree or disagree. 
Regarding organisational arrangements as shown in part B of the 
Appendix 3, the decree puts the School Committee below the school for which 
the committee is established. This may be interpreted as the school committee 
being seen as having a less than significant role. The school committee is neither 
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an equal partner nor does it have a horizontal position as a governance entity 
within the school. Further, the diagram states that other institutions that have 
responsibilities in educational management have mutual horizontal relationships. 
In terms of the state school system, the institution that has ‘responsibility in 
educational management’ is the educational district office, but the nature of the 
relationship is direct and instructive to the school. Again, inserting the school 
committee within an already crowded and hierarchical system may not be 
appropriate. 
5.2.4 Other guidelines to the decree 
 As part of the developmental process for the decree, the central office 
published a number of materials for public use.  These documents were used by 
central office staff in seminars, organized by education offices at district and 
provincial levels. This study examined these documents as they contained more 
comprehensive explanations, sometimes about operationalising the decree.  
  Unlike the decree’s content and appendices which do not mention about 
SBM explicitly, other official materials and guidelines from the central office 
were clear in stating that the decree is a form of implementing a school based 
management policy (Tim Pengembangan, 2002; Suryadi, 2003).  These 
documents confirm the underlying intentions of the decree formulation in terms 
of a political purpose that is not explicitly stated in the decree itself.  
 Suryadi (2003) observes that the roles of the education council and the 
committee involve a paradigm shift. Merely to be collecting money from parents 
as was done previously in the BP3 is something that has to be ended.  Further, he 
writes that “the BP3 institution is proven not effective to mobilise society 
participation and responsibility”. 
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 Suryadi also provides a thorough picture about school conditions with 
regard to capacity building. He differentiates these into four stages (pro-formal, 
formality, transitional and autonomous) where each school at a certain stage 
should be treated differently. However, such a proposal for a kind of 
“asymmetric” decentralisation contradicts the intentions of the decree where 
every school is treated the same way. Further, asymmetric decentralisation needs 
careful analysis and developing of criteria which can measure school conditions. 
To do this, the central government does not have authority anymore and the local 
government lacks the capacity to formulate such a policy. 
In relation to the subject of authority, Suryadi (2003) presents seven 
forms of authority that schools can exercise: 1) establishing the school’s vision, 
mission, strategy, aims, symbol, song and rules; 2) acceptance of new students; 
3) intra-curricular and extra-curricular activities; 4) procurement of educational 
means and infrastructure; 5) to write-off goods/equipment which are no longer 
functional; 6) teaching and learning process; and 7) educational innovation 
according to the school based management quality improvement concept. 
Obviously, the range of authority which ‘can’ be exercised by the school, 
according to Suryadi’s framework, is not new. In fact, the schools were used to 
this kind of authority even in the previous centralistic system. So, what is 
presented to schools as devolved authority is but marginal, like the situation now 
in practice. The suggested exercise of authority is on peripheral issues without 
any real intentions to empower schools. As a result, this explanation is similar to 
the unclear stipulations of the decree, and of course there is no authority being 
transferred to school committees.   
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5.3 Discussion    
The analysis so far has suggested that the school based management ideas 
in legal documents have merely stipulated the structure of the new educational 
arrangement, namely the Education Council at district and School Committee at 
the school level. These two new inclusions are intended to fill in the governance 
line at district and school level that previously has not existed.  
From a process perspective, it is noted that the central government 
actually needed a longer time to release the decree. This seems to indicate that 
the central government officials did not really believe in local capacity and 
commitment at both district and school levels, so they released the decree to 
slow the pace of decentralisation (see World Bank, 2004). It seems that by being 
brief and unclear in the decree’s content, minimum impact is preferred and a 
slower decentralisation process is desired.   
Further, the decree can be seen as a means to put forward other central 
office agenda during the autonomy era, without any consultations with district 
governments where the authority for the education sector now resides.  As a 
result, this is makes managing primary and secondary schools at the district 
government level confusing. This is because changing from a previously extreme 
centralisation to decentralisation at the district level is not a smooth or easy 
transition. While the Autonomy Law is still in its early implementation stage, the 
central office is also urging significant changes in the institutional arrangements 
for governance at district and school levels. This is something new and 
unfamiliar to the Indonesian education system, even for the society at large.  
When the decree was signed, it was clear that the intention was to fulfil a 
mandate of the Law 25/2000. As well, the decree served a political purpose, to 
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show that the government cared and was accomplishing public expectations. 
This is particularly referring to the tension evident in public opinion about SBM 
implementation during the years before the decree was signed.  
In hindsight, bureaucratic views are appearing in the decree’s 
formulations with regard to several issues. First, emphasis has been on changing 
structural arrangements. The state wanted to show that changes were happening, 
at least with the introduction of the two institutions for community participation. 
Further, the two new bodies were not designed to significantly impact on 
bureaucratic authority; hence they were given minimal support and marginal 
spaces to operate. The council and committee had little real authority given to 
them as they were placed at the periphery. Second, the decree imposed a uniform 
model, particularly for the school committee. It did not have regard for school 
level, size, location, and the type of community served. This shows a lack of 
awareness on the part of the designers regarding the diversity and complexity of 
Indonesian society. Although Suryadi (2003) proposes a school differentiation 
based on capacity building level, this is not officially written into the decree and 
consequently the ideas do not bind district governments to implement them. 
Thus, the nature of Indonesian education cannot be grouped by a single set of 
criteria on school institutional capacity. 
Furthermore, the decree’s formulation also reveals central bureaucracy 
interest, particularly in the establishment of Education Councils and School 
Committees. Both organisations, according to the decree’s appendices, have to 
be formed through mechanisms where certain parties, namely the education 
office at district level and the principal at school level, would be driving the 
changes. The intention of the central office, the authority which is tasked to 
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compose regulations such as decrees, is to redistribute power, during the 
autonomy era, only to groups with similar characteristics and similar 
backgrounds, who can be trusted based on their experiences from a previous 
time. Undoubtedly, the central office will protect the district office and the 
principal from their opponents and others who may not be trusted, especially the 
community. In other words, with the power they hold, the central office not only 
alters but also subverts ideas about school based management as proposed by the 
task forces and expected by the public. 
5.4 Conclusion  
The analyses in this chapter have demonstrated that the MoNE’s decree 
number 044/U/2002 has an ambiguous conceptualisation and lacks clarity about 
governance and management regarding new organisational arrangements at 
district and school levels. These criticisms relate to descriptions of how the two 
institutions will play their roles and functions, and fulfil their mandates. The 
societal expectations of the decrees have not materialized, due to ill-conceived 
nature of the decree as well as inadequate capacities at the local level to 
implement the policy.  
The next chapter will analyse the impact of the decree at the district and 
school levels as perceived and practiced by local stakeholders.  
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Chapter  6 
PERSPECTIVES  AND  PRACTICES  
AT  DISTRICT LEVEL  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The implementation of the autonomy law (Law 22/1999), starting on 1 
January 2001, gave district governments power to exercise full authority in 
public sectors including education. Undoubtedly this was intended to bring hope 
and opportunity for betterment of education for each district, but it also gave 
power to certain actors like mayors, local parliament members, and education 
district officials. Then 16 months later, the MoNE released a decree which tried 
to accommodate greater community involvement in education. This resulted a 
new body called the Education Council at the district level.  
The shift of direct authority from the central to the district, bypassing 
provincial government, resulted in power dynamics and new opportunities 
between key players.  Therefore it was interesting to gather the views and 
practices of significant actors at the district level regarding school based 
management policy particularly, and educational autonomy in general. It was 
also important to ascertain other education stakeholder perspectives about their 
actions, particularly the views of school supervisors, the teachers union, 
principals, teachers and school committee members.  
The analyses of respondents’ interviews, both from district and school 
levels, revealed that there were three key players with different degrees of 
influence. Firstly, district parliamentary members and the mayor were regarded 
 116
as a higher authority at the district level with moderate influence upon education; 
secondly, the district education office which had significant authority and 
influence; and thirdly, the education council who had little authority and limited 
influence. 
 Following this discussion regarding influence a number of issues relating 
to the key players will be considered. Several documents which related to 
education autonomy policy in the district (such as the district official budget and 
establishment of the education council) were analysed. Information about 
respondents’ backgrounds will be presented first to provide a context. 
6.2 Interviewees’ background 
Ten people were identified as key players at the district level and they 
participated as interview respondents. All of them were males representing 
different occupations and positions at district level in the education sector (Table 
6.1). Six of them were district government employees (I-1, I-2, I-3, I-6, I-7 and I-
24), one worked as a lecturer in a private university (I-4), two were recently 
retired civil servants (I-10 and I-23) and one was a local member of parliament 
(I-9) from a new party which held a seat from the 1999 general election.  Except 
for I-4, I-9 and I-24, all respondents had worked in the public education system 
for more than 15 years. Seven out of ten respondents had worked as teachers for 
more than 10 years (I-1, I-2, I-3, I-6, I-7, I-10 and I-23);  five of them (I-1, I-6, I-
7, I-10 and I-23) had held principalship positions for some years; three were 
officials in the education district office (I-7, I-10 and I-23). All respondents held 
an undergraduate degree, and two of them (I-4 and I-24) also had master degrees. 
Three respondents (I-1, I-2 and I-6) had identified themselves as not being local 
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people, whereas the rest originated from Lombok. Some respondents could be 
defined as average-income earners, owning their own homes with one motor-
bike (I-1, I-2, I-6, I-23 and I-24), whilst others could be considered as above 
average because they had more than one house and one or more cars (I-3, I-4, I-
7, I-9 and I-10). 
Table 6.1 Interviewees’ profiles  
Identity District level category 
I-1 School supervisor 
I-2 School supervisor  
I-3 Teacher unions 
I-4 Education council  
I-6 Teacher unions  
I-7 Education district official 
I-9 Local parliament member 
I-10 Education council  
I-23 Education council  
I-24 Official at the mayor office  
 
6.3 District level policy  
  Starting from early 2001, each district in Indonesia had been managing 
the public sector authority which was generally bigger than those managed by 
the central and the provincial governments (see sub-section 2.3.5). In terms of 
the education sector, there were three significant aspects of decentralisation of 
management by the district government: institutional and personnel conditions, 
finance and curriculum (see: Usman, 2001). Certainly each district government 
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comprising the mayor (executive) and local parliament members (legislative) 
played crucial parts. In the following section, the policy that was established at 
district level is discussed from the perspective of these two key players. 
      One instrument that can measure educational policy at the district level is 
the district regulation (Indonesian: peraturan daerah or perda). The regulation 
can be proposed either by the executive or legislature, but it needs to be 
discussed extensively in the legislative forum by both parties. Unlike several 
districts which have released regulations based on the MoNE decree regarding 
the education council and school committee, the Municipal city of Mataram has 
not, up to now, released any1. Official reports from the Law Division of the 
Mataram City Secretariat of the Mayor’s Office (from 2000 to 2004) did not 
indicate any district education regulations. This implies that the legislative vision 
about district education in the autonomy era has not been readily realised. By 
contrast, there were 39 out of 75 district regulations that were released between 
2000-04 were concerned with local taxation in order to increase income for the 
district government. As noted by two respondents, from the mayor’s office and a 
supervisor, it was the executive not the legislature office that proposed the 
regulation: 
So far, I’ve seen that most of the district regulations are the 
executive’s initiatives (I-2)2. 
                                                 
1 The Municipal City of Malang, East Java, has stipulated district regulation no. 13/2001 on 20 
October 2001 about  System of Educational Implementation in City of Malang; The Municipal 
City of Bandung, West Java, has stipulated district regulation no. 20/2002 on 2 May 2002 about  
Educational Implementation in City of Bandung; The District of Dompu, in the same province as 
Mataram,  has stipulated district regulation no. 19/2002 on 30 December 2002 about  Education 
Council and School Committee. All those regulations, except from Malang, its structures and 
contents are similar to the MoNE decree number 044/U/2002 (see Chapter 5) which of course 
shows little effort has been made when composed the regulation. But, of course, these show real 
concern from the legislative to education sector with regulation as an instrument of policy.   
2 “I” was the code for data from interview, and “2” was the number of participant in my list. 
 119
The mayor’s office is the main source of district regulations; the 
legislative did not get involved much and mostly agreed with 
proposed initiatives (I-24). 
Regulations relating to local taxes rose significantly after autonomy 
implementation proceeded throughout Indonesia because most district 
governments were concerned they might not balance their budgets. This had also 
occurred in Mataram where, since 2001, more than half of the regulations issued 
were about local taxes.  
 Besides the legislative body, the district parliament is divided into several 
special commissions dedicated to a particular sector. In Mataram, the education 
sector in the legislative is administered by the E Commission, which is 
composed of six district law makers from five political parties. Generally, 
members of this commission are perceived as more competent and are aware of 
education issues. When conducting field work research to collect data for this 
study (which was 3 years after the autonomy; and 20 months since the MoNE 
decree), I noted that there were no decisions about school based management and 
educational services from the commission. The most frequent activity of the E 
Commission was hearings, which were based on an official request addressed to 
them from the district education office, school supervisors and the education 
council (I-7, I-1 and I-10 respectively). This implies that implementation steps 
and initiatives regarding the education sector were originating with the 
executive.  
A number of interviews with several stakeholders were undertaken at the 
district level. This included ascertaining the personal views and interests of the 
district law maker. This confirmed that the legislator and indeed the E 
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commission seemingly had little understanding about education. The comments 
below came from school a supervisor and education district official respectively: 
In my opinion, the district parliament, particularly the members 
of the E commission don’t know about the substance of 
education issues. In most cases they only consider the budget 
aspect. [Researcher: Is it because they do not come from the 
education sector?] I think to give much support in this public 
sector, one does have to have experience in the educational 
sector, and most importantly s/he must understand the substance 
of the issue. It is something that in fact our lawmakers do not (I-
2).   
Researcher: What has the legislature suggested to your office? 
Participant: They have concern about social development issues 
including education. However, the concern is only rhetoric. 
Essentially, they don’t understand most education issues. Most 
legislative members are stupid. Most of them did not graduate 
from formal secondary schooling; I have signed many of their 
Package C certificates3, which plainly showed their quality. So, 
how can they understand the issues? (I-7). 
These views were also reflected somewhat in the response by the lawmaker. 
Several questions directed to the legislator (such as executive responsibility to 
education sector, regulation and policy, and quality issues) were not responded to 
as was expected. The participant’s [I-9] responses were as follows: 
[regarding the executive concern] Firstly, we try to make the 
education sector in the district budget reach 20% proportion. 
Secondly, we support acceleration of classes at general 
secondary school level, which should not only shorten the years 
of schooling from 3 years to 2 years, but also increase the 
number of subject matters that have to be given to students. So, 
in those two years students learn not only 10 subjects, but 15, 
even 20 subjects. That’s what I call acceleration.  
[regarding regulation and policy] I see that the district 
government already has a good concern for education, even 
though in terms of action it does not. So we as the legislative 
always apply political pressure. The real obstacle of course is 
                                                 
3 Package C certificate is an out-of-school program equal to formal secondary school level which 
mostly involves just sitting for an exam rather than years of learning (see section 2.2). The new 
legislation of the general election stated explicitly that a candidate for Member of Parliament was 
required to have at least an secondary school certificate or equivalent.   
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about funding. We do not have much flexibility because of 
limited resources. 
[regarding educational quality] Each time in the political arena, 
such as the conclusion session of the legislative process, I 
always emphasise that each school must have a library. How 
can we eat when the food has to be shared? Library books are 
like food which, each day, has to be consumed in enough 
portions, like we eat our food.   
Further, a principal of one state secondary school shared his experience when he 
dealt personally with the law maker from the E Commission. This concerned one 
extra-curricular activity in the school which was usaha kesehatan sekolah 
(Indonesian, abbreviated as UKS) or school health service. In Indonesian 
“usaha” refers to service but also can mean trade that could result in income. The 
principal didn’t understand what was proposed by the Member of Parliament: 
One day, one member of district parliament proposed to us that 
UKS should contribute to the district. [R: In terms of what?] 
The contribution is in terms of money. The member had 
perceived the UKS as a school business, and hence his proposal 
for it to give its revenue to the district government. It is funny, 
the UKS or school health service, is in fact a school subsidized 
activity. The member did not understand and was confused. 
This is because he really did not understand about education (I-
8).    
Such lack of understanding possibly accounted for the lack of promulgated 
regulations. The extent of knowledge and competency in the education sector 
seem to be related to the inactivity of the members of parliament. The quality of 
legislators is certainly one of the serious problems that the district faces 
particularly when parliament’s response has not occurred. A confirmation from 
one school committee member reflects this issue: 
In this autonomy era, the parliament and the E Commission 
particularly are having substantial authority, no doubt about 
that. But, if they do not understood education, what can we say? 
It is a problematic situation which cannot be solved, except by 
another general election (I-14). 
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 In the absence of specific district regulations on education and 
recommendations from the education commission or the district parliament, the 
legislature’s commitment can only be detected indirectly by the allocation of 
education sector expenses in the district budget. The district budget is also a 
district regulation that is the result of contacts between the mayor and the district 
parliament members. One respondent (I-24) noted this as a planning movement 
between the executive and the legislative during the implementation of district 
policy. Although, according to I-24, education funding arises from district 
policy, it is really a consequence of the political process between the mayor and 
local parliament members. The institution which designed the budget for the 
education sector was the district education office. The district budget was a 
public document and was freely accessed for this study and the 2004 budget for 
the socio-cultural sector is also analysed.   
 The total amount of the 2004 Mataram City budget was 218.318 billion 
rupiahs or equal to US$ 21.831 million (Mataram District Regulation no. 9/2004, 
shown in Appendix 3). From that amount, 20% or more than 44.2 billion rupiahs 
was allocated to the education sector (non-budget salary). The district 
parliament’s commitment to education was therefore relatively good. In other 
words, in terms of quantity of the fund, the legislative body agreed to what the 
executive proposed in the district budget. This significant percentage dedicated 
to education is almost one-fifth of the district budget that had to be allocated 
according to the national requirements. One respondent observed: 
I think in terms of budget allocation for the education sector, it 
has already reached 20% a year. The real problem is how far 
that big amount of budget money is effective and efficiently 
spent for educational purposes (I-24).   
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As shown in the Table 6.2 which summarises the district budget in the 
education and culture sector, 34.165 billion rupiahs (77%) was designated for 
some infrastructure projects. However, the first and second project took 85% of 
that amount (29 billion) to fund school refurbishment and to build three new 
secondary schools. This decision arose from the Mayor’s wishes for the 
education and the city, as explained by a board member of the education council: 
The decision was coming from the city government, 
particularly the mayor. He has a big concern for the education 
sector. He also wants Mataram as a capital city of the 
province to become a barometer for everything, including 
education (I-10). 
      Table 6.2 Budget Allocation for Education Sector year 2004 
I. Education and Culture Sector 44,422,108,100 
1. Infrastructural projects 
    (school refurbishments, building 
rehabilitations, construction of three 
new secondary schools, seven new 
classrooms, and fence for two 
schools) [1-5] 
34,165,000,000 
2. Programs for educational quality 
improvement [6-7] 
4,476,588,100 
3. Assistance fund for school 
examination and new student 
admission [8-10 & 13] 
1,180,000,000 
4. Improving teacher educational  
    qualification [11, 14 & 16] 
350,000,000 
5. Incentive for teacher and 
administrative staff [12, 19 & 21] 
1,210,000,000 
6. Training for school committee 
members [15]  
75,000,000 
7. Scholarships fund for students [17, 
18 & 20] 
1,025,520,000 
8. Culture activities programs [22-34] 1,340,000,000 
Source: summarized from Mataram district budget year 
2004 for education sector (Appendix 4). 
      note:   - amount in Indonesia’s rupiahs (1 US$ equal to 10,000 rupiahs) 
  - number in bracket is original list from point of budget allocation  
One refurbishment project was the renovation of three elementary school 
buildings, one school in each sub-district, with the physical appearance being 
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satisfactory by local standards. However, there were some critics of this kind of 
approach: 
I am very disappointed when the district government tries to 
improve education quality and comes up with physical 
infrastructure projects.  The three primary school buildings 
were refurbished, and people saw it as a shopping mall. The 
government clearly wanted to show Mataram as a developed 
region (I-1). 
I think, what is supposed to be considered by the district 
government is to allocate funds for something that is really 
needed. It should not be used for that kind of wonderful 
building refurbishment (I-9).  
A second comment was from a legislative member. He also disagreed with the 
project because the school building had a distinctive paint colour, the symbol of 
the mayor’s political party.    
At the secondary school level, the mayor’s personal influence was also 
evident. A comment from a board member of the education council confirmed 
this as follows: 
The opening of several new general secondary schools in 
Mataram was because of the pressure from the society. 
Students’ numbers passing junior secondary schooling have 
been increasing, and all their parents wanted them to study in 
state schools.  The parents said that if their children were not 
enrolled, they will burn down the schools. The mayor told me 
personally about that. So, the new secondary school buildings 
were erected in Selagalas which are excellent. Right now, other 
superb secondary school buildings are being constructed (I-10).  
Furthermore, the secondary school students’ admission policy signed by the 
mayor was an important feature.  It stated that each school had a quota for 
students who lived near the school, which operated before admitting students 
outside Mataram. The purpose of the policy was to give schooling opportunity at 
state schools to Mataram residents and this was considered to be a ‘geographical 
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fence’ policy. Interestingly, this kind of policy had been long supported by the 
legislators. One legislator said: 
It should be a policy which is giving priority to students who 
are living in Mataram. This means, regardless of low academic 
achievements of these students that does not imply they cannot 
enter state schools in this particular city (I-9).   
The policy was easy to understand. This is because it directly impacted 
upon political support in elections and the pupils at secondary level were future 
voters. The policy has resulted in larger classes and parallel class developments 
and this could impact upon achievement levels (I-8, I-16 and I-20). The 
principals’ concern about this was new because state secondary schools in 
Mataram were previously perceived as good schools with excellent academic 
results. The mayor’s policy was recognized as direct interference in schools. One 
principal noted: 
My experience in this autonomy era is that we cannot be free 
from its inefficiency – there is to much interference from the 
district government. Especially in terms of new students’ 
entrance, the government practically uses us as it wants on 
many occasions (I-20).    
 The Mataram mayor also released a circular letter (no 
420/526/Kesra/2001 on 28 August 2001) relating to secondary schools. The 
letter gave permission for state secondary schools in Mataram to regularly collect 
amounts of money from parents as a fee for the registration of their children at 
public schools. This letter indicated that the previous practice already established 
in state secondary schools through the BP3 could persist (discussed in more 
detail on sub-section 7.4.2 and section 7.6).  In spite of the intention to 
accommodate all secondary school expenses via the district budget, the mayor 
was relying on parents’ contribution to help the school fulfil its operational cost 
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(non-salary budget). A comment from one school committee member regretted 
such action: 
The school participation rate at secondary school level [in 
Mataram] is 31%. It should become a serious concern for 
legislators and executive to solve, because this means 69% of 
children ages 15-18 are not registered as students. If people 
consider the need for increasing participation, few will oppose 
an increase in the education budget, but this should not be  for 
refurbishing and constructing new schools. It has to be 
emphasised, that the key need is for children to be supported 
financially by the district government to continue their 
education (I-14).  
   The mayor was also involved in issues relating to the results of the 
secondary school final examination. The central office in 2003 increased the 
threshold of exam results, but the Mataram mayor refused to accept that policy 
(Bali Post, 2003). The new standard to pass students from secondary school level 
in three subjects was regarded as too high, not only for students in Mataram but 
all across Indonesia. The mayor’s actions could be interpreted as an effort to 
protect Mataram’s students and its parents regarding the possibility that 70% of 
students would predictably not pass the final examination. It also reflected 
tension between district and central government regarding their respective 
powers which were not clearly defined. However, it was indicated that the 
already established programmes and policy of the mayor were not improving 
educational quality as required by the new examination standard. As previously 
mentioned, it could readily be interpreted as a politically motivated decision. 
As discussed above, district policy regarding education, and particularly 
school based management, from the legislature and the executive was not well 
articulated by both authorities. Political reasons seem more salient in terms of 
policy development at the district level. 
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6.4 District education office  
The district education office was a new institution as part of Mataram 
district government. Previously there was a district education office which had 
limited authority to administer 3M (men, money and materials) at the primary 
school level. With increased autonomy in each district a new office was required 
and this catered for both primary and secondary levels. An explanation from a 
respondent illustrates this situation: 
Mataram district education office is a new body of 
government. The demands of this new office meant that 
experienced civil servants were needed. As a result many 
officials from the provincial education office joined and 
staffed this new body (I-24).  
With the beginning of the autonomy process in 2001, there was tension 
between the Mataram education office and the provincial education, sport and 
youth office. The sources of tensions were related to a number of issues: 
personnel, finance and materials; the appointment of principals at state schools; 
and permission for teachers to attend training outside the province (Lombok Post, 
2001). Interestingly, the six other districts in the province reacted differently to 
Mataram. They mostly followed what the province education office told them to. 
The Mataram district office perceived what the province office did as “a 
tendency to sustain an old paradigm” (Lombok Post, 2001). The problem was 
that preparation for autonomy was not complete and this resulted in conflict 
(Soewartoyo, 2002). However this situation also arose from individuals since 
both officials previously came from the same office (province education office in 
centralisation era) and people at the district office wanted to demonstrate their 
new power and authority. Eventually authority came to rest at the district level. 
This experience has meant officials from the province education office often face 
 128
difficulty when dealing with Mataram district education office. A comment from 
a teacher explains this as follows: 
Officials from the provincial education, sport and youth 
office, said that when they want to ask something from 
Mataram district education office, they often find it very 
difficult. They have to edit the language of their letters in 
order to make them appear not to be perceived as giving 
instructions. In other words, the language they use is not like 
a command, otherwise the district office will not reply to the 
letters (I-13).  
 The feeling of a ‘new centre’ emerging after the transfer of power (via 
the autonomy law) was undeniable. This appeared more salient in the education 
sector which was the largest ‘industry’ in the district. It employed teachers and 
administration staff that were the largest proportion of civil servants and it 
utilised a significant amount of the government budget for salary. It also 
involved nearly every household who had school age children. The power shift 
was easily recognized by education district officials. They also were more aware 
that they could now do many things which previously had been inhibited by the 
provincial office.  
 As a result, the district office implemented many administrative 
processes to demonstrate their new self confidence. The Mataram district 
education office had always had a slightly different policy to other district 
offices (in the same province) relating to such matters as teachers’ personnel 
affairs, decisions about beginning the academic year, and details about the end of 
term examination. Historically all of these were stipulated uniformly at 
provincial level by the province district office. A comment from a teacher 
expressed this: 
The disputes between the province education office and 
Mataram district education office were obvious. This is seen 
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in the decision about school holidays. Other districts followed 
the dates province office told them, but Mataram did not. 
Instead, Mataram makes its own academic calendar which is 
completely different. Last year’s school holidays also had a 
different timing for Mataram (I-21).     
In addition, the perception of a ‘new centre’ was also held by school 
supervisors.  Although organisationally the supervisors and the district education 
office had a coordinated relationship, district officials’ self confidence impacted 
on supervisors as well. A supervisor expressed this as follows: 
As part of our main job as new school supervisors4 in 
Mataram, we suggested some visions. The last vision stated 
that supervisors ‘gave recommendation to relevant officials 
regarding transfer and promotion of educators’. This was a 
role that supervisors wanted. However, the education office 
could not accept the role and rejected it. Further, mostly their 
officials see us as their subordinates whom they can instruct 
as they want, which is occasionally their practice (I-2).  
Some of the work of the new authorities had good results but other 
outcomes were not desirable. For instance, in terms of processing teachers’ 
personnel affairs, the district office was a pioneer in comparison to other 
districts. Introduced changes made administration simpler. For example, 
previously bureaucratic red tape made teachers’ promotions most difficult, 
because decisions rebounded between the school-district-province and the central 
office. Comments from a teacher and district official confirmed this as follows: 
A good thing in the autonomy era relates to teachers’ 
personnel affairs. The time needed to process a decree about 
my promotion as a government-employee-teacher is shorter 
than during the previous era. This is because many things can 
be solved locally, and the province or central offices do not 
have to deal with these matters (I-5). 
Since the autonomy began, we had been processing teachers’ 
promotion directly to central office. Faster and simpler 
                                                 
4 The school supervisor office in Mataram like the district education office is a newly established 
institution. Previously, all schools in Mataram were supervised by supervisors from province 
education office. 
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processes have been used, providing a model for other 
districts to follow. The province office had reluctantly given 
this authority, and it does not have much choice, especially 
when we can prove that we are doing it better. We have 
already processed very senior applications, including for 
teachers who are pursing higher ranks on the government 
employee ladder (I-7). 
It seemed that the main obstacle for the district education office authority 
was coming from their superior, the mayor. In fact, several district regulations in 
practice were rolled-back by the mayor, such as regulations relating to 
principals’ positions and teacher transfers. One teacher and a principal gave 
examples of this in relation to the relocation teachers between public schools in 
Mataram by the district office: 
Last semester the district education office was implementing 
a teachers’ relocation programme. However in a particular 
public school, where one of the teachers was a close relative 
of the Mayor, he complained and then the transfer was 
blocked.   This means, the real power is held by the Mayor. In 
fact, the whole program regarding teachers’ relocations is 
stopped and no one has spoken about it since (I-15).   
Regarding the programme for transferring teachers to another 
location, the district education office is not brave enough to 
implement it properly. The district officials must face the 
mayor’s office, and when this happens, the district office 
backs down. One of my teachers was placed to teach in 
another general state secondary school by that program, but 
because of many protests regarding the relocation program, 
the teacher never moved (I-20).  
Meanwhile a district official explained the tensions that occurred when his office 
proposed teachers as candidates for principals’ positions: 
In terms of principalship selections, this issue always seems 
to present a difficulty. While, on the one hand, the system is 
short  of qualified candidates, on the other hand our 
recommendations of suitable candidates often are rejected by 
the mayor’s office. That is our situation; teachers who are 
short listed are not always permitted to be appointed (I-7).  
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Other stakeholders also discovered that the transfer of power was not 
beneficial. For example, a teacher complained about the quality of the training 
organised by the district office: 
The teacher training that we had was really unprofessional. It 
could be that this was a new thing for the district office; 
eventually it also showed their limited capability (I-21).   
In addition, another comment from a school supervisor (who was invited as a 
speaker for a training event) noted that: 
This morning, the district education office was organising a 
certified education-and-training for candidates who will 
become state school principals. The training is conducted only 
for three days. This is supposed to be a serious training and 
not just a socialization activity. The way the training is 
organized and its short duration do not support this assertion.  
I think, the programme is meant only to show that the 
principals’ candidates at least have attended. The principals 
are engaged in what I call an economical training (I-1). 
This kind of activity was reminiscent of the practices in the previous 
administration and indicated that there was a desire to simply fulfil minimal 
standards of bureaucracy. It could have been exploitative (see sub section 2.3.4).  
 Moreover, a greater concern related to the district budget process and the 
authorities for accessing this. As previously mentioned, although the district 
budget is considered and authorised jointly by district parliament and the mayor, 
the initiators of it were the district education officials. An explanation from an 
official of the mayor’s office illustrated this: 
Before the autonomy era, the funds for the education sector 
never reached one billion rupiahs [equal to US$ 100,000]. 
Then since 2001 the education officials have administered 
forty times that amount like in the budget of 2004. You can 
imagine the effect on the officials.  Many argue that it is 
normal, because of the volume of matters they handle and 
their authority and there is also consensus regarding budget 
priority for education nationally. However, what is more 
important? Is the big budget really effective and efficient? In 
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my many years in the board of planning and development 
office, reviewing proposed budgets in the education sector, I 
have always ended up with heated debates with the officials. 
You can check yourself, issues of proportion or whether 
programmes that are listed in the budget plan are on target. 
Because most of them came from department of education 
office [in the New Order], the budget plans are merely for 
‘copy and paste’ from their usual office activities, such as 
raising flag ceremony competitions (I-24).  
One source stated that the reason for this was the quality of its human 
resources. A school supervisor and district education official commented upon 
this: 
In relation to operating educational services, especially at the 
district education office level after autonomy, it is noted that 
many of the employees are not from education backgrounds. 
[R: Don’t they understand educational issues?]. This means, 
they find it difficult to comprehend the issues. These are 
predominantly officers with much practical experiences as 
heads of sections in non-education offices. Many of them are 
coming from district governments and had positions as village 
chief (I-2). 
Some positions in my office are filled by officials who have 
backgrounds from the ministry of home affairs. Some of them 
even served in the military. This means that many positions 
are not held by the right people. For instance, two of heads of 
sections in the district office are ex-village chiefs. Mostly 
they are starting from scratch to understand their own jobs. 
We regretted this situation (I-7). 
It would seem that the problem was structural and could not be solved in a 
relatively short time. One of the problems during the autonomy era was that 
positions at district level are decided by the mayor, a person who does not have 
much information about applicants’ background for most positions. Knowledge 
and skills required for the educational official position for example seem not to 
have been considered carefully. 
 The above explanation probably accounts (at least in part) for why the 
performance of district education office, in terms of education budget proposals, 
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tended to follow the old tradition. In addition, according to one district official, it 
was noted that most did not want the previous practice to be changed: 
In terms of technical matters, such as how is teaching and 
learning practiced in school, how are examinations conducted, 
or how supervision is undertaken, most of these have 
remained the same. We are not brave enough to change all of 
that (I-7).  
Similar decisions also happened relating to the funds parent contribute to state 
secondary schools. The head of the district education office, unlike the mayor 
who issued a circular letter, released an official letter giving permission for 
public schools to collect funds (head of district education office decree no 
422.2/632/B/Dik/2001 on 31 July 2001).  The decree clearly showed the district 
education office adopting the previous practice. Even when other regulations are 
promulgated (such as the MoNE decree concerning education council and school 
committee on April 2002 and the new Education Law on July 2003) there was no 
change in policy regarding the collection of money from parents on a regular 
basis.  
Regarding the school based management policy which became the 
official policy based on the MoNE decree, the district education office also did 
not have clear directions. The only indication that explicitly appeared was the 
training program for school committee members, as listed in the district budget 
(point 6 in Table 6.2). The training was for 200 school committee members to 
improve their knowledge. However, it was late in coming (2 years after the 
introduction of school committee) and was also conducted in a manner that 
reminded everyone of the power issues. One respondent noted: 
What I see in this particular training is that the district 
education office wants to show that it has the real power. The 
district office wants to show that the school committees are its 
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subordinate. The office uses the training to impress on 
trainers that the activity is funded and organised by the office 
(I-2).  
Several respondents from the secondary school level commented about 
the district education office policy in negative terms. A school principal 
commented: 
What I see of the education bureaucrats is that for the most 
part, they don’t understand comprehensively that school 
based management is about educational change. Previously 
all instructions came from the central office in Jakarta then it 
was controlled at the local level. Nowadays, those roles 
should be facilitated and monitored by bureaucrats. However, 
I see that, many district office working programmes are 
positioned by the bureaucrats and that schools are required to 
follow everything, not giving any flexibility. In terms of 
technical matters, we are always giving the bureaucrats 
academic-professional arguments in order to make them not 
force us, but they usually counter it with authoritative and 
political reasons, which of course do not always match (I-8). 
A school committee member who had years of experience as a BP3 member also 
had similar views: 
Currently, as they said, we practice school based management 
ideas, but in reality this is not fully SBM as many things are 
still decided by them. For instance in terms of teacher 
selection, it should be that the school has the right to do that, 
but the bureaucrats are not allowing this to happen (I-11).  
A school supervisor explained this situation in terms of the structural limitation. 
He concluded that: 
I see some kind of a gap between school and district 
education officials. In terms of SBM the mode of thinking of 
educational bureaucrats is not fast as teachers and principals 
want. That is why from my point of view, I believe that the 
district education office should not be involved in technical 
matters in education. They must not be organising technical 
activities. They can play effectively in terms of policy and 
support for schools (I-2). 
Likewise, policy practiced at the district level was of concern. One issue 
more salient than others was about students’ admission to state secondary 
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schools. Several principals noted that the pressure from the district education 
office was overwhelming and made them change school plans because of larger 
classes or adding of new classes (I-8, I-12, I-16 and I-20). Two principals 
personally confessed that education bureaucrats also pressured them to accept 
some students without an entrance test (I-12 and I-20).  
6.5 Education council  
 Unlike the Mataram district education office, the Education Council was 
a new institution established with new personnel and new governance 
arrangements.  Officially, the education council was stipulated by a Mataram 
mayor decree no 253/VI/2002 issued on 5 June 2002.  This means it was only 2 
months after the release of the MoNE decree requiring the setting up of 
education councils in each district. The rapidity of response and smoothness of 
the process to create an Education Council at Mataram was something that 
indicated interference from the government. Further, as stated by a member of 
the education council, the council was not structured and prepared via an official 
preparation committee as dictated by the MoNE decree. A comment from an 
education council board member explained as follows: 
Firstly, several government officials, including the head of the 
district education office called Mr. X to talk about the people 
best suited as education council members. Then, they got 
some names and called the candidates to ask about their 
willingness to join. Following that, there was a meeting where 
the head of the district education office explained the 
education council, based on the decree, and its tasks. Finally, 
the Mataram education council was formed with its board 
members. Then, based on acclamation Mr X become the head 
of the education council (I-23).   
This shoulder-tapping method to decide the head of the Education Council by the 
educational bureaucrats was something that was expected (Muslim, 2004, 
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personal communication). Moreover, this demonstrates how the education 
council members were hand-picked jointly by the head of the board and district 
education officials. The composition of the council was something appreciated 
by the monitoring team from the central office according to one board member:  
The council consists of seventeen members, as suggested by 
the decree and includes a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary 
and treasurer. Those representing the society make up more 
than 90%, though there are 4-5 bureaucrat. But, not many of 
the bureaucrats are better equipped. That’s why according to a 
team from the central office in Jakarta, Mataram education 
council is the best because its members are better suited as the 
decree stated (I-4). 
However, the whole recruitment process invited complaints from several 
stakeholders. An explanation from a representative of teacher unions is typical: 
What really happened was that educational bureaucrats were 
involved deeply in creating education councils in hastiness. 
This means that practices that are necessary to establish new 
processes through society-based initiatives are only given lip 
service. In fact, educational bureaucrats positioned many of 
their own favourite people inside the institution (I-6). 
Two members of the council gave explanations for why the institution 
was established relatively quickly (I-4 and I-10). Previously in Mataram, there 
was the School Council, its functions and roles were similar to the Educational 
Council, based on the MoNE decree. However, the School Council acted like a 
non-government organisation outside district education office influence. 
Accordingly, it would be considered appropriate to create a new institution with 
legal backing and district influence.  
 According to the council official report, several activities had been 
completed by the Education Council since it was formed to early 2004. This 
included socialise about the education council and the school committees, 
hearings with legislative, surveys to schools in Mataram regarding school 
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committees and a seminar about the new curriculum. Although the council was 
to be given funding from the district government, in the last 2 years it was not 
allocated any funds. Consequently limited support to the Education Council has 
lead to complaints: 
Based on the mayor’s decree the district government has 
clearly stated that every expense should be funded by the 
district budget, but up to now this is not yet seen. Fortunately 
central government has provided grants in the last two years 
to fund all activities (I-10).  
Actually we received little support from the government. We 
don’t have a secretariat. No staff are helping us even with 
little things such as office stationary. As a board member, I 
sometimes have to deliver letters personally to schools or 
district education offices. In short, we are inhibited from 
working effectively (I-4).  
 Further, comments from some respondents suggest that the relationship 
between the district education office and the education council were not 
symmetrical as suggested by the decree. One school supervisor and a member of 
parliament directly noted what education council members said to them: 
A board member of an education council once told me that 
the council is like a kite that is meant to fly high but the 
strings to make it fly are short. So, how can the council ‘fly’ 
when everything is limited. In fact the council is pushed to 
become a volunteer institution by the district office (I-1).  
There is an impression that the education council is a sub-
ordinate of the district education office. [R: why? Education 
council is an independent organisation]. The members 
explicitly told me so. That’s why we suggested to the mayor 
that it should not be the district office that is the boss to the 
education council (I-9). 
The above responses were not surprising to many because of the way the council 
was formed.  A representative of the teacher unions commented: 
The bureaucracy has an interest in co-opting members into 
each institution at the district level in order to preserve its 
power. That’s why the education council is needed to be part 
of its power structure. The council has societal representatives 
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who can contribute and participate on educational issue I-6). 
  
Some respondents from district and school levels had diverse views about 
the Education Council and its activities. A school supervisor, a principal and a 
school committee member for instance noted that the Education Council 
consisted of educational experts who continue to give valuable input to the 
executive and legislative (I-1, I-8 and I-14). Another teacher commented, 
however, that the Education Council was only a sophisticated name and it had 
little practical functions for the school (I-15). A school supervisor was critical of 
the seminar organised by the council: 
Last month I found an invitation from the council regarding a 
seminar about a new curriculum.  When I read the invitation, I 
was disappointed. This is not a role for the council to play. I 
am happy if the council facilitates the empowerment of 
society or groups of people in terms of community 
participation in education. That kind of seminar is not for the 
council. I think that the district education office is more 
appropriate to organise such a seminar. Further, I am a bit 
worried that members of the education council do not really 
know the key tasks of the education council itself (I-2). 
One teacher suggested that the council should be named the ‘school 
rehabilitation council’. He argued that, “most of the council’s job focussed on 
school rehabilitation projects, because it was required by the central government 
to liquidate the fund” (I-3). This cynical view was also confirmed by a board 
member of the council, but he also noted that potentially the council could play 
an even bigger role here when dealing with the district education office. To 
illustrate, one council member explained: 
We also involve the district education office in several 
activities such as in block grants from the central government 
to refurbish school buildings; and scholarship grants for 
students who come from low income families. The official 
letter to liquidate the fund is jointly signed between us as 
without our agreement they will not get the money. This is 
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because the requirement from the central office is that the 
education council has to be a part of the committee to 
administer the grants (I-10).  
The explanation above indicates the tension between the district education office 
and the Education Council. The council had an advantage because it was an 
institution with community representatives and founded on regulations stipulated 
by the central government. However, as discussed, this advantage in terms of 
power dynamics is limited and infrequently demonstrated.   
6.6 Conclusion  
 In this chapter views and perspectives at the district level about 
educational autonomy in general and SBM policy in particular were discussed.  
Key stakeholders who held authority and could make substantial changes to 
SBM still had not utilised their power and influence. Knowledge and skills 
needed to facilitate school autonomy were not comprehensively understood. 
Rather, practices of power and self interest were dominant. Consequently, the 
future of SBM looks bleak.  
 These research findings point to the need for education of the local 
legislators and executives about the SBM as a top priority. Enhancing capacity of 
district education officials in general will lead to much more effective ways to 
support the Education Council and schools.  
 Given the findings in this chapter, stakeholders at the school level in 
Mataram could find SBM implementation difficult, particularly while their 
higher level institutions are unaware of such complexities. The next chapter 
explains how principals, teachers and school committee members dealt with 
issues of SBM.  
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Chapter 7 
PERSPECTIVES  AND  PRACTICES  
AT  SCHOOL  LEVEL  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The introduction of school based management policy as a form of 
educational reform challenges and confronts school stakeholders. Basically, in 
order for the policy to succeed, it should take into account the real situations of 
schools, in particular the views and practices of educators, including school 
committee members. Therefore, this chapter will discuss the practices and views 
of school stakeholders about school based management in state secondary 
schools in Mataram, Lombok, Indonesia. It will consider the views of principals, 
teachers, and school committee members. The stakeholders’ understandings, 
perceptions and practices regarding the SBM policy, devolution of authority to 
schools, parents’ and community involvement and the effects on the school 
committee and school are considered. Background information about 
respondents who participated is presented first to give a context for the analysis 
of the data.   
7.2 School stakeholders’ background 
This section presents some basic data about school stakeholders in 
Mataram, Lombok, who participated in the study. There were 5 principals, 57 
teachers and 21 school committee members. Some of these, 4 principals, 6 
teachers and 5 school committee members, were later interviewed, and two out 
of five secondary schools participated in site studies. Some information 
 141
regarding the state secondary school situation in Mataram is also considered, 
giving information on student enrolments and class structures. 
7.2.1  Principals’ background 
All principals of the five state secondary schools who participated in the 
study were male, as shown in Table 7.1. In the past only two of the schools had 
been led by a female principal. A gender disparity for principalship positions in 
state secondary schools is an issue. At this level female principal under-
representation is evident, compared to junior high or elementary schools in the 
same city. Table 7.1 also summarises the principals’ basic information. 
 Table 7.1. Principals’ basic information (n=5) 
Q1 Gender:  Male  
5 (100%) 
 
Q2  Age group 
45-50                51-55                  more than 55             Average 
   2                         2                             1                            52 years 
 
Q3 Total years as principal  
less than 2 years                    4-5 years       more than 8 years 
          2                                      1                            2 
 
Q4  Have been principal in this school 
less than 2 years                    4-5 years           
          3                                      2 
 
Q5 Highest educational qualification 
Bachelor degree               Master degree 
4 1 
 
 
The principals were in the middle age group with at average age of 52 
years.   It is not surprising that the principalship is only available for teachers 
who have served at least 20 years. They had reached a higher rank in the 
government employee hierarchy after being proposed by their previous superior 
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officers.  Principalship positions in Indonesian schools, particularly at the 
secondary level, are highly respected and competitions for the positions are 
considerable.  Often a teacher who is selected as one of the four vice-principals 
in a school is most likely to become a principal in the future.  
Three out of five principals had served for more than 4 years. This means 
they had been principals for more than one term. Furthermore, two principals 
had been principals previously in other schools before they transferred to their 
current schools. Only two principals had served less than 2 years. In addition, 
three out of the five principals who had served more than 4 years were 
considered experienced and knowledgeable in all kinds of school business.  
All of the principals had undergraduate degrees, a bachelor degree being 
a prerequisite for the position. One principal who had an MA from the United 
States, had also served as an English teacher and supervisor, and later won a 
scholarship to undertake postgraduate study before becoming a principal.  
Interestingly, three principals originally came from the same school, 
Mataram state secondary school number 1.  This school was considered highly in 
the province by the public because students who graduated from it had good 
academic results. It had many good teachers and was regarded as a training 
ground for principals for state junior and secondary schools in the region.  
7.2.2  Teachers’ background 
 A total of 57 teachers participated in the study. From this group, 23 
(40%) were female (Appendix 7.1). The 40% female distribution reflects the 
teachers’ gender distribution in state secondary school teaching staff (although in 
elementary school female teachers are always the majority). However, among the 
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secondary teachers, gender difference is not a professional issue as female 
teachers or their male counterparts are able to teach any subject at any grade.  
   Generally, most teachers in this study were more than 40 years old and 
the average teaching experience was 14.4 years. This means that many teachers 
who participated in this study started their careers in the 1980s. At that time, the 
University of Mataram, the major supplier of teachers in the province, had just 
begun graduating students in several subject areas such as English, Indonesian, 
biology, mathematics and social sciences (civic education, economy, history).  
As graduates, those teachers had signed official employment contracts to become 
civil servants and were placed in several new state secondary schools including 
Mataram. 
 The distribution of teaching subjects and classes taught also indicated 
actual conditions in the schools. The subject group sizes varied because of the 
nature of the groupings of the specialist subjects. Sciences teachers comprised 
those who taught biology, physics and chemistry. Language teachers were 
divided into Indonesian, English and other foreign languages. Social science 
teachers taught civic education, geography, economics, and history. Many 
teachers were teaching in more than one grade and in this study, the majority of 
teachers taught in the final grade. In the Indonesia situation, grade III (year 12) is 
a crucial one, due to national final examinations. The results of passes in the 
national examinations are assumed to reflect school quality and therefore schools 
assign their best teachers for their grade III classes. Except for counsellors, most 
teachers were responsible for several classes in the same grade. In the state 
secondary school situation, in spite of the range of classes and grades, teacher 
mandatory work is 18 lesson hours per week (12.5 normal hours). In reality, 
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some have heavier teaching duties especially in schools with limited numbers of 
teachers. In other instances, teachers also volunteer to teach extra hours, teaching 
in other schools or places (at English courses or as private teachers) in their own 
free time to maximise their incomes. 
 Most teachers who participated in the study were permanent teachers. 
Only one was non-permanent and another was a contract teacher. This 
permanency of the teaching positions indicates that state secondary schools 
located in the city are probably favourite workplaces for many teachers across 
the province. 
Only 4 of the 53 participating teachers did not have undergraduate 
degrees. The Department of Education regulation for secondary school teachers 
stipulates that teachers must have an undergraduate degree, otherwise they would 
be asked to retire early. However, three of them were teaches of religion who 
found it difficult to pursue their B.Ed. degree because the nearest university was 
in Java, thousands of kilometres away. The reason why the fourth teacher had no 
degree was not known, although it is possible to complete a degree from the 
local university or from the distance learning Open University. 
7.2.3 School Committee members’ background 
 The basic information regarding 21 school committee members are 
presented in the Appendix 7.2. The majority (86%) of the committee members 
were male and this reflected the male dominated culture in many social 
organisations in Lombok. Interestingly, two female committee members were 
teachers in other schools.  
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The average age of school committee members was 47 years, perhaps 
reflecting the general active role of people in the middle age group. Interview 
data indicated that some of these people were highly regarded members of 
society (discussed later in Sub-Section 7.6).   
More than one half of the committee members were serving as BP3 
members (BP3 is a parent-teachers organisation tasked to collect funds from 
parents regularly towards school operational costs, see Sub-Section 2.3.4).  
Participation in BP3 activities provides useful experiences for committee work. 
Often, those with such experience are selected as the school committee members. 
On average, committee members in the study had served for more than a year.  
The study data showed that school committee members were highly 
qualified. All had an undergraduate degree and three (14%) had masters degrees. 
In general, only 4% of Indonesian population have higher degrees and this is 
usually lower in the eastern part of Indonesia such as in Lombok. It is probable 
that school committee members are selected partly on the basis of their 
educational qualifications. Undoubtedly, within the Indonesian context, the 
school committee reflects a well-regarded organisation with an elite section of 
the community over-represented. 
The school committee was comprised of parents’ representatives, school 
staff representatives, members of the community, government officials and 
alumni. However, there were others serving as school committee members as 
parents’ representative, even after their children had graduated from the school. 
In these situations, the contributions of the individuals was considered valuable 
and still needed by the school.  
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7.2.4 State secondary school general situation in Mataram, Lombok 
 All participating schools had more than 500 students. The schools were 
located in the capital city of the province and had been established for a long 
time compared to other schools on the same island. The oldest school in the area 
(“No. 1”) had more than 1,000 students and was also regarded as the best in 
regard to academic outcomes of its students. In comparison, two other state 
secondary schools in the same city which were not involved in this study had 
fewer than 500 students and were only established in the last two years. These 
new schools had not yet graduated their students.  
 Based on government regulations, the maximum student number for each 
class was 40. However, principals and teachers indicated that usually the class 
roll is higher, somewhere between 41 to 45. This claim was confirmed from the 
site studies’ schools. According to teachers and principals, class sizes of more 
than 40 was perceived as large, making it difficult to manage for effective 
teaching and learning. 
 State secondary school organisations in Mataram are the same as others 
around Indonesia. The principal who is chosen and elected by the mayor 
(walikota) is the superior officer of teachers and administrative staff in the 
school. The head of administrative staff in the school is stipulated also by the 
mayor with the main task of supporting school administration. The principal then 
selects four teachers, usually senior teaching staff, for vice-principal positions, in 
yearly periods. The vice principal is responsible for the following: curriculum 
affairs, students affairs, public relation affairs and infrastructural affairs. 
Organisational units such as science or language department are not established 
in Indonesian schools. In addition, the principal assigns teachers for certain 
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responsibilities such as science laboratory, homeroom teacher and extra 
curricular activities. 
The school academic year begins in July and ends in June of the 
following year and is divided into two semesters. At the secondary school level, 
grade I and II (year 10 and 11) students have similar teaching programs of 14 
compulsory teaching subjects in a year with 42 lesson hours per week. Starting at 
grade III (year 12), students are grouped (usually based on their choices), into 
three specialties: natural sciences, social sciences and language. At this grade 
level they learn 10 compulsory teaching subjects in 44 lesson hours per week. 
There is no compulsory zoning to enforce student attendance in a 
geographic area. Instead, students who have a good academic performance and 
wealthy socio-economic backgrounds are enrolled in schools of the parent’s 
choice – schools they consider to be of higher standards. This means that some 
secondary schools are in a bargaining position to select students. Therefore, there 
is always a competition between state secondary schools. As a result, many 
private schools enrol students who are not accepted by state schools. 
7.3 Information regarding school based management 
 This section explores issues relating to school based management, and 
the participants’ views about their participation in SBM training.  
 Appendix 7.3 shows the range of information sources about SBM for 
each and includes principals, teachers and school committee members ranked 
respectively from higher influence to the lowest. The questionnaire survey 
revealed that all five principals obtained information directly from policy 
documents, which usually came to them via post either from the education 
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district, provincial or central office. Four principals also obtained information 
from meetings they had in the education district office, which was usually a first 
level socialisation program to explain new government policy in education. Only 
one principal mentioned having received information from other sources. 
Because of their positions it seemed that principals therefore obtained the 
information from official channels. 
The majority of teachers responded that their principals were seen as the 
source of information about SBM. The second source was the school meetings, 
where the principal delivered information to the teachers, usually on issues that 
the principal thought they should know. It is clear that the principals’ 
understanding of SBM would also determine what teachers would or should 
know about SBM. 
The education district office, other teachers, newspapers, SBM 
documents and others (education council, TV, Internet and radio) also gave 
teachers information regarding SBM, although the influences of these sources 
was less considerable than that of the principals. Of the 10 teachers who had read 
SBM documents, some were vice-principals, and some were also members of 
school committees, representing teaching staff. This means that principals again 
played crucial roles in ensuring that necessary documents were accessible to 
teachers. But they were also acting as gate keepers – only a few teachers were 
part of the principal’s inner circle (such as the vice-principal and teachers who 
represent staff in school committee). 
 As for teachers, the majority of school committee members also reported 
that principals were their main sources of information about SBM. Sixteen of 
them mentioned that school meetings were an equal source of information. 
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Again, it was usually the principals that invited committee members to attend 
meetings and to become members. School committee members’ knowledge 
about SBM, like that of teachers, was highly influenced by the principals’ 
understandings of SBM. A comment from a teacher unions’ representative in the 
province reflected this: 
I believe it should be the principal who is more knowledgeable 
about the school based management issue, and he discussed that 
within his school. However, if the principal has limited 
understanding about school autonomy, its structure and how to 
implement it, then it will not work (I-3).1
 Only 9 out of 21 committee members mentioned having obtained 
information from SBM documents. This means that more than half of the 
committee members depended on information given by principals. From the 
interview data it was found that of the committee members who read documents, 
one was a member of the education council and three were teachers in other 
schools. Because SBM documents are legal bases for administering schools, 
they are important as primary sources of data for committee members. Again, it 
seems that access to the SBM documents (for the committee members) was via 
the principals.  
 The comments below by two committee members reflect some concerns 
about the information they got about SBM: 
The need is for a deeper familiarisation on what school based 
management is about - particularly for the school committee 
members (Q-19).2
School based management is a new thing and it takes time to 
implement as intended.  Conceptually and organisationally it 
needs several improvements in terms of its socialisation; and 
                                                 
1 “I” was the code for data from interview, and “3” was the number of the participants in my list. 
2  “Q” refers to data from questionnaire, while the number was the order number of participants 
in my list 
 150
also improvement and enhancement of school committee 
human resources (Q20). 
The comments above indicate that conventional ways to disseminate information 
about SBM were insufficient. The first respondent even stated that school 
committee members needed to know basic information about SBM. The term 
“familiarisation” implies something is not known and/or there is a need for a 
deeper knowledge. The second comment criticises the “socialisation” method for 
understanding SBM policy. This method involves advice given by principals 
during school meetings and the second respondent deemed this method to be 
unsatisfactorily. The respondent suggested that it should be used with other 
methods, more than once or regularly, and focus on the improvement of a wide 
range of committee members’ capacities. 
 On the adequacy of information about SBM policy, all principals felt that 
the information was sufficient. Seventeen or 81% of school committee members 
agreed. On the contrary, the majority of teachers were not sure or felt that 
information was not sufficient (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 Participants’ view about SBM policy they got 
Q2  Information about SBM policy got enough? 
                                   Yes                Not sure               No 
Principal                      5                      -                          - 
Teachers                     23                   24                        10 
School Committee      17                    2                          2 
 
Although both teachers and school committee members obtained the 
same information from the same source (their principal), their views were 
different in terms of their understandings about SBM. This is interesting since 
the teachers spent considerably more time in school and had more contact with 
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principals than committee members. It seems that what transpired in meetings 
for school committee members was different to that in teacher meetings. One 
explanation is that SBM was not a topic so readily discussed with teachers 
because it was the committee members who had management roles. An official 
from teacher unions confessed that for most teachers, ideas about SBM were 
good and they want to implement it as well as possible, but their 
capability and even understanding about SBM is not fully 
informed (I-3). 
 Regarding SBM training, Table 7.3 shows the extent of involvement of 
school stakeholders in training activities. Three out of five principals participated 
in training sessions as compared with 5 (9%) teachers and 6 (29%) school 
committee members. Further, when asked about how long the training sessions 
were, there was no agreements about duration. These responses answers needed 
further examination however, since respondents were from the same schools and 
city and it would most likely be that they attended the same SBM training 
programs. Interestingly, the answers to the question about duration varied. For 
one principal and four school committee members it was 3 days. One teacher, 4 
days. Another teacher, 5 days, another teacher, 6 days. For one principal, one 
school committee member and two teachers it was one week. For one school 
committee member it was 1-2 weeks and for one principal it was two weeks. 
 Table 7.3 Participation of SBM training 
Q3 Participated in SBM training? 
                                   Yes                 No 
Principal                      3                     2 
Teachers                      5                    52 
School Committee       6                    15                           
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The interview data revealed that only two of three principals actually 
attended SBM training. The other one attended a training session with a similar 
name, MPMBS (see Section 2.3.5) and this same principal wrongly mentioned 
the length of that training. Similarly, two other school committee members gave 
wrong information about the training days. Some of the teachers did not 
participate in SBM training in the city, but attended other in-service training that 
was organised by the central government. This included training on new 
curriculum, new teaching methods, or new evaluation methods and part of that 
program also dealt with information about SBM policy. This confusion was 
related to the policy being introduced by the central government simultaneously 
with several other new policies about education. Principals and the teachers 
therefore found themselves occupied with many new ideas regarding educational 
innovation, driven mainly from the Department of National Education in Jakarta. 
The new policy regarding a minimum threshold for students to graduate from 
secondary school was one example.  
 There were a few people in the state secondary schools who had first-
hand accounts about the SBM policy as a result of participation in an in-service 
program. These training sessions were organised by education district offices, 
and presented by educational experts from the central, provincial and district 
offices all who had been trained at the national level. In Mataram, official 
information about SBM came in the form socialisation between participants, and 
also in training programs for principals and school committee members for all 
levels of education (I-7). The minimum exposure of school stakeholders 
involved in SBM training undoubtedly affected the policy intention and was 
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likely to lead to a superficial implementation at the school level. One teacher, for 
instance, refers to this concern, as follows: 
School based management ideas are good enough, however at 
the implementers’ level there were big obstacles, resulting in 
gaps between understanding and implementation (Q-68). 
 Regarding the training session itself, one official from the district level 
explained his experience in organising the program, as follows: 
In the training programme we invited principals and school 
committee chairman as a pair. However, from what I have seen, 
the principals tended to involve teachers [not the committee 
chairman or members], and this arrangement was unworkable. 
Their reason was because the committee member was busy or 
because it was easier to take teachers. Sometimes it was done 
this way so that they [school committee members] did not know 
about the issue (I-7). 
This particular respondent was complaining about what appeared to be unfair 
treatment by the principal on the school committee. Furthermore, a teachers’ 
union representative noted that both socialisation and training conducted in terms 
of SBM by the district government and education council never reached a point 
whereby change would occur. He was convinced that as: 
[socialisation and training about SBM] was not frequent, not 
enough, in fact it was far from an effective and efficient method 
intended to spread ideas about SBM to school stakeholders (I-
6). 
In short, the quality of training was questioned and the training program itself 
was not available to all the state secondary schools stakeholders.    
7.4 Views and practices about devolved authority to the school 
 This section presents data about school stakeholders’ perspectives and 
practices regarding devolved authority to the school level. Subsequent sub-
sections will analyse general issues and more detailed ones about the authority 
given to schools. The first sub-section discusses the kinds of authority exercised 
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by schools. The later three sub-sections explain authority in terms of financial 
management, staff management and curriculum management.  
7.4.1 Authority devolved to school 
 Appendix 7.4 shows the views of three respondent groups regarding the 
authority they think that schools can exercise. Although the three groups 
responded slightly differently, they agreed that a school development plan, 
managing school facilities and budget allocation and management are the three 
key roles that should be transferred to schools. However as found from site 
studies, Indonesian state secondary schools had already exercised these kinds of 
de  facto authority for years. In this sense, it was not a new thing for school 
stakeholders. However SBM policy made this authority more salient, requiring 
all schools to use strategic management tools (such as SWOT analysis to make 
their own vision and mission statements), plan for the school’s future, and 
identify resources. 
  As a group, the principals were in favour of authority transfer to schools; 
generally they wanted all authority to be devolved to site levels. With regard to 
teacher training, only three of the principals thought it could be organised in 
schools and only two out of 5 principals felt that curriculum management should 
be authorised by the school. In the previous and present systems government 
regulation stated that only the central office had the responsibility for  
curriculum issues. The following comment from three principals reflected this 
concern: 
In managing the school, with SBM policy, it was given much 
flexibility to develop itself and that included curriculum 
management, based on regulation of course, but it was not 
unlimited freedom.  We also have flexibility in instruction and 
its management and source of fund (I-8).  
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The basic foundation of SBM in the decentralisation era is 
school autonomy and participatory decision making which 
involves all school stakeholders (I-16). 
According to SBM, school is given the authority to develop 
themselves in order to compete with their own potential (I-20).  
These statements from principals show their knowledge and awareness about the 
issue, but this awareness did not emerge from teachers or school committee 
members. For principals, SBM can be used to legitimate extra school activities 
such as an English day programme (compulsory English speaking in school for a 
whole day), building refurbishment and improving student discipline. Those 
efforts regarded as innovation that make the school look better, and will make 
their school impress by the public.  
  Teachers on the whole felt that the authority for making decisions 
regarding maintenance, budget, school plan, student and curriculum ought to be 
devolved to schools. Less than half the teachers felt that schools should have 
authority for staff management and teacher training. It appears that many 
teachers did not think that schools would give them better service than the 
present district-centralised system. 
About one half of the school committee members felt that managing 
students, generating other resources and teacher training should be devolved to 
schools. By contrast, committee members did not see schools managing 
curriculum and staff. These views were similar to the views of other 
stakeholders; and were indicative of their belief in a limited school capacity.  
Several comments from the questionnaire and interview data revealed 
some of these issues. Two school supervisors, for instance, explained what they 
saw happening in the schools: 
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One of the real obstacles in schools and for school principals 
particularly, is that they don’t fully understand the changing 
system. As a result, in many schools we could find many 
principals who are not used to school autonomy as an 
opportunity. This is because under the previous system the 
practice was to wait for technical instruction from our superior 
officers. Furthermore, there was little training and preparations 
for this to occur (I-1).  
In terms of substantive change, I don’t see any significant 
things happening at school… This is because the changes 
involve a way of thinking and attitude, which are not simple (I-
2). 
One teacher had also had similar view about what occurred at the school level:  
Institutionally I think our school is not ready to take its’ own 
action as mandated on the SBM system. In addition we also 
have what I call ‘centralisation syndrome’ which means we 
don’t have courage to take any action without the superior 
officer at district level knowing about the content of decision.  
As far as I know, there is no principal who takes such actions 
which is his legitimate authority without obtaining agreement 
from education district office (I-13).  
These two explanations above indicate who the participants believe is the real 
authority on education in the autonomy era.  It is not surprising that the 
principals were the individuals who most fully understood this situation because 
they were selected by the bureaucratic process. If they made unfavourable 
decisions without consultation with their superior, these could jeopardise their 
careers.  So it was prudent to simply follow the traditional means of decision-
making. 
 On the other hand, there was an explanation from the teacher union 
representative about this situation, 
principals and teachers felt that in fact in this autonomy, what 
really is happening now was half-hearted autonomy….school 
superior officers indeed were not ready to see the school as 
being independent (I-6). 
 157
  However, when an official from an education district office was asked 
about authority that could be executed by schools, his response was as follows: 
Devolved authority is a good thing, but it can become a really 
big problem when directed by an incompetent principal. It can 
destroy the school. However, if the principal is good, the school 
can make great achievements (I-7). 
This officer seemed to think that the important component for SBM was a good 
school principal. Schools would not be ready to manage themselves unless they 
had a good principal. This respondent’s perspective also suggested that 
devolving power did not necessarily result in a competent principal.  
 Another issue related to the perception by principals and superior officers 
about what constituted a good school. A school supervisor describes it as 
follows: 
I really understand that most principals perceived the success of 
their leadership was not based on intangible things, something 
ideal, such as managing the school to become more 
independent. But they perceived physical appearance such as 
refurbishment of school buildings, new painting of fence and 
fine-looking school yard as the indicator of school achievement 
(I-1). 
         A different view was expressed by a teacher, who saw that one impact of 
the implementation of SBM policy was reducing the uniformity that had usually 
been practiced during the previous regime:  
If there is no uniformity about regulations, this would result in 
the community complaining, especially in terms of new student 
entrance requirements (Q-65).  
The above comments are undoubtedly indicative of the extent of influence of the 
previously centralised system. The comment indicates that some teachers regard 
change as likely to pose risks to their careers. It cannot be denied that devolved 
authority to manage dissimilar problems and priorities is likely to pose different 
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challenges for different schools. In the Indonesian situation, student admission to 
certain public school has the potential to become big news. This is because of the 
way good quality schools are perceived and competition for places in schools is 
high. Further, in state secondary schools nowadays, entrance is not only based on 
academic performance but also on the willingness of parents to pay funds to the 
school.  
Interviews with groups of respondents revealed that student admission 
was most critical because strategic manoeuvres by each party ensured maximum 
influence to achieve their intentions. This is because state secondary schools 
were perceived as directly responsible for achieving a better future for students. 
As a result, a school’s authority, particularly the principals’, in terms of student 
admission is marginalised. One state secondary school has to follow community 
pressure to accept students from a nearby school as one principal illustrated: 
We plan to accept four parallel classes; each class consisting of 
40 students. But, people who live close by school, the sub-
district government official forces us to accept more, and so in 
the end we have six classes which contain of 48 students per 
class, which is certainly too many (I-8). 
For other schools, the party who usually persuades the school to increase the 
number of student admissions is superior officers (the mayor and education 
district office): 
Our school has to add one class (40 students), because they 
demanded that. We can do nothing about that even when we 
explain we don’t have enough class rooms for that (I-20). 
As a principal who originally was a science teacher, I feel 
ashamed. This is because we use the science laboratory as a 
regular class room. We just follow orders to increase new 
student numbers (I-16).  
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Moreover beside this there are also personal requests to the principal, usually 
from officials in the education district office, to enrol certain students. 
Undoubtedly this results in conflicts of interest. One principal noted: 
Student admission is a sensitive practice and at times 
intervention occurs from outside.. It is because students who do 
not pass the test can actually be accepted because they are the 
child of an important government official. This is unfair to 
others, and makes me have sleeping problems…. Sometimes I 
can refuse one or two but as a result my superior officer gets 
really angry with me (I-20). 
Another principal, however, welcomed the request: 
Because we have specific instruction from the mayor which 
states ‘children who live close to school shouldn’t be rejected as 
students.….There was also a new student enrolled in our 
school, the father was an important bureaucrat and had recently 
transferred to this city.... the district education office gave me 
an unofficial request to admit the student, so I just put him into 
our school. It seems everybody was happy (I-12). 
What this all implies is that student admissions are an indicator of authority and 
one way in which the degree of school autonomy can be measured.  
7.4.2 Financial management authority  
 With regard to devolved authority relating to finances, the view of the 
three groups of school stakeholders appeared to be the same (Appendix 7.5). It 
seems the groups consistently held similar views regarding priority and the 
nature of financial authority. 
 For a long time, all stakeholders knew that one of a school’s main tasks 
was planning the school budget. For stakeholders, this was a priority task. As 
public institutions, state schools were regularly provided with funds from the 
central government through a block grant to the district government for salaries 
and operational costs (recurrent budget). Yet, stakeholders’ ranked the 
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management of government funds second, compared to managing funds from 
parents, which was ranked first. This ranking supports the view that money from 
parents was seen as more significant for schools. Further, unlike funds from the 
government which is often outside their influence in terms of the amount and 
timing of receipt, the money from parents comes on a regular basis (monthly), 
and is more flexible in terms of spending. Parental funds are decided by schools 
and remain in the hands of the schools. Schools use these funds to meet their 
needs, because funds for operational costs from the government are very limited 
even for the school’s basic expenses such as electricity, water, telephone bill and 
paper. For the school staff the funds are a source of additional income for them 
as well, depending upon their hours of teaching and position.  
When respondents were asked about changing budget allocations, there 
appeared to be little support for this. Participants felt that schools were restricted 
by government regulation, particularly for funds from the government. The idea 
of managing teachers’ salaries, giving the school the right to decide their salaries 
and to deliver these regularly, was not considered favourably. Few respondents 
supported this kind of devolved financial authority. Participants felt that 
managing teachers’ salaries is a difficult task and school administrations do not 
has the capacity satisfactorily to handle it. 
 Data from interviews were consistent with the questionnaire. Two 
significant issues emerged in terms of financial management in school: the funds 
from the government and from the parents. But these two funds had different 
sources and were treated differently.    
Dealing with the routine fund that incorporated the yearly school budget 
was mainly the authority and responsibility of the principal. Deliberations 
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regarding it were conducted mostly in secret, from it’s planning to reporting 
stages, even after the introduction of the SBM policy. The following comment 
from a teacher typifies the common practice that happened in many schools: 
The routine fund comes from the government; we do not know 
how much it is. According to the principal, the school 
committee members and the teachers are not allowed to know 
about it. In short, most principals have an attitude that they do 
not want to share such information. Only two people have 
access to it [the principal and school treasurer]. As a result we 
do not know about the routine fund contribution to the school 
budget, it could be that some bills are paid twice from two 
sources [routine fund and parent’s money] (I-13).    
A school committee member who had been experienced as a member of BP3 in 
two consecutive periods (about 6 years) expressed a similar view: 
Regarding the routine fund, we are not involved at all. The 
routine fund is managed by the principal. But the school 
committee may be invited to talk about it and make the decision   
(I-11).   
The above comments indicate who is significantly in control of the school 
budget, particularly the routine fund from the district government.  
 In the autonomy era, contrary to the previous system where funding was 
directly given to the school from central office, state secondary schools had to 
deal with considerable bureaucratic red tape at the mayor’s office in order to 
obtain non-salary funds (to meet school operational costs). It often did not come 
in the full amount and was delayed. That is one reason why the schools relied on 
money from parents.   
With regards to the fund that came from parents, the budgeting process 
was somewhat different. This is because at the beginning many parties were 
involved and shared information. Usually the budget planning process was 
started at the end of academic year (June).  The draft was mainly developed by 
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the principal and then given to a delegated teacher. Undoubtedly, the budget 
proposal had more than one draft. The following comment from a teacher (I-21) 
illustrates this: 
Researcher (R): How is the school budget proposed to the 
committee? 
Participant (P):  The school proposes the budget to the 
committee and I make the budget plan for this academic year. 
Actually I made ten budget plans over one week.  
R: Why do you have to make that many plans? 
P: The ten budget plans were shown to the principal, and then 
he with the committee choose and decide which one is 
appropriate. 
R: What are the differences between those ten budget plans? 
P: Basically it is the amount of monthly school fee that has to 
be paid by parents. The principal and the committee select 
which one is the best, and then the committee will release this 
to the parents in the committee general meeting. Certainly the 
meeting is the most risky one, because it could be the parents 
don’t agree.… After the budget officially is accepted, we 
disseminate the details to teachers and administration staff. This 
ensures they know about the amount of money they will receive 
and are aware of the kind of school programmes that are funded 
from the parents’ money.  
The principal (I-16) from another state secondary school explains the process 
slightly differently as follows: 
The budget plan was developed only by the principal. I made a 
draft then we discussed it in a meeting with teachers and 
administration staff, collected comments and made revisions. 
After that we asked the school committee members to  
brainstorm about the programmes that were to be funded by the 
budget.. The committee were always curious about the program 
that we planned, and asked, why is there urgency for this?  This 
then led to another revision of the budget plan and agreement 
reached. Early in the academic year we print the budget plan 
and distribute it to parents at the annual school meeting. 
Subsequently, there was bargaining with parents [about amount 
of school fee].  
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Those two quotations indicate that the budget planning process with the parents’ 
money was more transparent and democratic than the government fund, certainly 
as far as these respondents were concerned.  
In contrast, some parents considered the method of developing the school 
budget manipulative. Only parents of new students were invited, the meeting 
agenda had already been drawn up by the school, it followed its interests, and 
there was little time provided for understanding or questioning it. Many believed 
that parents were driven by the school to accept the plan without listening to 
their concerns. This practice is similar to what happened with the POMG and the 
BP3 (see sub-section 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).  In addition, inflation accumulation since 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the perception that state schools are of 
superior quality, resulted in ‘stipulated’ school fees which became a burden to 
the average parents’ financial situation.  
Two state secondary schools which volunteered details of their school 
budget documents, and these revealed interesting information (a sample of 
typical state secondary school budgets is shown in Appendix 6). Firstly, in terms 
of total amount, parents’ money collected by the school in a year was much 
greater than the operational fund from the government.  According to Supriadi’s 
(2003) study, state secondary schools are regularly given around 30 million 
rupiahs (equivalent to US$ 3,000) for operational costs from the government 
annually. However the two site study schools could collect ten to fifteen times 
that amount.  Secondly, 40% of the fund was allocated to school staffs (which 
already had regular salary as civil servants) based on their position (principal, 
vice-principals, administration staff, teachers); an additional amount of money 
also based on teachers’ teaching time and extra responsibility (such as home-
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room teachers, teachers responsible for extracurricular activities, and teachers 
who were assistant to vice-principals). Thirty percent of the fund was allocated 
for non-permanent staff (non-civil servants) and an additional fund to cover 
school over-head costs; around 20% of the fund is used to support teaching and 
learning processes. Thirdly, what the school indicated about their innovative 
programmes was under-funded and unsustainable. This is because many 
programmes that were listed in the budget plan were in the main not supported 
with enough funding or had inadequate capacity to fulfil the programme, its 
intention was more to show that the school had a wonderful plan.  
From a legal perspective, public secondary schools that collect funds 
from parents don’t have enough legislation and regulation to back up their 
actions. Although in the budget plan stated by the education district office a 
‘school levy’ regulation existed, and a circular from the mayor commented on its 
use this did not make it legitimate. Moreover, the school committee also 
stipulated that an additional amount of money had to be contributed by parents 
regularly, which was 55% higher than the ‘school levy’ stipulated by the head of 
district education office. However, nobody questioned this kind of activity - 
school stakeholders such as principals, teachers, parents, and the community 
regarded it as something ordinary and were accustomed to it.  
Undoubtedly, this kind of fund is very flexible for the school in terms of 
spending, which is not a characteristic of the routine fund. A principal explained 
it as follows: 
As long as we talk about our request and give clear and rational 
argument for that to the parents’ representative, they will 
provide authorization. Changing allocation of the budget should 
be informed and accountable. So, changing school budget 
allocations is permitted as long as they know about it (I-16). 
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On the one hand, funds from parents are becoming a significant 
contribution towards school operational costs (non-salary budget). On the other 
hand, this did not result in a bigger bargaining position for parents or their 
representatives on the school committee. A school supervisor explained this 
issue as follows: 
Some principals don’t want to be controlled at all by the school 
committee. However, it depends on each individual. Although 
the principal in some schools may have that attitude, in terms of 
financial accountability he must make it very clear. It was not 
only implementing what the principal wants…..at least before 
the money is spent there was an agreement from the committee 
(I-2).   
 One school tried to involve as many parties as possible in the school 
budgeting process for all funds. The principal, who has a postgraduate degree 
from an overseas university used different practices to empower teachers in 
relation to the school budget. The following comment illustrates this: 
For transparency in our school, the practice at the beginning of 
the academic year was to appoint a teacher responsible for a 
certain program.. There was a teacher responsible for religious 
instruction, increasing academic performance program, 
vocational activity, information technology, sport activity, (etc.) 
... outside the vice-principals who have their own program. 
Then other teachers were grouped to each program, to make 
their own budget plan together. After that, all plans were 
gathered, related to the available funds for that year, and then a 
spreadsheet was developed. One example … for the sport 
activity the teacher he will know where the money to finance 
sporting activity will come from; it could be from the 
management operational assistance fund … some million 
rupiahs [routine fund], and from BP3 [parents] another million 
rupiahs etc…Each teacher who had such responsibility knew 
the amount of his/her budget in a year including its source. As 
the principal I monitor what is happening (I-8).  
One teacher who came from the same school was interviewed and confirmed the 
principal’s explanation (I-22). Interviews and observations in other schools 
revealed, however, that such practice was not common.  
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7.4.3 Authority in staff management 
Unlike the results discussed in previous sub-sections, participants’ 
responded differently regarding the matter of authority in staff management. It 
seemed that each group had a different priority regarding this issue. Data from 
questionnaires and interviews indicated a number of complex issues surrounding 
devolved authority on staff management. 
As a group, the principals felt that schools should be responsible for 
selecting and recruiting administrative staff (Appendix 7.6). Their attitude shows 
that the principal’s job as school administrator depends on the administration 
staff who were often seen as inadequately trained. Unlike teachers who have a 
university education, nearly all administrative staff were secondary school 
graduates. Principals found their close supervision of the day-to-day activities of 
administrators was not beneficial. They felt that the administrative staff do not 
provide the kind of adequate performance required, which is generally consistent 
with how others think about the public sectors (see for example Rohdewohld, 
2003; Filmer and Lindauer, 2001). The teachers’ response revealed a similar 
perspective.  Only school committee members who were not involved in daily 
school activities had a different view. Eight out of 21 school committee members 
agreed with such devolved authority. 
Respondent groups felt that the evaluation of teachers’ performance 
should be a devolved authority. Principals already exercised annual performance 
assessment for the teacher as a government employee. But this evaluation was 
administrative and too general. The teacher’s performance evaluation in teaching 
and learning was still conducted by the district office, but this exercise was 
basically a paper exercise, and did not measure the effectiveness of teachers’ 
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work (see Nielsen, 2003).  So the idea that schools appraise teachers was not 
only supported by principals, but also by teachers and school committee 
members. It seemed that principals were confident about their own abilities to 
undertake performance evaluation of teachers. 
However for the teachers, their professional development was their 
priority (42 out of 57 were in favour). This was not a coincidence since most in-
service training was organised and conducted by their superior officers who were 
either education district officers, provincial officers or officers from central 
office. From the teachers’ point of view, professional development sessions 
generally made them feel disempowered (see for instance Thair and Treagust, 
2003). To them, the professional development activities use one-way 
communication, with the main purpose being to socialise them into new 
government policy or educational innovation. A representative from the teachers 
union argues that this is why it does not empower teachers: 
The administrative purpose is the essential purpose. .... it is  just 
to spend the money. They don’t think some kind of need 
analysis is required, which would demonstrate different needs 
for different teachers. Experienced biology teachers, for 
example, their need for professional development is different 
from novice teachers. They don’t care about it, that’s why the 
results are far from optimal (I-3). 
On the other hand, teachers who attend professional development training had 
free time from their teaching. Furthermore, they got additional money just by 
attended the training and sometimes an opportunity to see other places.  
Unsurprisingly, for training in other provinces or in the capital city, teachers 
were competing to get the chance (Mulyana, 2003, personal communication).    
One promise that came with the implementation of the SBM policy was 
that professional development for teachers could be conducted as they wanted 
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(see sub-section 5.2.1). However, there appeared to be no changing practice 
regarding this issue. As indicated in this comment from a school supervisor, 
change at the school level was not happening: 
Any kind of previous professional development efforts for 
teachers at district level like PKG [pemantapan kerja guru, the 
strengthening of teachers’ work] or MGMP [musyawarah guru 
mata pelajaran, the consultation of subject teachers] organised 
by bureaucrats didn’t work very well. Then we came to the 
idea, why don’t we give money directly to the teachers and let 
them make their own program for professional development at 
school level. Unfortunately, this idea was not supported by a 
group of principals, they were afraid. They even influenced the 
education district office to ensure this did not happen, and 
suggested it would be best to implement another year… a 
buying time strategy (I-2).  
The ideas of recruiting principals and teachers at the school level was not 
supported however by all groups of respondents. Only one out of five principals, 
one school committee members from 21 participants, and 18 out of 57 teachers 
agreed that schools should select their own principals. These small numbers 
demonstrate that delegating this kind of authority may be far too ambitious at 
this time. These views also parallel responses about schools recruiting their own 
teaching staff. Teachers, in particular, considered this to be a low priority.  A 
comment from a teacher reflected this view: 
At this time only half-policy about SBM is really implemented, 
which means only some particular and trivial things get done. 
Far too difficult for it to include exercising authority about 
principal selection, I think that’s very hard (I-15). 
Becoming a principal in Indonesia’s state secondary schools is regarded, 
as was mentioned earlier,  as a privilege by many people (Purwono, 2004, 
personal communication). The principal is selected through a very routines 
bureaucratic selection process between senior teachers. Once a person is 
selected, it is unlikely s/he will return to work as a teacher in the future. This 
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means that the system will maintain s/he to continue as a member of this 
exclusive group with ‘powers’ in the education sector. Principals also have an 
opportunity to obtain more prestigious positions later. So it is not surprising to 
see the principal’s perspective appearing to support their own interest. 
A teacher who opposes principal recruitment by schools explains his 
concerns as follows: 
I am afraid, that if we choose our own principal, then the 
person, who emerges, based on popular vote, may be a dictator 
or may be obsessed with the need for respect. This will result in 
very bad impacts on the school (Q-65). 
A school committee member also believes that the real implication of selecting 
principal by school committee will create a worse situation: 
I think that will be more risky to the school. How do the 
committee members know which principal candidates is better? 
Nowadays it should be acknowledged that we are faced with 
nepotism, when the committee has a right to principal selection 
the level of nepotism will be higher (I-11). 
These two perspectives implied that a ‘democratic election’ to recruit principals 
by school stakeholder was not advisable either. A teacher and a school 
committee member thought the worse case scenario involved a lack of capacity 
to judge possible principal candidate which can result in favouritism based on 
nepotism. In another response, it was suggested that teachers generally were 
inadequate to become principals. An official at district level supported this view: 
At this time, we can choose someone to become principal from 
eligible teachers but most of them are unqualified. There are 
few who are qualified, they may be too young and his/her rank 
position is not sufficient. Also we are not ready for a young 
person to become principal. In short, still lots of obstacles (I-7). 
However, by contrast, another teacher supported the idea of principal 
selection by the school. But he believed that teachers should have this authority: 
 170
I think school committee members do not know much about the 
performance of each teacher. Only teachers at the school who 
are acknowledgeable about a particular teacher if s/he is 
suitable, capable or smart enough to become a principal. The 
teachers should be given rights to choose their own principal (I-
21). 
He believed that teachers know more than school committee members, and that 
this should be a leverage to use in gaining what teachers want. 
 Others responded differently – some believed that the best way was by a 
clear and transparent mechanism. Comments from two education council 
members illustrate this as follows: 
In the previous system, the appointment of principal was merely 
based on like and dislike. A new principal can be completely 
unaccustomed to our school situation. At this time we want at 
least school stakeholders to be asked about who they want… if 
they have a candidate, or the authority can be given some 
alternatives before appointment (I-4). 
Principal selection at school level obviously will draw conflict 
between school, school committee, district education office and 
of course the mayor. The first thing that has to be established is 
a mechanism for that, it should be open and fair for every party    
(I-23). 
With regards to teachers’ recruitment at school level several issues were 
also identified. All secondary schools which participated in this study reported 
that currently some teachers were needed to teach particular subjects, although it 
would probably be a long wait before appointments were made. A principal 
explains this situation as follow: 
From the school side, we have a responsibility to ask the district 
education district for some teachers. A couple of days ago I 
asked for a qualified teacher….just move him to our school. 
But, the office answer was that we will consider that later, just 
use who is already eligible (I-20). 
Because it was difficult to attract teachers via the district government, the school 
itself selected non-permanent teaching staff.  This response from a teacher 
illustrates an experience which others have had: 
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Usually the vice-principal for curriculum affairs tells the 
principals that there is no teacher for specific subject matter or 
that a particular teacher has a heavy teaching job. Then they 
look for a non-permanent teacher, they select from available 
candidates who meet requirements. The principal and one 
teacher decided which one passed the selection (I-15).    
 In contrast, for the appointment of a permanent teacher (civil servant 
teacher) the schools did not have any choice except to receive who was 
appointed. So the notion that schools could select their own permanent teachers 
was an appealing idea for principals and teachers. One principal who was excited 
with this possibility noted that the: 
Principal should be given authority to appoint and fire 
permanent teachers and administration staff (Q-22). 
Teachers also supported the idea because they found that the performance of 
permanent teachers was not always satisfactory. Three permanent teachers from 
three different secondary schools shared their experience regarding their 
counterparts: 
Regarding teacher’s recruitment, schools can only take it for 
granted and cannot select and refuse who is coming to our 
school.  This is our weakness, we do nothing about it. There are 
some teachers who have big problem here, we cannot reject or 
fire them because they are government employees who hold an 
official appointment letter from the government (I-19).    
We have difficulty in dealing with teachers who sometimes 
come late to the class or their teaching work is inadequate. They 
were permanent teachers and it was difficult to fix (I-15).   
I always find it frustrating when I have to manage students in 
relation to teacher absence. That is our classic problem. I only 
can give suggestions to the principal regarding that teacher’s 
performance, but mostly there was no good solution (I-13). 
As a result, permanent teacher selection was viewed as a key task that many 
wanted devolved to the school level. This was because the school could have 
greater flexibility to manage permanent teachers and minimise bad performance.   
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 Another sensitive issue that emerged more openly in Indonesia during 
the autonomy era related to diversity. For example, one educator wrote:    
Enhancing nationalism, abolish preference which is based on 
race, culture, religion, ethnicity/local identity (Q-64).  
This view has become more accepted and was practiced at the district level 
across Indonesia, in terms of new government employee recruitment or 
appointments to strategic positions (see for example Sagala, 2003; Soewartoyo, 
2002). The respondents undoubtedly perceived that if the school was given the 
power to recruit principals and teachers, then some preferences were likely to be 
shown. Like other areas in Indonesia, Lombok has people from diverse 
community backgrounds within its education sector and one group (usually the 
local ethnicity) dominant in its bureaucracy. Other groups who are minorities in 
the local population (but usually the majority in their place of origin, such as 
Javanese in Java) often do not really enjoy such privileges.   
 A school supervisor who came from another island also indicated the 
possibility of this becoming an issue: 
I have a concern that the employee recruitment mode in the 
future may be based not on the quality of candidates, but on 
their identity, using the authority opportunity that is given by 
autonomy. My worry is that there is something sad in this 
regional autonomy policy that a person who governs education, 
because of the autonomy spirit, has to be governed by local 
people. I think this one is not a possibility anymore. It is a 
reality (I-1).  
A teacher who was born in Lombok also had a similar perspective: 
I hate to see preferences such as ones based on locality or 
religion for a reason, they hide themselves from incapability. It 
is not fair and also it will jeopardize the future of this island (I-
15). 
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However, two respondents who had years of experience in government 
positions acknowledged the practice could happen and suggested solutions for 
that. An official from the education district office argued as follows: 
Let’s see what happened in Java. Central Javanese civil servants 
cannot get a position if they worked in East Java, and vice 
versa. Even in Bali, for a long time that was the common 
practice. I think in Lombok the situation is different, we 
welcome the others. Of course with the autonomy, there were 
people who use this opportunity. It is something that cannot be 
avoided, so we have to establish a regulation about that (I-7). 
A school committee member who worked as a high ranking official on a 
development planning board at provincial level gave a similar view: 
Lombok people are more accommodating than others, 
compared to Bali for instance. We don’t have a problem with 
other ethnic groups who hold strategic position in the local 
government. I know that the situation is slightly changing at this 
time, that’s why we need a fair meritocratic system for that (I-
14). 
7.4.3 Authority in curriculum management 
Appendix 7.7 shows participants’ responses about the ‘core business’ of 
schools - curriculum management. Only teachers, amongst the respondent groups 
favoured devolved authority to schools for curriculum management. It seems that 
teachers are ready to implement it without hesitation. 
From the principals’ point of view, teaching methods, and curriculum 
development along with textbook choice are favoured areas for devolved 
authority. There seemed to be less support for other teaching materials and the 
graduation examination. These choices certainly reflect the position of principals 
more than education officials who tend to stick to current regulations. For 
instance, on the one hand, principals favour being able to decide which textbooks 
should be used in school, but on the other hand other they do not support control 
 174
new other teaching materials. This is because any textbook that is used in school 
has to be short-listed through a central government selection process, but other 
teaching materials mainly come from teachers’ efforts to enrich students’ 
learning.  
Unlike principals, school committee members chose other teaching 
materials as their first choice for devolved authority. However their perceptions 
tended to be different to those of teachers and principals. A comment from a 
school committee member is indicative of the difference: 
Choices of curriculum, book and other teaching materials 
should be based on national standards, not devolved authority 
(Q-17).  
 For principals and school committee members, the idea that schools 
should create their own graduation examinations received the lowest priority. 
But for each group it was based on different reasons. The principals considered 
that the MoNE should continue to conduct the final examination. This process 
involved the central government having veto over planning, implementation and 
establishing passing standards to be achieved by students. For committee 
members, quality and state certification tended to be their main motives as most 
of them were higher educated parents who wanted their children to pursue higher 
education. 
 Other issues raised by a teacher reflected some of the wider concerns: 
There needs to be a streamlining of teaching subjects and 
curriculum loads. School infrastructure needs upgrading to 
support teaching and learning in terms of school based 
management (Q-64). 
The points above are classic complaints by teachers about Indonesia’s school 
curriculum.  Teachers have, for some time, felt that there are too many subjects 
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to teach to students and an over-whelming syllabus in each subject.  In addition, 
teachers see that there was having been no changing practice about this, 
especially with regard to the curriculum target which has to be completely 
delivered to students in an academic year. One teacher complained as follows: 
The principal said we had come to the end of the curriculum 
target. There were no such things like mastery learning, he 
never thought about it. The curriculum targets were to be 100% 
delivered, if there was a teacher who wrote 75% or 80%, this 
became a big question (I-13). 
Another teacher sharing his experience and noted that: 
The principal and school supervisor always had concerns about 
the curriculum target and its level of absorbability. Curriculum 
target had to be 100% delivered, and its level of absorbability 
reach the same point. I had a heated discussion with a 
supervisor regarding this, but the answer is very clear, we have 
to follow the establishment (I-17).  
 Those views reflect the facts that for teachers, having authority in 
curriculum management is positive for them. They hoped that one of the 
outcomes of the transfer of this authority would be to resolve such concerns. It is 
a hope based on the perception that school based management is the catalyst for 
innovation in education for all Indonesian schools. 
In order to nurture the schools autonomy to plan and execute their 
programme to improve educational quality, the MoNE introduced the MPMBS 
programme (see sub-section 2.3.5). Three out of the 5 schools involved in this 
study were selected to implement this programme. One of the objectives of the 
MPMBS for the schools was to incorporate all educational innovation that had 
been given by the central office (such as contextual teaching and learning, and 
portfolio assessment) into their own programme to improve student achievement.  
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 However, two schools who participated stated that there were some 
difficulties in the implementation of the program. One school reported that the 
fund termed BOMM (bantuan operasional manajemen mutu, operational 
assistance for quality management) from the MoNE could not be used fully. This 
was because the funds earmarked as ‘seed money’ have to be given as 
“kickbacks” (one source said it’s nearly 35% of the total fund) to buy laboratory 
equipment and materials that schools already had. The following comments from 
a teacher discuss this: 
We have to buy a list of laboratory materials for a certain 
amount. A month later the materials came. On the other hand 
that fund was not intended to buy such things, that made the 
budget be squeezed and some programs were eliminated   (I-
21).  
Another teacher responded that a big proportion of the BOMM funding was to 
finance a programme that provided extra teaching time to students to assist them 
to pass the national final examination. He expressed the following: 
Extra teaching for other grades was present [beside grade III]. 
But, to buy teaching materials, such as books, was not 
happening. Enrichment for students through extra teaching is 
routinely performed by the school long before the MPMBS 
program is implemented; we only added nominal honorarium 
for teacher because of that (I-15).  
It seems that the MPMBS fund’s role is to assist schools to continue practising 
their usual programmes. This implies that the school capability to plan, to 
innovate in curriculum management as desired by the MoNE, was far from 
satisfactory.  
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7.5 Parents and community involvement  
 This section will discuss participants’ perceptions and the practices of 
parents and community involvement in schools. Appendix 7.8 outlines responses 
of three groups of school stakeholder in this matter.   
 All groups appeared to think that the role of parents and community in 
relation to schools was mainly to supply and maintain facilities. These 
perceptions were reflected in some of the comments from the interview sessions 
with the school committee members, teachers and principals respectively: 
The main task of the school committee is to help in terms of 
physical things…for instance that kind of development that is 
not funded by the government, then it is for the committee to  
act (I-5).  
School committee involvement is mainly in terms of supplying 
physical things, such as facilities that school needed (I-19). 
In terms of planning, to make school buildings some fund 
comes from the government, then with the committee’s help 
two or three buildings are developed, because the school 
committee has a responsibility  to collect funds from other 
sources (I-8). 
 Unsurprisingly, responses from the questionnaire were quite consistent 
with these views. All groups of respondents chose involvement in supplying 
school resources as the main way parents and the community could participate in 
school life. This was a long-standing view of the parents most appropriate role. 
The introduction of the SBM policy did not make a difference, parents and other 
community representatives than parents were still positioned on the periphery - 
as providers of unlimited resources for schools. In a immediately, the resources 
become the monthly school fee that parents had to pay (as explained in sub-
section 7.4.2).  
 178
Four out of five principals responded that parents and the community 
representatives have to be included in managing funds that are collected from 
parents. The main reason for this was that the money can only be spent based on 
permission from parents’ representatives. A similar number of principals were 
also in favour with the involvement of the community in term of maintaining 
school facilities. Sharing responsibilities for school buildings would be 
welcomed by principals where government support was limited. It would 
increase the sense of belonging by the community and also be a source of cheap 
labour to complete jobs that educators lack expertise in. Three principals 
supported the view that parents and community members should be sharing their 
knowledge and skills in teaching and learning. The principals acknowledged that 
there was plenty of experience that people outside school could be contributing 
to students’ understanding. However, for principals parental involvement in 
extra-curricular and out-of-school activities was not favoured. The principals 
realized most of these activities were outside school and therefore difficult to 
control, so they believed they were best undertaken by teachers.  
Generally, for the groups of teachers and the school committee members, 
their responses were the same. More than half of both groups supported the 
involvement of the community as a labour force to maintain school property.  
The main reason for this, as with principals’ was to tighten the relationship 
between the school and the community. In particular, 11 out of 21 school 
committee members supported the idea of involving themselves in managing 
school funds coming from their constituency. The rest believed the school was 
capable enough to administer the funds. The respondents indicated that the 
school committee members did not know much about school financial issues. 
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Furthermore, the school seemed to enjoy this position, at a time when funds from 
parents were more significant than those from the government (discussed in 
section 7.4). A group of teachers and school committee members were in support 
of other community involvement approaches, but they were fewer than 50%.  
From the teachers’ perspective, for instance, the community did not have enough 
capacity to engage in teaching. All groups of respondents seem to position the 
schools as more knowledgeable, therefore community involvement was welcome 
only when the school needed this and in a limited way.   
The data from interviews also revealed similar findings. In addition, the 
data provided further explanations about several issues, in terms of relationships 
and methods of involvement. First, respondents were asked about their 
perspectives regarding four roles and seven functions of the school committee as 
stated in the MoNE decree (see subsection 5.2.3 and Appendix 3). Most 
respondents believed that these were difficult to implement, and only one role 
and one function specifically were always mentioned. These were the 
committee’s role as a supporting agency (role number 2) and the committee’s 
function to collect money from the parents (function number 6).  
Second, some respondents provided different examples that needed 
parents or community involvement. Several responses from the participants 
revealed that in most cases the school invited other stakeholders to become 
involved in terms of: 
• students who had difficulty in learning or behaviour (I-13, I-19) 
• requesting additional funds for building refurbishment (I-23) 
• finding a resolution with the local community because school 
buildings separated by public path makes is difficult for school to 
monitor students (I-13) 
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• establishing a new student admission figure so as not to overload the 
school (I-22) 
Overall, these examples show that parents and the community are predominantly 
involved only by a request from the school.   
A school supervisor argued that this situation occurred because the 
school itself was not open to others’ ideas about education,  
I believe there are many people who want to contribute and be 
involved in school in terms of wanting to improve educational 
implementation and quality. Their obstacles are they don’t have 
any access to the school or the committee and rigidity of school 
organisation structure which usually makes them feel 
subordinate and they don’t like it very much (I-2).  
It is expected that community involvement could bring positive contributions 
(Bray, 2000), especially in the reform era where opportunities should be more 
available. One participant concluded that: 
Involvement methods in terms of thinking, input, and then 
attention are mostly needed by the school. Those are more 
important than money, I think. The money is important, but 
mainly we are not measuring its contribution in terms of the 
achievement. In other words, the school is supposed to be more 
open for others because they already drain other resources (I-1). 
7.6 School Committee 
The emergence of a new body at the school level will undoubtedly make 
adjustments, adaptations and may even contribute to some innovations.  This 
section deals with the dynamics of the school committee issue at the school 
level. Participant responses from the questionnaires and interviews provided 
colourful descriptions about this new body at the school level.  
Appendix 7.9 summarises all participants’ responses to the five questions 
about the school committee. The response to the first question (Q9a) was similar 
for all groups - more than half perceived that the school committee was not an 
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independent body. The response was really interesting, particularly from 
principals who were the first in the school who knew about the decree that stated 
that the committee is an independent body. It seemed that the majority of 
participants’ responses could be based on the reality they actually experienced 
about the school committee. They saw that the committee was not independent. 
Instead they perceived the committee as being dependent on the school. That the 
committee was not considered an independent body, reflected the power 
relations that existed in most state secondary schools.  An illustration from an 
educator indicated the reason for this: 
In all schools, the committee is highly dependent on the 
school’s host in terms of financing their existence; one example 
… conducting a meeting and purchase of food ... the committee 
cannot do it. This is because the committee does not have 
authority in terms of funding (I-6).   
 The majority of participants responded that membership on the 
committee was not decided by the principals (Q9b). Instead, the recruitment 
method used to select individuals to be school committee members, while 
facilitated officially by the school was decided by others. Around 78% of 
teachers as well as 86% of committee members also responded that the 
principals did not directly decide on the committee composition. However, 
participants’ responses from the interviews reveal several issues regarding 
committee formation and methods of recruitment.  
 Firstly, all schools elected their own school committee members at the 
annual school meting. Parents, mostly of new students, were invited and the 
meeting’s agenda was to form a school committee and at the same time to decide 
about the amount of the school fee. The meeting itself, however, is fully 
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controlled by the principal (see sub-section 7.4.2).  Parents’ participation was 
somewhat limited: 
Researcher: Were all parents coming to the meeting? 
Participant: It never happened. All over Indonesia never do all 
parents come to the meeting. As a maximum there are around 
20 to 40% [parents of new student] (I-14).      
From this small proportion who came, usually a few would speak about their 
concerns in the limited time available. A school committee member noted: 
The school committee in our school was directly appointed, and 
then the principal made a decree to stipulate that. The first thing 
was a plenary meeting with all parents, which coincided with 
the ending period of the BP3; then a direct appointment 
occurred with regard to who will represent parents, fortunately I 
was involved in the last two periods of the BP3. Some of the 
board members came from BP3, some as community figures, 
and also a teacher representative (I-11). 
 Secondly, people nominated as school committee members were 
regarded as community figures. One school committee member was convinced 
that: 
The person who can become a member of board of school 
committee was not restricted to parents of students. We can 
elect for instance a governor [of the province] as a board 
member or a kapolda [chief of the police in the province]. It is 
dependent on the school meeting decision (I-5).  
This indicates that unlike the BP3, which is restricted to parents’ representatives, 
the school committee has flexibility to recruit from any part of society. Of the 
five state secondary schools that participated in this study, it was revealed that 
the chairman and secretary positions in each school committee were filled by 
well known figures and authorities. One school had a rector of the only state 
university in the province, and a school supervisor as chairman and secretary 
respectively. Other schools had success in recruiting the head commissioner of 
the state bank, high echelon officials from provincial or district government, 
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prominent businessmen and public figures.  This was planned by the principals.  
One principal acknowledged what he had done in the school annual meeting: 
In terms of the formation of the school committee, I have to put 
in the right people as board members. I should know him/her 
personally, s/he has interests in education and be useful for the 
school. If the committee makes too many troubles, I can dismiss 
it, that’s my perception….For the chairman position, of course, 
it should be someone who I know more. And I told the parents 
in the school meeting when they asked about the committee 
positions, ‘don’t worry I know good people who are 
knowledgeable about education and they are willing to be 
involved’. So, there was no tension in the meeting, it went 
smoothly, and I can put the right people on the committee’s 
board (I-12). 
The motive for recruiting prominent figures of the community was based on the 
assumption that their influence can be used to help the school. One teacher gave 
an example of this, 
When we started to recruit people for school committee’s 
board, the principal and teachers maintained that s/he should be 
an important person who has power in executive or legislative. 
This is because s/he can help the school whenever the school 
makes any kind of proposal, so s/he can facilitate our plan and 
make recommendations. Then s/he can directly say to the 
executive to approve our proposal (I-17). 
One difficulty, however, was time restriction. High profile people are also busy 
people3 and one teacher described: 
The real obstacle with the board of the school committee is to 
find time for meeting. Sometimes we have to come to their 
workplace, because there is no alternative. For instance, the 
treasurer of our school committee is working at the mayor’s 
office, and then we have to meet there. This is because all of 
them are busy and important people (I-15). 
Since the principal controlled the meeting, he was the significant individual who 
arranged for the people to be available for appointment. Recruiting of high 
                                                 
3 During data collection, the researcher also found it difficult to find time for interviews with 
school committee members. Some of them were really busy and it was very difficult to spare 
time for interview, some of them having to change the commitment several times.   
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profile people had its advantages for the principals. It improved the school’s 
bargaining position in the society in general, and on the other hand it could be 
used in the principal’s best interest for any kind of problem. For example, 
parents who complained about the amount of school tuition fee would feel 
hesitant to confront community figures. The committee was also comprised of 
representatives of the administration, the teaching staff, students and alumni. 
Several responses from the participants revealed that principal’s vested interest 
was evident in nominating people for the school committee. One teacher (I-18) 
claimed that the principal himself purposely put him on the committee as the 
teacher representative; similar practices also happened in schools of I-15 and I-
19 (teachers) and I-11 (school committee member). In one school, even the 
alumni representative (according to a teacher I-17) was a permanent teacher in 
the school. These actions drew criticisms - one teacher was convinced that the 
school committee had become the principal’s puppet. He commented: 
Many facts suggested that bureaucratic [district education 
officials and principals] interference was too much in the 
formation of school committee. This does not support the 
democratisation process that was intended by regulation. So, it 
shows that democratisation in schools is not something wanted 
by the bureaucrats (I-6). 
 However, as suggested previously (see Chapter 5), the regulation itself gave 
many privileges in terms of process to committee members and yet still fulfilled 
the regulation’s mandate.  
 Thirdly, in terms of school committee composition, in most schools as 
shown in Appendix 7.2 (school committee member’s profile) the majority of 
members had served on the BP3 board or as common members. Several 
participants suggested that they only practiced changing the name of BP3 to 
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school committee to comply with the regulation.  One teacher stated this 
experience as it happened in his school: 
Researcher (R): How was the formation process of school 
committee in your school? 
Participant (P): It is just continuing of the BP3, old board 
members just change the name to school committee. 
R: all the same personnel?  
P:  Apparently…. from the BP3 members like Mr X [the 
chairman of school committee], he is a community figure in 
Mataram, though he didn’t have a child in the school. The 
treasurer, Mrs Y, who still has a child who is a student in the 
school; the secretary is a figure of one of the non-governmental 
organisation. This is because the old board members fulfilled 
the requirements needed [that stated by the regulation], then we 
just changed the name from BP3 to school committee (I-21). 
Another teacher from a different state school noted: 
As far as I know, the BP3 held a meeting which also invited 
several people who were nominated to be included in the school 
committee. Because, it was still periods of service of the BP3, 
then we just changed the name to school committee. 
Automatically the chairman and other board members were 
similar to the BP3, and some new people as additional ordinary 
members to become the required community representatives (I-
22). 
These explanations revealed what could happen in practice to the creation of the 
committee in the school. Previous practice by the BP3 had not seemed to change 
(see sub-section 7.4.2). However, there was one school that used this opportunity 
to completely transform the BP3 and recruit all new people for the school 
committee. One teacher explains this: 
Our school committee members are all new people. This was 
because the last chairman [of the BP3] was interfering too 
much, mainly in the refurbishment project that occurred in the 
school. He was not a developer, but he took the project. Then, 
we considered this with other teachers, and concluded he was 
not the right person to help the school, we have to get rid of 
him. Beside in the 3 years in his service as the BP3 chairman, 
the previous principal clashed with him….the school tuition fee 
was not increasing at all in those periods (I-15). 
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Participants’ responses to question Q9c regarding the committee’s roles, 
indicated that all groups of the stakeholders were generally aware of the 
changing roles. This is not surprising since the main and only role and function 
of the BP3 was to collect money from parents, whereas the committee as 
stipulated had four roles and these were promoted extensively. The interview 
responses indicated that the educators and committee members responded 
similarly about the broadening role of the committee and felt that it was a 
beneficial development.  For instance, a principal commented:   
There are bits of difference, but mainly the same. School 
committee’s authority is more far ranging [than the BP3], such 
as the committee can give many inputs regarding design and 
planning of particular programs to the school (I-16).   
However, not all of the committee’s roles have been apparent. A comment from 
one school supervisor illustrates this as follows: 
The role as advisor is rarely used by the committee; supporting 
role is limited only to supplying the funds that the school 
needed; as a controlling agency…. only practiced when there 
was the annual school meeting just to stipulate the amount of 
money that had to be paid by parents regularly; and mediator 
role was only used when they thought it was necessary to get 
involved (I-1). 
Several teachers also confirmed that many suggestions regarding the school 
programme arose mainly from them, while the committee simply approved the 
ideas.  Typical remarks from teachers in two different schools were: 
It could be good if the committee would give inputs with 
anything that needed to be supported. But, right now everything 
is proposed by the school. The committee is actually always in 
agreement with the program that we propose (I-15). 
I think the committee is always cooperative with us. Everything 
that we proposed is approved by them. In terms of fund raising 
for that program, school policies, is always accepted (I-21). 
These explanations suggest that some committees tend to agree to most things 
that the school suggests. An expansion of roles assigned to the committee is still 
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to occur. By contrast, according to one school committee member who served as 
a board member of the BP3, there was no difference between BP3 and the school 
committee: 
I think when we were running the BP3; we already practiced 
what we now call the school committee’s role.  From my point 
of view, what we have done is just like that (I-14).    
It seems that, although the BP3’s role was not similar to the school committee, 
the latter is administered like the former. This indicates that previous practices 
and procedures are still used in the committee, because it is operated mostly by 
the same individuals. 
 The two last questions regarding school committees (Q9d and Q9e) asked 
about the committee’s real influence in the school as perceived by school 
stakeholders. All principals, all school committee members and the majority of 
teachers responded that the school committee has the right to control educational 
implementation and their authorization is compulsory for school budgets. This 
view reflects the broadening of the committee’s roles and functions, and all 
groups of respondents felt that this kind of power-sharing should happen.  
  However, data from the interviews revealed a different picture. 
Generally, respondents perceived that there was limited power sharing in terms 
of the control of the committee in relation to educational implementation. A 
school committee member explain this issue as follows: 
We try to be independent, this means that the mandate from 
parents is something that we are all committed to. For instance, 
in terms of budget, we are very strict, the fund that came from 
the parents has to be accounted for accurately, how it is spent 
and it should be based on a budget plan that we agreed on….We 
asked those kind of questions of the principal. But we are also 
cautiously not to interfere in the education process, we are still 
in the corridor which means not involved in school technical 
matters (I-14). 
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Another committee member (I-11) from another school responded similarly: 
Researcher (R): What are the committee’s involvements in 
educational implementation based on given authority? 
Participants (P):  We always cooperate; consultative process is  
how we deal with the school. Frankly, in our school, we as the 
school committee do not interfere much, there were many 
things we were not involved in .  
R: What if there is a lack of teachers? 
P: We are not involved at all. 
R: So what really happened then? 
P: We just pleased the principal; we only supported the school 
in terms of financial, fund raising and the like. 
These two interview participants’ descriptions indicate that, although all groups 
of respondents felt that the committee had rights in terms of control of school 
business, in reality this only involved marginal supervision of the budget. This 
new is in accordance with those already discussed in previous sections (section 
7.5). 
Regarding the committee’s endorsement of the school budget, the 
practice in all state schools was the same. A school principal (I-20) explained the 
main reason for the continuation of the practice: 
Researcher (R): Did you ask the district government for all the 
actual money that the school needed yearly so you don’t have to 
collect money from parents? 
Participants (P):  Off course we did. We made an official 
request to the parliament and the executive based on our annual 
expenditure outside teachers salary.  
R: Was it granted by them? 
P: Oh, you don’t have to ask that. If we asked for ten, actually 
they would give us about half. I think it is impossible. We asked 
the government about the funds we needed, it is always refused, 
what can we say? No other choice but to ask parents for help. 
Even, in this early academic year the district government 
promised to give us 750 thousand rupiahs [equal US$ 75] as a 
subsidy for the new student admission process in every school. 
The fund is needed because we conducted student’s entrance 
test mandated by the government which is for transportation, 
consumption and to buy office stationary. However, they only 
gave us the money after tremendous effort and so we informed 
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the local newspaper about that. That’s the reality, and it is 
difficult to deal with.  
In practice, the limited amount of non-salary budget for a state secondary school 
located in the city is only enough to administer the school for four months. As a 
result, money from parents becomes a strategic source of income enabling the 
school to function for the whole academic year. Two teachers (I-15 and I-21) 
who were involved in budget planning revealed that total parental money 
compared to the full amount of money from the government (salary and non-
salary fund annually) was at a ratio of 1:2.5. This significant contribution then 
led to increasing the committee’s bargaining position at least in terms of 
authorization of the school budget. Because of the considerable amount of 
money involved, a dedicated employee in the school is made responsible for it. 
His/her job is usually to collect school fees from the students regularly and to 
deposit these in the school committee’s bank account (I-13, I-15, and I-21).   
 Like principals, teachers and administration staff who have an extra 
income from the school budget (in addition to their salary as civil servants, see 
sub-section 7.4.2), the committee members also have this additional funding 
source. Although the proportion has not reached more than 5% of the school 
budget, it was bigger than the amount a teacher would receive. Comments from 
principals and teachers from two different schools confirmed this: 
R: Does the committee member receive an honorarium like BP3 
in the past? 
P: It is the same, that is our policy, and it is an agreement 
reached between the committee and the school. Well, we also 
understood, actually they own the money. It can be given to 
them as a meeting stipend, monthly honorarium, or in terms of 
goods, basically it depends on the agreement. Usually at the end 
of the school financial periods, there is still money left in the 
balance, so we buy thing like clothing (etc) for them (I-16).  
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What really happened in our school… the committee members 
themselves who already know amount of fund from parents and 
its allocation, also asked about regular honorarium? They think, 
they fill the positions, doing the job and have responsibility, so 
automatically they should take a share from it (I-17).  
7.7 Effects of SBM policy on the school 
This section explains participants’ views and practices about SBM policy 
and its effects on the school. Questionnaire responses from school stakeholders 
are shown in three tables, and the result is discussed together with data from 
interviews. This relates to views about the policy itself, it benefits and 
constraints, and the changing roles experienced. 
Table 7.4 shows groups of participants’ responses about the SBM policy. 
Two groups of respondents, principals and school committee members, felt that 
the policy was appropriate to implement in their schools. The principals’ 
responses was easy to understand. Because of their structural positions in the 
educational bureaucracy it was unlikely they would refute the policy. Further, the 
policy arose from their superiors so the principals had to implement it. For the 
committee members, it was apparent this policy involved them as part of a 
legitimized school community. The members saw that the previous system 
somehow excluded them from school, but involved them as agents for school 
funding. In this new policy, their role was expanded (at least in theory) and there 
was a promise that the school would be more responsible to it stakeholders in the 
community. The majority of teachers, 43 out of 57, also agreed that the SBM 
policy was appropriate to implement. Only a small proportion of teachers felt 
unsure and did not agree. The teachers’ support of the policy was probably based 
on their feelings that the committee would help them if they also had a 
representative on the committee to take care of them. 
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 Table 7.4 Participants’ view about SBM policy  
Q10  Is SBM a good thing for your school? 
                                   Yes              Not Sure                  No 
Principal                       5                      -                          - 
Teachers                     43                   13                          1 
School Committee      21                     -                           - 
 
 In terms of benefits and constraints of the SBM policy, all groups of 
respondents clearly show (Appendix 7.10) that they felt the policy was more 
positive. Generally, a majority in each group felt that the policy brought many 
advantages to the school. For the principals, SBM would enhance their school 
operations. The teachers’ viewed participation in decision making and control of 
school resources as key priorities. For groups of school committee members, 
involvement in it was their major concern. These optimistic responses from all 
groups mirrored the data from interviews. Participants listed what they thought 
the benefits of the policy were. Some of these were: 
• Empowering community and parents about education issues (I-17) 
• Schools developing themselves based on their distinctive features to 
achieve excellence (I-7, I-20, I-21) 
• Power leverage to principals and education bureaucrats (I-17) 
• Democratisation in education (I-6)  
• Intervention from central and provincial office is limited  (I-21) 
 All groups of respondents felt that there were not many constraints faced 
in the implementation of the SBM policy. However all groups put lack of 
resources and funds as their top constraints. This seems to be a reality that has to 
be faced by every state secondary school in Mataram, and arises mainly because 
of students numbers as discussed in the previous section. Interestingly, only 3 
out of five principals answered this question. This means that for the principals 
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the SBM policy did involve any serious concerns except in terms of the 
perceived lack of resources and funds.  They also wanted to give the impression 
that nothing was wrong with the policy regardless of the many documented 
limitations. It could be that it was because the new policy operated in a similar 
way to the previous system which made the principals believe that not so many 
constraints existed.    
 Generally, the groups of teachers’ felt there were not too many 
constraints with the introduction of the SBM policy. Only 17 out of 57 (30%) of 
the teachers saw a link between the policy and their main job in school, which 
indicates that most of them saw SBM policy as still not connected to teachers’ 
work. Because only a few teachers in each school were involved in school 
committee activities, only eight wanted training in SBM. Only four of them had 
experienced or known about the committee’s operations.   
Similar responses also emerged from the group of school committee 
members. Only 10 out of 21 who participated in the study felt they needed 
training for their involvement in the committee. The reason for this was because 
most of the committee consisted of board members of the BP3, and they still 
operated in a similar manner. Most members had also experienced that the 
committee’s meeting they had attended (which is at least one a year) had 
proceeded without any tensions. However three participants felt that the meeting 
involved an element of time wasting. 
 One teacher (I-3) believed that SBM policy was good but its 
implementation was problematic and he identified the source of the problem as 
the education bureaucrats. Another teacher (I-21) also considered the policy 
good, but was concerned that the committee interfered in school business such as 
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dictating students admissions. An educational bureaucrat responded that the real 
limitation of the policy was the principal: 
I think the major constraint is the principals. They are not as 
capable as expected such as implementing SBM policy 
creatively,   full of fresh ideas, working effectively in short 
excellent. If the principals had those characteristics everything 
will be done (I-7).    
These perspectives above, like others, generally portrayed the policy as 
advantageous, but identified a lack of knowledge about SBM issues in general 
(see chapter 5 for comparison). 
 Three groups of participants’ responded that their role changed because 
of the SBM policy, though not significantly (Table 7.5).  Two principals felt that 
their roles changed to a large extent but the rest of them responded that change 
had seem more limited. The majority of teachers and school committee members 
also noted similar changes. Overall, it was perceived that there was a smooth 
changeover when the policy was implemented.  
Table 7.5 Participants’ view about role changed because of SBM  
Q13  To what extent has your role changed as a result of the move to 
SBM? 
                                a large extent      some extent          Not at all 
Principal                          2                         3                           - 
Teachers                        11                       42                           4 
School Committee           3                       18                           - 
 
By contrast, data from the interviews revealed that for several 
participants the introduction of SBM policy had not resulted in changes as 
expected. Two teachers from different schools commented that even though the 
SBM policy had been implemented in their schools, nothing much had really 
changed at the school level:  
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Nothing changes felt, just like the previous system (I-21). 
Generally, everything is the same (I-22). 
Several teachers in the site studies made similar comments. This phenomenon is 
not surprising, because the SBM policy only emphasised a new structural 
institution (the school committee) but its practices at the school level remained 
similar to the BP3.  
7.8 Attitude toward SBM policy and practices  
 In this last section, groups of respondents were asked about participants’ 
attitudes to SBM policy and its practices in their school (Appendix 7.11). 
Generally all groups of respondents had a positive attitude, except for Q14c and 
Q14q where some of them had different views.  
Principals’ attitudes to SBM were mostly positive with regard to all 
aspects. All principals’ agreed that the SBM policy resulted in more effective 
school management, improved decision-making and increased student 
achievement. Most of them also thought that SBM would increase community 
involvement, improve the relationship, and improve teachers’ jobs, giving them 
more freedom. By contrast, one principal thought that the community 
involvement in SBM would not work, and one principal also thought there was 
no relationship between SBM and the extent of teachers’ freedom. 
Teachers’ attitudes to SBM were also positive. They saw it as improving 
the decision making process (95%), making schools more effective (86%), 
improving relations with the community (84%), promoting effective teaching 
(75%), facilitating freedom in the teachers’ job (67%), improving student 
achievement (65%) and increasing community involvement. Interestingly, the 
teachers’ responses were high in terms of school management (the top two 
 195
attitudes) compared to schools’ core business which was teaching and learning 
(65%-75%).  It seems that teachers do not always welcome community 
involvement, in terms of decision-making processes in school. 
School committee members’ attitudes to the SBM policy were quite 
similar to the educators. They thought it could make schools operate more 
effectively (100%), improve relationships between the school and community 
(100%), improve decision making (95%), promote effective teaching (86%), 
improve student achievement (81%), increase community involvement (76%) 
and promote freedom in teachers’ jobs (52%).  Interestingly, they viewed their 
involvement in school very positively. By contrast, a minority of them regarded 
SBM policy as not relating to teaching practice.  
7.9 Conclusion 
 This chapter has unfolded the perspectives and practices about the SBM 
policy as perceived by school and district level stakeholders. Undoubtedly, the 
principals’ powers highly influenced the kinds of implementation of the SBM 
policy in the state secondary schools. The principals’ control started from 
dissemination of SBM information and formation of the school committee, to the 
setting of the agenda for the school annual meeting. This was a legitimated form 
of hegemony. At the same time, many responses indicated that most principals 
were not prepared and motivated to implement the policy as expected, but 
managed to the extent somewhat stipulated in the regulations. In addition, 
teachers and school committee members could only contribute to the 
implementation as long as there was time and opportunity for their involvement, 
given by the principals.  
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 The findings in this chapter provide suggestions for reform of the existing 
SBM policy in Indonesia. The centralisation of power that had been practiced in 
the previous era at every level of the education system is still prevalent. The 
policy-makers who wanted to transform the system, constructed a policy that 
actually became an instrument to strengthen the establishment. Whereas policy 
construction with clearly stated rights and authority for each stakeholder could 
lead to different and more positive outcomes. Also the whole process has to be 
transparent and accessible to every involved party, which would lead to a 
practice of more genuine power sharing.  
 Many issues identified in this chapter are interrelated with those already 
discussed in the analysis chapters, and these will be returned to and examined in 
the final chapter. The next chapter will corroborate the findings, and set the 
agenda for the future of school based management policy in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS  
8.1 Introduction 
 This study investigated SBM in Indonesia with a particular focus on the 
state secondary school level in Mataram. The study examined the current 
Indonesian education context; its educational decentralisation experience and 
compared this to the SBM issues internationally.  The study analysed specific 
policies as stipulated nationally, and collected and analysed field data from 
educational stakeholders at district and secondary school levels (Chapter 5-7). 
The study used a triangulation approach with different sources of data, thereby 
enhancing the credibility of its findings. The following three broad findings are 
noted. 
• The SBM policy: the study problematized how the policy was portrayed 
nationally, stipulated and dispersed at district and school levels. As well, 
the study showed how these portrayals were manifested in stakeholders’ 
perspectives and practices.  
• The devolved authority:  the study examined the devolved regulations as 
stipulated nationally and implemented locally. It also exposed the 
perspective and practices of stakeholders regarding devolved authority.  
• Community involvement: the study discussed how regulations positioned 
the community; how they were portrayed at district and school levels; 
and how these regulations were manifested in stakeholders’ opinions and 
practices. 
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In this concluding chapter, the main findings reflecting the issues listed 
above are discussed in relation to the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. 
This final analysis has also taken into account relevant literature on SBM. 
Implications for SBM in Indonesia are discussed together with a possible agenda 
for reforming SBM in the country. 
8.2 Overview of research findings  
In the following subsections, brief overviews are given of SBM. 
8.2.1 The SBM Policy 
At the national level  
 The study found that the SBM policy at national level, namely the 
Kepmendiknas 044/U/2002, lacked clarity. The regulation did not establish 
obligatory institutions as mandated. Nor did it offer clear statements about the 
transfer of powers for community involvement at district and school levels.  
There was also vagueness in the contents of the decree relating to governance 
and management arrangements. Inconsistent with a previous study which 
supported the decree, the Kepmendiknas was not based on fieldwork research 
and public consultation. Instead, it had a political purpose, to demonstrate that 
the government cared. The regulation implied a uniform model of SBM 
regardless of school level, size, location, type of community, or whether schools 
were public or private. Also it did not differentiate between public-secular and 
Islamic school systems. Moreover it was not clear what type of SBM was 
intended to be established. This study revealed that the policy was corrupted by 
ideas about SBM originating from Western models, without sufficiently 
attempting to acknowledge the Indonesian context. It appeared that the central 
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office could not position itself appropriately in view of the demands of the 
changing landscape of public sectors including education. It was obvious that 
central office personnel were not sufficiently experienced or adequately prepared 
for the reforms.  Furthermore, it was obvious that the implementation of the 
SBM policy as planned was unrealistic due to the politically driven nature of the 
autonomy law. It had been recommended by a donor agency, emphasising 
structural changes, namely, the creation of education councils and school 
committees. To recap, the characteristics of the official SBM policy in Indonesia 
are: centrally initiated and formulated; centrally stipulated without adequate 
research and public discussion; implemented with uncertain and unclear 
regulations; and emphasising structural changes.  
District level perspectives and practices 
 In the case of Mataram, the SBM reform did not include subsequent 
policy development to regulate district level implementation. Consequently, no 
clear legal guidelines were in place. It was obvious, therefore that attention by 
both the legislative and executive arms of government to education at the district 
level was minimal. The only indication of their concerns was through the district 
budget, with 20% of it allocated to the education sector. These funds were used, 
however, for infrastructural projects such as the building of new schools and 
refurbishment of school buildings. The study found that the education district 
office had released some policies, supposedly relating to SBM, but these merely 
continued previous practices and, to some extent, the policies failed to strengthen 
school autonomy. Limited staff capability and the absent of capacity building 
programmes to support SBM, led to the district education office down-playing 
educational activities. Educational reforms were therefore based on the minimum 
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requirements of the bureaucracy. Consequently, schools ended up directly 
intervening. This is, in fact, the legacy of the previous Indonesia regime. It 
seemed that an easy way for the government to deal with the autonomy era was 
to retain an old paradigm and approach. The one obvious change originating 
from the SBM policy at district level, was the major decree concerning the 
establishment of education councils. 
School stakeholder perspectives and practices 
 The study found that dispersing information about the new policy to 
school stakeholders was not systematic or programmed. It was conducted in a 
manner that did not provide much information. Only a small proportion of 
stakeholders participating in SBM training had knowledge about the policy. This 
means that teachers and school committee members relied heavily on 
information about SBM from the principal. In terms of establishing school 
committees, the study noted that all schools which participated in this study had 
school committees. The staff of these schools perceived the policy as being a 
good one. However, as the study noted the lack of clear guidelines to the district 
level meant that district level practices of SBM continued to reflect previous 
practices. In this way, SBM was superficially implemented at the school level 
mostly by the principals.  
8.2.2 Devolved authority  
At the national level  
 The study revealed that neither in the decree’s content or in its 
appendices was there a mention of devolved authority. The reference to 
devolving authority only appeared in the documentation giving further 
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explanations to the SBM policy. However, authority which was suggested to be 
exercised by the schools, was in fact already practiced, and these were only 
marginal discretions. A similar case also existed for education council 
institutions. The non-existence of explicit devolved authority in the policy raises 
serious questions. For instance, to what extent is a school committee acting 
legally when it is collecting money from parents? How legal is such a practice 
without proper legislative authority? The absence of properly devolved authority 
in laws demonstrates a decree formulation which was ill-prepared and not 
adequately thought through. 
District level perspectives and practices 
 Under the autonomy law, the transfer of powers regarding public sectors 
to district level was taken for granted. As noted, the legal transfer of laws was 
not shared with educational governance institutions at the district level 
(education council). In turn, devolution did not take place further down to the 
school level.   The district was also limited and late in terms of providing 
capacity building to school stakeholders about SBM. The study noted that the 
legislative and executive further intervened, imposing a ‘geographical fence’ 
policy regarding students who entered public schools.  In addition, the limited 
capacity of the district education office had meant that it could not operate in 
newer ways to strengthen school autonomy. Instead, practices remained as they 
had been previously.  
School stakeholder perspectives and practices 
 The study found that school stakeholders generally agreed that authority 
could be devolved to the school level. The basis for their view appeared to have 
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been their experiences and what had been practiced for some years. Regarding 
three essential matters of authority (budget, staff and curriculum), which are 
usually devolved in the SBM policies elsewhere, Indonesian secondary schools 
in reality are neither supported nor given much flexibility to implement these. 
Participants generally welcomed the concept of the transfer of powers to schools, 
though they also realised that doing so needed time so that ways of thinking and 
attitudes could also change. The study found that with the introduction of SBM, 
school practices had not changed. The study also showed that principals were 
reluctant to share powers and to be accountable to other stakeholders. It was 
noted that in some matters, principals used their authority to be secretive about 
the concurrent budget (routine budget) thereby providing minimal information to 
stakeholders. However, the schools cannot rely on concurrent budgets from the 
district government which only gives, on average, one tenth of actual school 
operational costs (non-salary budget). Such a situation has led the school to 
collect funds from parents through the school committee on a regular basis. The 
practice is, however, flawed, with limited transparent and accountability systems.  
Regarding staff management, the schools studied do not have any flexibility, as 
the responsibility for all school personnel is held by the district government. It is 
as this level that educators are recruited and decisions on professional 
development are made. In addition, the study found a disturbing development 
whereby appointments of educators of particular ethnicities were made to 
strategic positions. The study found that authority for the curriculum was still 
held by the central office. District and school levels acted only as implementing 
agencies.   
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8.2.3 Community involvement 
A key intention of the SBM policy was to strengthen community 
involvement in education. But the study revealed only superficial participation at 
the district and school levels. It also demonstrated that participation was not 
adequately covered in the contents of the decree. 
At the national level  
 The study found that one weakness of the SBM policy was that it did not 
differentiate between community involvement at the district level from that at the 
school level. The similarity of roles and functions for the education council and 
school committee was designed to make these two institutions operate without 
actual authority. Both the council and committee operated in advisory capacities. 
Both respond to and are dependent on the bureaucracy without any resources or 
legislative mandates. Regarding the education council, there was no obvious 
indication about its clients, which was problematic at the district level.  
One of the functions of the school committee appears to be to generate 
funds for the school budget without proper acknowledgement of the sources of 
the funds. This practice is supported in practice as a way of hiding the inability 
of central government to support education adequately. There is vagueness in 
terms of which particular members of the society can join the committees. It 
seemed that the party with power is able to dominate the committees.  
District level perspectives and practices 
 At the district level, the education council is a forum for community 
involvement. The council, however, may be considered as a sub-ordinate of the 
executive. Although board members come from different parts of the 
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community, they are hand-picked and shoulder-tapped based on the executive’s 
preferences. Limited support from the bureaucracy and the incompetence of 
untrained members of the council has made the council focus on certain tasks 
while neglecting others. The council appears to be always bargaining its position 
and roles with the district education office.  
School stakeholder perspectives and practices 
 School stakeholders saw community involvement as an additional source 
of resources for the school in terms of funding and free labour. Further, the 
community was seen as a supporting agency of the school committee. In this 
sense, the school committee is mainly used by the schools to legitimize all kinds 
of policies, but particularly when stipulating school budget and fees. Generally, 
school committees represent elite sections of the community, with members who 
are handpicked by the principal. This appointment process is a provision of the 
regulation. Through this practice, the principal preserves his own power without 
sharing it with others. The study noted that the committee has seen itself mainly 
as a source of funding for the school. Its involvement is exclusively in relation to 
fundraising which clearly shows a continuing practice of the previous institution 
(the BP3).   
8.3 Discussion and implications  
8.3.1 The SBM policy at national or district level  
The MoNE policy concerning SBM was influenced by the study 
conducted by national academics, field work in some regions, and involving 
many stakeholders and donor institutions (Kompas, 2000a; Jalal & Musthafa, 
2001). This situation has some parallels but not exact to what happened in New 
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Zealand (Barrington, 1997) and Australia (Caldwell, 2002). The SBM policy was 
also influenced, to some extent, by the public in its call for improving the 
effectiveness of Indonesian education (Kompas, 2000c; 2000e; 2000f). However, 
the Indonesian case is different from many others internationally in that those 
who wrote the decree, while influenced by political considerations (Wirt et al., 
1985), were officers of the MoNE. These bureaucrats had minimally been 
involved in the design of the previous study, and were unclear about how to fit 
SBM within the new autonomy regime. As a result, this SBM policy, from its 
design to implementation stage, was deemed to be ineffective, as the pre-
conditions for making it work were not in place (World Bank, 2004).  
Further to the findings in the previous sections, a number of other 
considerations are pertinent to the failure of the Kepmendiknas. Firstly, a new 
law had subsequently been adopted to regulate and reform the school system 
according to SBM policy. This new law (Law 20/2003) had adopted a new 
paradigm, clearing the way for a new governing system based on 
decentralisation. Sections of the new law have explicitly provided for school 
based management, community involvement in the form of education councils 
and school committees, conditions which were absent in previous legislation. 
Unlike the Kepmendiknas, which was based on previous bureaucratic-centralism 
education system law (Law 2/1989), the new regulation about SBM which was 
released by the central office could be the basis for a government regulation 
which had a much stronger legal basis than the previous ministerial decree. As a 
government regulation stipulated by central office, the new regulation set the 
standards regarding SBM policy issues, allowing for authority which had already 
been devolved to the district level, to be used. In addition, the central office’s 
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role could be that of a supporting agent to the district level, helping in the design 
of SBM policies for particular districts through the legislation process.   
 Secondly, it is suggested that the inadequacies of the existing MoNE 
policy document’s content can be improved in the following manner: a) use clear 
statements to avoid ambiguity, tension and conflict in the actioning of the policy; 
b) acknowledge the diversity of Indonesian schools and society and do not 
assume a one-size-fits-all approach; c) differentiate between governance and 
management and ensure that devolved authority to certain levels respects the 
division; d) recognize community involvement as genuine participation in terms 
of transparent and accountable mechanisms. It is possible that the above 
suggestions can be incorporated in the formulation of either national regulations 
or district legislations. This point is further explored below.  
 The decree’s formulation should provide clear guide-lines in the use of 
such phrases as ‘mandatory’ or ‘compulsory’, rather than ‘can be used’. In this 
way, clarity of meaning and expectations are established up-front for community 
involvement both at district and school levels. It is possible, when regulations are 
not clearly written, for people to exploit the laws, based on their own interests. In 
particular, the parties or groups that are in power can easily exploit such laws.  
The need for clear definitions and avoidance of multiple interpretations in a 
decree has been suggested. Sadly, some have experienced conflict arising from 
multiple interpretations (see, for example, Wyle, 1995; Fullan and Watson, 
2000). Confusion and tension are common, particularly at the school level 
regarding responsibility and authority, where imprecise words are used in the 
regulation (Daun, 2000). In the case of the Kepmendiknas, the wordings are not 
based on comprehensive research of the Indonesian school system. Carefully 
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chosen words to regulate SBM policy must also be backed-up by research on the 
current school system. The other need is to involve all interest groups at the 
different stages. This study showed that stipulating a decree with limited public 
consultation and using a coercive model by which the central office controlled 
everything, resulted in vagueness and a confused policy. There needs to be an 
agreement when establishing a consultation process to include from the 
beginning. Such processes will reduce misunderstanding and gain greater 
consensus from all parties (Fiske, 1996; Gershberg, 1999). 
 The diversity of Indonesian society is considerable. Consequently, one of 
the aims of the autonomy law is to acknowledge this diversity. In addition, 
diversity is also seen at the district level.  To impose one model of SBM policy 
nationally at various school levels, for different sizes, locations and types of 
communities ignores of the diverse Indonesian context. By comparison, several 
states in the United States and Australia, with their diverse societies, have 
attempted several models of SBM, based on their school and community cultures 
and histories (Murphy and Beck, 1995; Caldwell, 2002). This study has shown 
that the failure to acknowledge complexities and diverse local contexts by policy 
makers has contributed to the policy failing to meet expectations from the 
beginning. Ideally, the central office can provide variations of SBM models from 
which particular district governments might choose. An administrative model of 
SBM where the principal is dominant, for instance, might be selected where 
principal selection and recruitment are merit-based. A community control model 
might be implemented where a community is more knowledgeable about 
education. Moreover, since the debacle of the New Order regime, Indonesian 
society is flourished with people movements, and stipulating uniformity in terms 
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of an SBM model and placing of community involvement can be seen negatively 
as a return to the previous era. Another related issue is that the policy which 
emphasised structural change, namely establishing education councils and school 
committees, led to superficial implementation instead of improving the capacity-
building and reculturing that was supposed and necessary to support the policy 
(Fullan, 2001).  
 As mentioned, another failure of the Kepmendiknas related to its unclear 
definitions and lack of differentiations between management and governance 
both for district and school levels. At the district level, governance resides with 
the district parliament, which means that the education council at best has an 
advisory role rather than a management one as stipulated in the decree (World 
Bank, 2004). An ideal single agent in governance and management is much more 
sensible compared with an education council without clear or no authority, 
capacity and support. At the school level, the situation is different where a school 
committee can effectively learning the principle to manage. Therefore the 
starting point for policy makers is to decide which authority to devolve and to 
whom at the school level. Considerable contextual knowledge about the school is 
necessary so that the kind of SBM model selected is appropriate to the school 
system in a particular district. The details must be clearly defined in the decree. 
The various roles must be clearly stated; what is to be shared, what hands-on 
roles (the committee members actively involved in actually implementing 
policies) and hands-off (where the committee’s role is only on a policy one) roles 
are agreed upon. Doing so will result in a much more healthy relationship, where 
certain issues such as curriculum, personnel, property, finance and discipline are 
handled by the people who hold particular expertise and authority. 
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 To obtain genuine community participation at district and school levels, 
something needs to be done with the mechanisms for recruiting stakeholders. 
Previous practice (see Chapter 6 & 7) clearly showed that multi interpretations of 
a decree’s contents and appendices had led to superficial implementation. 
Analysis of the decree (Chapter 5) indicated that there is a hidden agenda from 
the central office to preserve bureaucratic power both in the education council 
and the school committee. In addition, transparency and public involvement 
should be formulated in the decree so as to lead towards community awareness, 
and societal participation in education (Bray, 2000). In order to make both 
institutions become part of an effective bureaucracy, membership of the 
committee should be more focussed. For instance, an education council with an 
advisory role does not need members from the bureaucracy or the legislature. 
Meanwhile there is also a need to clarify meaning about community figures. 
Who are these individuals? At the school level, it may be more sensible that 
representatives of teachers be elected by the teachers, and parents’ representative 
be chosen by parents. Again, the mechanism to recruit should be open to the 
stakeholders and the general public with proportional accountability. In terms of 
equal opportunity based on gender and minority groups, the decree must 
acknowledge and allow for equal representation in the composition of 
communities.  
8.3.2 The district level  
The analysis of district government support for the SBM policy in 
Chapter 6 showed that there are some issues to be resolved. First, there needs to 
be some basic understandings about the education system for the policy makers, 
both in the legislature and the executive. Understanding can be enhanced through 
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seminar participation, particularly with specific exposures to make policy makers 
more aware of educational issues. It is obvious that the low level of 
understanding by policy makers has resulted in poor leadership and vision for 
SBM, particularly at the district level. Enhancing knowledge and skills also 
should be encouraged in technical institutions that recruit people for positions in 
district education offices. Limited personnel capability in the district level also 
can lead to a minimal standard of bureaucracy that could be manipulative.  
Regular use of local media such as the radio and local newspapers to 
communicate; and inviting the public to scrutinise plans and activities, are 
healthy ways of engaging the public about educational issues and 
democratisation.  
Second, involving the public from the beginning and keeping 
communication lines open about policy in education and not just about SBM, 
both by the legislature or the executive at district level, are good ways of sharing 
power in education. Exposing district regulation plans concerning education or 
SBM to stakeholders through consultation or advice are recommended. As such, 
pre-requisites for policy implementation will be listed by every stakeholder and 
help avoid one-sided attention to structural changes without proper reculturing 
programmes (Fulan and Watson, 2000). Further, as found by Taruna (2001), 
disciplining bureaucracy at all levels (district, sub-district and schools) to act 
equally as other participants, in the Indonesian context will lead to greater trust, 
and openness and encourage genuine public participation. 
Third, preserving the practice of collecting money from parents by 
schools indicates that financial support from the district government is not 
adequate or dependable. Whereas in fact, funds allocation for the education 
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sector in the district budget is substantial (Chapter 6), showing clearly that 
school operational costs are not prioritized by the legislature and executive. 
Establishing a form of formula funding for non-salary budgets has to be 
stipulated ideally at every school level. Besides policy on equality, it is also 
important to ensure equity in terms of financial support through formula funding 
which is worth more than a designated ‘geographical fence’ policy.  Further, if 
the practice still persists because of some reasons, then it is best this kind of fund 
mobilisation from members of society (i.e. parents) be legalised through district 
regulation. This is because in fact, public secondary schools with this kind of 
practice are playing roles as agents of tax collection without proper legal 
backing. The regulation can then stipulate the maximum amount that can be 
collected from parents, methods of collection, activities that can be financed with 
that money, and proper accountability report through independent auditors.  
Fourth, as suggested by Fullan and Watson (2000, p. 460) “new policies 
and structures may be necessary, but are not a sufficient step for reform”. This 
means that continuing district support is needed and should be programmed 
accordingly. The study reveals that the failure of policy implementation can be 
easily predicted where three-way interactions are not happening between 
national, district and school personnel. In the Indonesian situation, did not 
happen even after SBM policy was implemented.  
8.3.3 The school level  
The study has revealed that limited information and support, 
accompanied by unclear regulations has resulted in schools continuing with 
previous practices and implementing SBM policy in superficial ways. Although 
the SBM policy is new for school stakeholders to manage, it is hand in hand with 
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the spirit of decentralisation. The SBM policy, if administered effectively, can 
also be as instrument to make schools more open to the public, more transparent, 
accountable, and more inviting in terms of genuine participation by the 
community.   
 In order to make SBM policy really work, well prepared and highly 
motivated school principals are needed (Bangay, 2005, personal 
communication). The study found that most principals tended to practice an old-
style paradigm of their role. They have continued to use an approach with an 
authoritative leadership style even after introducing a SBM policy. While their 
knowledge of SBM may have included notions of transparency, participative 
decision making and proper accountability in terms of running schools, these 
principals had found it hard to follow them in to act accordingly.  One practice, 
explanation for this relates to unsatisfactorily principals’ selection processes. 
They are often chosen by the bureaucracy, mostly in a secretive way which is not 
based on meritocracy. Changing the recruitment model for principals to involve 
other school stakeholders such as teachers and parents should make them more 
aware of public accountability. Further, disseminating policy can be 
accomplished more effective when the documents are easily accessible through a 
variety of sources, including openly discussing matters, rather than just waiting 
for official dissemination.  
 The school committee has now existed for a considerable time in each 
school since the introduction of the decree. It may be encouraged to reconsider 
its own roles and functions and, if permitted, determine what degree and kind of 
authority can be shared with schools. Self-owned capacity building programmes 
are likely to make the public more aware of the complexity of the SBM policy. 
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The committee can also voluntarily request an independent agent, though no 
regulation exist for this, in order to audit the funds regularly collected from 
parents and to report on this to every stakeholder. When committee members are 
encouraged to participate in school planning, policy setting and activities, the 
result will be a more genuine feeling of participation on the part of the 
community. 
8.4 Future agenda  
 Some future directions are proposed based on the findings of this study. 
The educational reform and SBM as part of the changing landscape in 
Indonesian decentralisation is undoubtedly complex. It is the view of the 
researcher that practical solutions more reasonably be implemented at the district 
level. This is because authority in education is legitimated by the autonomy law 
and takes place at the district level. At this location, power transfer is attainable 
and manageable particularly given the factors of population and area size.  
 Firstly, the Mataram district government where this study was conducted 
has the abilities to reform its education system as it wished. Having said that, it is 
necessary to carry out comprehensive research to analyse and assess the current 
education system if the best outcomes were to be achieved. This cannot be 
avoided since there is incomplete data about education and an absence of clear 
directions for education. The district government could invite experts and 
academics from the university, the central office, or consultants from donor 
agencies to conduct the research. The results of such a study would be 
informative and would provide a comprehensive picture for policy makers and 
practitioners at the school and district levels to enable them to take necessary 
action.  
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One area of attention for such research would be to provide information 
regarding the most appropriate method for the recruitment and preparation of 
principals in order to get the best possible appointments to schools. The research 
should also provide information about merit-based and equal opportunity 
systems for teachers regardless of gender and ethnicity. Another focus should be 
to create student formula funding based on each level of education. Since the 
BP3 and recently the school committee funds from parents have often not been 
utilised effectively or appropriately. Relating to district budgets, the amount 
which is annually provide for the education sector makes sense only if the 
government can fund operational costs fully, based on actual school needs. On 
the one hand, this will be a real public service to society. On the other hand, such 
a practice encourages schools to be accountable, for their use of public funds.  
Research could also offer insights about SBM policy in terms of what 
best suits the district at particular levels of schooling. In addition, as this study 
has identified, the new policy should explicitly state which authorities are most 
appropriately devolved to the local level in order to gain grassroots’ 
responsibility. Any new policy emerging from public consultations and reached 
by consensus must also give clear guide-lines regarding external relationships 
where continuing reform is still open for discussion (Fullan and Watson, 2000).  
Having said this however, it is important that effective implementation of any 
new SBM policy must be adequately prepared for if schools and their 
communities are to be expected to support and own the policy. 
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8.4.1 Future Research 
 There are several areas where further research into SBM would be useful. 
First, the new education legislation, Law 20/2003, and subsequent government 
regulations, require considerable general and particular scrutiny. Research on 
detailed regulations, their implications and applications for education councils 
and school committees need careful scrutiny. Unlike the Kepmendiknas 
044/U/2002 which was based on the previous education law for centralised 
systems, the new education law relates to an education system in a 
decentralisation mode. Textual and content analyses of these new regulations 
should validate the present study, especially for comparison purposes. In 
addition, district level regulations concerning education specifically in relation to 
SBM in Mataram would be worth undertaking. 
 Second, fieldwork research located in Mataram has indicated further 
possible research directions. Mataram is a small municipality (kota) in the 
Eastern part of Indonesia. It would be worth knowing how SBM in Western 
Indonesia, especially in the more advanced regions of Java, is being experienced. 
Then a similar study in a comparable or different sized district (kota or 
kabupaten) in Western Indonesia (including Java) or other Eastern Indonesia 
regions would provide comparative information. Other districts that have 
established regulations regarding SBM would also offer insights for comparative 
purposes if similar studies were undertaken on them. 
 Third, this study examined state secondary schools. An examination of 
the SBM experience at other levels in state sector systems, namely elementary 
schools and junior high schools, would also provide useful findings for 
comparison. This is because the secondary level is regarded as more complex 
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than the elementary level where students and parents will be more commonly 
members of the local community than is the case with secondary schools. 
8.4.2 Final Reflection  
 Undertaking a research project of this nature was satisfying. I was able to 
spend time away from Indonesia, while allowed me to reflect on the 
implementation of SBM and its impact at the district and schools levels. The 
review was also challenging because stakeholders appeared unclear about key 
issues of SBM. Many continued to practice school management which did not 
reflect SBM. Many seemed to understand the decree and what was intended. 
 If I were to do the study again, I should have included, as participants, the 
designers of the decree from the central office. As well, a more longitudinal 
study would be valuable to show changes in stakeholders understanding and 
practices. Doing the study has, however, has prepared me to play a role in the 
agenda to reform education in Indonesia.  
   
 217
REFERENCES 
Abu-Duhou, I. (1999). School-based management. Paris: UNESCO: 
International Institute for Educational Planning. 
 
Ainley, J. and McKenzie, P. (2000). School Governance: Research on 
Educational and Management Issues. Paper presented at South Australian 
Institute for Educational Research. Flinders University. Adelaide. 
Australia.  
 
Anderson, G. (1998). Fundamentals of Educational Research. Second edition. 
London: Routledge-Falmer. 
 
Aspinal, E. and Fealy,G. (eds.) (2003). Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, 
decentralisation and democratisation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies. 
 
Atkinson, P and Coffey, A. (2004). Analysing documentary realities. In 
Qualitative Research, theory, method and practice, edited by D. 
Silverman. London: Sage. 
 
Bali Post. (2003). Jika digunakan standardisasi UAN, diprediksi 70 persen siswa 
tak lulus (It is predicted that if final examination used standard based 
criteria, 70 percent students not pass the exam). Bali Post, 8 April 2003. 
 http://www.balipost.co.id/balipotcetak/2003/4/8/nt4.htm
 [online accessed 24-04-2003] 
 
Ball, S. J. (1990). Markets, Morality and equality in Education.  England: 
Tufnell Press. 
 
Bangay, C. (2005). Private Education: relevant or redundant? Private Education, 
decentralisation and national provision in Indonesia. Compare 35 (2) pp. 
167-179.  
 
Barrington, J. (1997). Central and Local Control in Education. New Zealand 
Annual review of Education, no. 7. pp. 79-93. 
 
Beeby, C. E. (1979). Assessment of Indonesian Education. Wellington: New 
Zealand Council for Educational Research and Oxford University Press. 
 
Beck, L. G. and Murphy, J. (1998). Site-Based Management and School Success: 
Untangling the variables. School Effectiveness and School Improvement. 
9 (4) pp. 358-385. 
 
Bulock, A and Thomas, H. (1997). Schools at the centre? A study of 
decentralisation. London: RoutledgeFalmer. 
 
Burki, S. J., Perry, E. G. and Dillinger, W. R. (1999). Beyond the center: 
decentralizing the state. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
 218
 
Bray, M. (2000). Community Partnerships in Education: Dimensions, variations 
and implications. Paris: UNESCO. 
 
Brown, D. J. (1990). Decentralization and School-Based Management. London: 
The Falmer Press. 
 
Bryk, A.S, Sebring, P. B., Kerbow, D., Rollow, S. and Easton, J. Q. (1998). 
Charting Chicago School Reform. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Caldwell, B. J. (1994). School Based Management. In Torsten, H and 
Postlehwaite, T. N. The International Encyclopedia of Education. 2nd ed. 
New York: Pergamon. pp. 5302-5308.  
 
Caldwell, B.J. (1998). Self-managing schools and Improved learning outcomes. 
Canberra: Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth 
Affairs. 
 
Caldwell, B. J. (2002). The Design and Implementation of Self-managing 
Schools in Australia. Paper presented at Conference on Autonomy in 
Education in the Indonesian context, at The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 29 September 2002. 
 
Caldwell, B. J. and Spinks, J. M. (1988). The Self-managing school. London: 
Falmer. 
 
Cheng, Y. C. (1996). School Effectiveness and School-based Management. 
London: Falmer. 
 
Chubb, J. E. and Moe, T. E. (1990). Politics, Markets and America’s School. 
Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution. 
 
Clark, D., Hough, J., Pongtuluran, A., Sembiring, R., and Triaswati, N. (1998). 
Financing of Education in Indonesia. Manila and Hong Kong: Asian 
Development Bank and Comparative Education Research Centre-The 
University of Hong Kong. 
 
Cohen, J. (2001). The Regulatory Structure Supporting Basic Education in 
Indonesia: Analysis Covering 1989 to Present. Working Paper Number 
VIII, Regional Education Development and Improvement Project 
(REDIP). Jakarta: the MoNE.  
 
Creswell, J. W. (1994). Research Design, qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
 
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and Research design, choosing 
among five traditions. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Cumming, T. (1994). Alternatives in TESOL research: descriptive, interpretive 
and ideological orientation. TESOL Quaterly, 28(4), 673-703. 
 219
 
Darmaningtyas. (1999a). Pendidikan pada dan setelah krisis (Education at and 
after crisis).  Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar 
 
Darmaningtyas. (1999b). Pendidikan Militer(istik) (militaristic education). 
Kompas, 3 May 1999  
http://www.kompas,com/kompas-cetak/9905/03/opini/pend45.htm
[online accessed 18 June 2003]. 
 
Daun, H. (2002). Educational Restructuring in the context of globalization and 
national policy. New York: RoutledgeFalmer.  
 
Davies, L., Harber, C. and Dzimadzi, C. (2003). Educational Decentralisation in 
Malawi: a study of process. Compare 33 (2), pp. 139-154. 
 
Denzin, N. K and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds). (1998). The Landscape of Qualitative 
Reseach. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
 
Djajadiningrat, R.L. (no date). From Illiteracy to University, educational 
development in the Netherlands Indies, Bulletin 3 of the Netherlands and 
Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
 
Duflo, E. (2004). The medium run effects of educational expansion: evidence 
from a large school construction program in Indonesia. Journal of 
Development Economics 74:163-197. 
 
Fajar, A.M. (2004). Sambutan Menteri Pendidikan Nasional pada upacara 
peringatan hari pendidikan nasional tanggal 2 Mei 2004 (Speech of the 
Minister of National Education in the celebration of national education 
day on 2 May 2004). 
 http://www.itb.ac.id/focus/focus_file/hardiknas%2002-04-04.pdf
 [online accessed: 6 June 2004] 
 
Feith, H. (1963). Dynamics of Guided Democracy. In Indonesia, edited by R. T. 
McVey. New Haven, Connecticut: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale 
University. 
 
Filmer, D. and Lindauer. (2001). Does Indonesia have a ‘low pay’ civil service?. 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (2): 189-205. 
 
Fiske, E. B. (1996). Desentralisasi Pengajaran, politik dan konsensus 
(Decentralization of Education, politics and consensus) (B. Bengoteku, 
Trans.). Jakarta: Grasindo. 
  
Fontana, A. and Frey, J. H. (2000). The Interview, from structured questions to 
negotiated text. In Denzin, N. K and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds). Handbook of 
Qualitative Reseach. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Fullan, M. (1991). The New Meaning of Educational Change. New York: 
Teachers College Press. 
 220
 
Fullan, M. (2001). The New Meaning of Educational Change. 3rd ed. New York: 
Teachers College Press. 
 
Fullan, M and Watson, N. (2000). School-Based Management: 
Reconceptualizing to Improve Learning Outcomes. School Effectiveness 
and School Improvement. 11 (4). pp. 453-473. 
 
Gershberg, A.I. (1999). Education ‘Decentralization’ Process in Mexico and  
Nicaragua: legislative versus ministry-led reform strategies. Comparative  
Education. 35 (1). pp. 63-80. 
 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Peraturan Pemerintah nomor 25 
tahun 2000 tentang Kewenangan Pemerintah dan Kewenangan Propinsi 
sebagai daerah otonom (Government Regulation number 25/2000 
concerning Government Authority and the provincial authority as an 
autonomous regions). Jakarta. 
 
Hawkins, J. N. (2000). Centralization, decentralization, recentralisation, 
Educational reform in China. Journal of Educational Administration. 38 
(5), pp. 442-454. 
 
Hodder, I. (2000). The Interpertation of Documents and Material Culture. In 
Denzin, N. K and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds). Handbook of Qualitative Reseach. 
2nd edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Hofman, B. and Kaiser, K. (2002). The Making of the Big Bang and its 
aftermath. Paper read at “Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia”, 
at Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia. 
 http://lnweb.worlbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/attachments/041802-
hofmankaiser/$file/hofmankaiseratlanta_3.pdf
 
Indriyanto, B. (2003a). Current Status of Educational Research: Indonesia 
Country Report. Paper presented at the 5th UNESCO-NIER Regional 
Meeting of Directors of Educational Research and Development 
Institutes, at Tokyo, Japan, 27-31 January 2003. 
 
Indriyanto, B. (2003b). School-based management: Issues and Hopes toward 
Decentralization in Education in Indonesia. Paper presented at the 3rd 
International Forum on Education Reform.  Bangkok, Thailand, 8-11 
September 2003. 
 http://www.worldedreform.com/intercon3/third/f_bumbang.pdf
 [online accessed 14 February 2006] 
 
Jalal, F. and Musthafa, B. (Eds.). (2001). Education Reform in the Context of 
Regional Autonomy: The Case of Indonesia. Jakarta: Ministry of National 
Education, National Development Planning Agency and The World 
Bank. 
 
 221
Jazadi, I. (2003). An investigation of current constraints and potential resources 
for developing learner-centred curriculum frameworks for English 
language at high schools in Lombok, Indonesia. Unpublished PhD thesis, 
Division of Education, Arts and Social Sciences, University of South 
Australia, Adelaide, Australia. 
 
Kroeskamp, H. (1974). Early Schoolmasters in a Developing Country, a history 
of experiments in school education in 19th century Indonesia. Assen, The 
Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp B.V. 
 
Kompas, (1998). Lebih Jauh dengan Drs. JIGM Drost SJ (More depth with Drs 
JIGM Drost SJ).  Kompas, 3 May 1998. 
 URL: http://kompas.com/9805/03/naper/lebi02.html  
[online accessed 21 Feb 2000] 
 
Kompas. (2000a). Mendiknas  Berharap 20 persen Dana dari APBD (The 
Minister hopes that education budget for education in each district reach 
20%). Kompas 5 July 2000. 
URL: www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0007/05/dikbud/mend09.htm
[online accessed 5 July 2000] 
 
Kompas, (2000b). Mendiknas Berharap 20 Persen Dana dari APBD (minister of 
nasional education hopes that 20% local government budget for 
education sector). Kompas 5 July 2000. 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0007/05/dikbud/mend09.htm 
 [online accessed 13 August 2003] 
 
Kompas, (2000c). Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah segera diberlakukan (school 
based management will be implemented soon). Kompas 26 September 
2000. 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0009/26/dikbud/mana09.htm 
 [online accessed 31 March 2003] 
 
Kompas, (2000d). Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah sulit dilakukan dalam waktu 
dekat (school based difficult to implement soon). Kompas 27 September 
2000 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0009/27/dikbud/mbss09.htm 
 [online accessed 31 March 2003] 
 
Kompas, (2000e). Tahun 2001, dunia pendidikan hadapi dua isu besar (In year 
2001, education will face two big issues). Kompas 8 December 2000. 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0012/8/dikbud/tahu09.htm 
 [online accessed 31 March 2003] 
 
Kompas, (2000f). Catatan Pendidikan akhir tahun (notes about education at year 
end). Kompas 23 December 2000 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0012/23/dikbud/cata09.htm 
 [online accessed 31 March 2003] 
 
 222
Kompas, (2001a). Sekolah harus menjadi milik masyarakat (school should be 
owned by the community). Kompas 29 January 2001 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0101/29/dikbud/seko09.htm 
 [online accessed 01 April 2003] 
 
Kompas, (2001a). Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah segera diujicobakan (school 
based management will soon be pilot projected). Kompas 14 February 
2001. 
 http//www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0102/14/dikbud/mana09.htm 
 [online accessed 01 April 2003] 
 
Kompas, (2004). Kerusakan bangunan SD, fenomena memalukan dan 
memilukan (The damage of school buildings is a shameful phenomenon). 
Kompas 14 February 2004. 
 http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0402/14/humaniora/857258.htm
 [online accessed 23 April 2004] 
 
Kompas, (2006a). Angka UN Harus naik (Final examination threshold mark 
should be increased). Kompas 5 May 2006. 
 http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0605/05/humaniora/2631051.htm
 [online accessed: 5 May 2006] 
 
Kompas, (2006b). Sarjanakan dulu guru (Made it all teachers have a bachelor 
degrees). Kompas 24 May 2006. 
 http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0605/23/humaniora/2677713.htm
 [online accessed: 24 May 2006] 
 
Kopong, E. (1995). Culture and Schooling: an explanatory study of curriculum 
localization in Indonesia. Unpublished PhD thesis, Flinders University of 
South Australia, Adelaide. 
 
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis, an introduction to its methodology. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Lauglo, J. (1995). Forms of Decentralisation and Their Implication for 
Education. Comparative  Education, 31 (1) pp. 5-29. 
 
Lee, K.H. (1995). Education and Politics in Indonesia 1945-1965. Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia: University of Malaya Press. 
 
Leigh, B. (1999). Learning and Knowing Boundaries: Schooling in New Order 
Indonesia. SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 4 
(1):24-56. 
 
Leithwood, K. and Menzies, T. (1998). Forms and effects of school-based 
management: a review. Educational Policy. 12 (3) pp. 325-346. 
 
Lindle, J. C. (1996). Lessons from Kentucky About School-Based Decision 
Making. Educational Leadership, December1995/January 1996, pp. 20-
23. 
 223
 
Lombok Post. (2001). P3D belum diserahkan, Diknas Mataram protes Dikpora 
(Educational authorities has not been transferred, Mataram education 
district office complain to provincial education office). Lombok Post, 21 
May 2001. 
 
Madya, S. (2002). Educational Autonomy in Indonesia: at present and as 
designed for the future. Paper presented at Conference on Autonomy in 
Education in the Indonesian context, at The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 29 September 2002. 
 
Malik, A. (2004). Dewan Pendidikan:Mission Impossible (Education Council: 
Mission Impossible). Sd-islam mailing list discussion  
 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sd-islam/message/5635 
[online accessed 2 March 2004] 
   
Malik, A. (2005). Ujian Nasional: Untuk Apa? (national examination: for 
what?). Kompas, 11 February 2005.  
 http://www.kompas.com/kompascetak/0502/11/humaniora
[online accessed 11-02-2005] 
 
Marginson, S. (1993). Education and Public Policy in Australia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
McGinn, N and Welsh, T. (1999). Decentralization of Education, why, when, 
what and how?. Fundamentals of Educational Planning – 64. Paris: 
UNESCO.  
Available at: http://www.unesco.org/iiep
 
Miller, G. (1997). Contextualizing Texts: Studying Organizational Texts. In 
Context and Method in Qualitative Research, edited by G. Miller, 
Dingwall, R. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
 
Ministry of National Education (MoNE). (2001). Hasil  Monitoring Program 
Manajemen Peningkatan Mutu Berbasis Sekolah (School Based Quality 
Improvement Management Monitoring Result). Jakarta: Direktorat SLTP 
dan Universitas Negeri Semarang.  
 
Ministry of National Education (MoNE). (2002). Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan 
Nasional Republik Indonesia No. 044/U/2002 tentang Dewan Pendidikan 
dan Komite Sekolah (The decre of the Minister of National Education of 
the Republic of Indonesia number 044/U/2002 concerning Education 
Council and School Committee). Jakarta. 
 
Mulyasa, E. (2002). Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah: konsep, strategi dan 
implementasi (school based management: concept, strategy and 
implementation). Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya. 
 
Murphy, J and  Beck, L. G. (1995). School-Based Management as School 
Reform, Taking Stock. Thousand Oaks: Corwin Press. 
 224
 
Nielsen, H.D. (2003). Reforms to Teacher Education in Indonesia: does more 
mean better? In Comparative Education Reader, edited by E. R. 
Beauchamp. New York: RoutledgeFalmer. 
 
Nieuwenhuis, F. J. (2003). Managing Change During The Process of 
Decentralisation: A Question of Power and Authority. Paper presented at 
the International Conference on Education and Development, Oxford, 
UK. 
 
Oplatka, I. (2004). The principalship in developing countries: context, 
characteristics and reality. Comparative Education. 40 (3): pp 427-448. 
 
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Poerbakawatja, S. (1970). Pendidikan dalam Alam Indonesia Merdeka 
(Education in Independence Indonesia). Jakarta: Gunung Agung. 
 
Purwono, E. (2003). SK Dewan Pendidikan (the decree about educational 
council). CFBE mailing list discussion  
 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/cfbe/message/4409 
[online accessed 24 August 2003]  
  
Purwadi, A. and Muljoatmojo, H. (2000). Education in Indonesia: Coping with 
Challenges in the Third Millennium. Journal of Southeast Asian 
Education 1 (1): pp 79-102. 
 
Rasyid, M.R. (2003). Arus balik ke pusat (a return flow to the centre). Tempo 
Magazine, 25 May  2003. 
 
Rentoul, J and Rosanowski, J. (2000). The Effects of School Governance, 
ownership, organisation and management on educational outcomes. 
Strategic Research Initiative review 4, Christchurch College of 
Education. Wellington: Ministry of Education. 
 
Ricklefs, M.C. (2001). A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200. 3rd ed. 
Hampshire: Palgrave. 
 
Rideout, W.M. Jr. and Ural, I. (1993). Centralised and decentralised models of 
education: Comparative Studies. South Africa: Center for Policy 
Analysis, Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
 
Rohdewohld, R. (2003). Decentralisation and the Indonesian bureaucracy: major 
changes, minor impact? In Aspinal, E. and Fealy, G. Local Power and 
Politics in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Rondinelli, D. A., Nellis, J. R and Cheema, G. S. (1983). Decentralization in 
Developing Countries, a review of recent experience. Washington D. C: 
The World Bank. 
 225
 
Rose, P. (2003). Community Participation in School Policy and Practice in 
Malawi: balancing local knowledge, national policies and international 
agency priorities. Compare 33 (1) pp. 47-64. 
 
Rosyid, D.M. (2006). Ujian Nasional, Kematian Kreativitas (Final Examination, 
the dead of creativity). Kompas, 8 Mei 2006.  
 http://www.kompas.com/kompascetak/0605/08/humaniora/2633946.htm 
[online accessed 8-05-2006] 
 
Sagala, S. (2003). Desain Organisasi Pendidikan dalam Implementasi Kebijakan 
Otonomi Daerah (Education Organisational Design for the 
Implementation Regional Autonomy Policy). Unpublished Doctorate 
thesis, Facultas Pasca Sarjana, Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia. 
Bandung. 
 
Satori, D. (Ed). (2001). Pedoman Impementasi Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah di 
Jawa Barat (School based management implementation guide in West 
Java). Bandung: West Java Education Province Office. 
 
Schwandt, T.A. (2000). Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry: 
Interpretivism, Hermeneutics and Social Construction. In Handbook of 
Qualitative Reseach, edited by Denzin and Lincolns. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage 
 
Schiefelbein, E. and Schiefelbein, P. Three Decentralisation Strategies in two 
decades:  Chile 1980-2000. Journal of Educational Administration 38 
(5), pp. 412-425. 
 
Sidi, I.D. (2001). Menuju Masyarakat Belajar, menggagas paradigma baru 
pendidikan (becoming learning community, ideas for new education). 
Jakarta: Paramadina. 
 
Sihombing, P.B. (2004). Batalkan Konversi Nilai UAN (Abolish Final 
Examinationa Raw Score Conversion). Kompas, 15 Juni 2004.  
 http://www.kompas.com/kompascetak/0406/15/opini/1082948.htm 
[online accessed 17-06-2004] 
 
Smith, B.C. (2003). Understanding Third World Politics, theories of political 
change and development. 2nd ed. Indiana: Indiana University Press. 
 
Soewartoyo (ed.). (2002). Desentralisasi Pendidikan dalam Perspektif Daerah, 
studi kasus di Kota Mataram (Educational decentralisation from 
regional perspective, case study in Mataram City). Jakarta: Pusat 
Penelitian Kependudukan- LIPI. 
 
Soewartoyo (ed.). (2003). Persepsi Masyarakat terhadap Desentralisasi 
Pendidikan, studi kasus di Kota Manado (Society Perception about 
Educational decentralisation, case study in Manado City). Jakarta: 
Pustaka Sinar Harapan. 
 226
 
Stake, R. E. (2000). Case Studies. In Handbook of Qualitative Reseach, edited 
by. Denzin and Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Subijanto. (2000). Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Operasional 
Manajemen Mutu (BOMM) di SMUN 10 Surabaya (Studi Kasus) (A 
case study of monitoring of quality improvement operational assistance 
programme at State Secondary School Number 10 in Surabaya).  Jurnal 
Dikbud Number. 027, November 2000. 
 
Supriadi, D. (2002). Perubahan Pendidikan harus bertahap (education change 
should be staged). Pikiran Rakyat, 19 Desember 2002. 
 http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/1202/19/0107.htm
 [online accessed 4 April 2003] 
 
Supriadi, D. (2003). Satuan Biaya Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah 
(Educational costs of primary and secondary schooling). Bandung: 
Remaja Rosdakarya.  
 
Surakhmad, W. (2002). Desentralizing education: a strategy for building 
sustainable capacity for regional development. Paper presented at 
Conference on Autonomy in Education in the Indonesian context, at The 
Australian National University, Canberra, 29 September 2002. 
 
Suryadi, A. (1998). Manajemen Pendidikan Nasional Menuju Kemandirian 
Bangsa (managing national education to develop the nation). Kajian 
Dikbud, number 14, September 1998. 
 
Suryadi, A. (2003). Dewan Pendidikan dan Komite Sekolah: mewujudkan 
sekolah-sekolah yang mandiri dan otonomi (Education Council and 
School Committee: creating autonomous schools). Seminar paper of the 
socialisation for empowering education council and school committee. 
 http://www.depdiknas.go.id/serba_serbi/dpks/PemberdayaanDPKS.htm
 [online accessed 30 September 2004] 
 
Taruna, J.C.T. (2001). "MBS Jalan Terus....Trus!" (SBM go ahead). Kompas, 1 
May 2001  
http://www.kompas.com/kommpas-cetak/0105/01/dikbud/mbs38.htm
[online accessed 9 April 2003]. 
 
Taruna, J.C.T. (2003). "Sinyalemen Korupsi di Sektor Pendidikan" (Corrupt 
indication in educational sector). Kompas, 22 December 2003.  
 
Thair, M and Treagust, D. F. (2003). A brief history of a science teacher 
professional development initiative in Indonesia and the implications for 
centralised teacher development. International Journal of Educational 
Development 23, pp. 201-213. 
 
 227
Thomas, D., Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., Sikoki, B., Strauss., J. and Teruel, G. 
(2004). Education in a crisis. Journal of Development Economics, 74, pp. 
53-85. 
 
Tilaar, H.A.R. (1992). Manajemen Pendidikan Nasional, kajian pendidikan 
masa depan (managing national education, a study of future education). 
Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya. 
 
Tilaar, H.A.R. (2000). Paradigma Baru Pendidikan Nasional (The new 
paradigm of National Education). Jakarta: Rineka Cipta. 
 
Tim Pengembangan Dewan Pendidikan dan Komite Sekolah (Development 
Team of Education Council and School Committee). (2002).  Panduan 
Umum Dewan Pendidikan dan Komite Sekolah (General Guideline of 
Education Council and School Committee). Directorate General of 
Primary and Secondary Education, Ministry of National Education. 
Jakarta 
 http://www.dikdasmen.depdiknas.go.id/html/dikdasmen/dewan%20pendi
dikan.htm  
[online accessed 15 July 2003] 
 
Umaedy. (1999). Manajemen Peningkatan Mutu Berbasis Sekolah (School-based 
quality improvement management). Jakarta: Ministry of Education and 
Culture. 
 
Umar,  J. (2004). Pendidikan nasional dalam ujian (examination in national 
education). Media Indonesia, 4 May 2004 
 http://www.mediaindo.co.id/newsprint.asp?Id=2004050401161628&jenis
=c&cat_name=Opini  
[online accessed 5 June 2004] 
 
Usman, S. (ed.). (2001). Dampak otonomi daerah terhadap layanan pendidikan 
(the implication of local autonomy to education service: a research 
report). Yogyakarta: Fisipol UGM. 
 
van der Veur, Paul W. (1969). Education and Social Change in Colonial 
Indonesia (I), Papers in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 
12. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
Southeast Asia Program. 
 
White, C. (1997). Indonesian Social Studies Education: A Critical Analysis. The 
Social Studies 88 (2):87-91. 
 
Whittey, G. and Power, S. (1997). Quasi-markets and Curriculum control: 
making sense of recent educational reforms in England and Wales. 
Educational Administration Quarterly, 33 (2), pp. 219-240. 
 
Wirt, F., Mitchell, D.E. and Marshall, C. (1985). Perceptions of State Political 
Culture by Education Policy Elites. Peabody Journal of Education. 62 (4) 
pp. 48-60. 
 228
 
Wohlstetter, P. and Odden, A. (1992). Rethinking School-Based Management 
Policy and Research. Educational Administration Quarterly.  28 (4) pp. 
529-549. 
 
World Bank. (2004). Education in Indonesia: Managing the Transition to 
Decentralisation. Volume 2. revised edition February 2004. Washington 
DC.  
 
Wylie, C. (1995). Finessing site-based management with balancing acts. 
Educational Leadership. Vol. 53  No. 4  December 1995 
 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Study Research, design and methods. 2nd ed. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
 
Yonezawa, A. and Muta, H. (2001). Financing Junior Secondary Education in 
Decentralised Administrative Structures: The Indonesian Example. 
Journal of International Cooperation in Education 4 (2):109-124. 
 229
Appendix 1 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
About School Based Management  
for general secondary school stakeholders in Mataram  
 
TEACHERS` QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please use thick 9  inside the box that suites to your 
condition. 
 
Example:  
Are you a teacher ? 
9 Yes                    No    
 
A. School Based Management 
 
1. Where do you get information on School Based Management (SBM) ? [you 
can answer more than one] 
 F Document of SBM regulation 
F Education District office  F Mataram Education Council 
 F Principal    F others` teachers  
 F school meetings   F Newspaper  
F TV     F Radio 
F The Internet      
F others (describe):   
________________________________________________ 
                                                  
________________________________________________ 
 
2. Do you think that you got enough information about the SBM policy ? 
F Yes  F Not sure    F No 
 
3. Have you got special training of SBM?    
F No   F Yes 
 If you answer Yes, how long is the training that you attended ? ……… 
 
4. SBM policy wants to empower school stakeholders and deliver some 
authorities to school. What kinds of authorities do you think that can be 
given to school ?  [you can answer more than one] 
F school development plan    F budget allocation and management  
 F staff management      F curriculum management 
 F managing school facilities       F student management 
F generating others resources    F teachers training 
      F others (describe):    
_________________________________________________ 
                                            
5. What is/are the school`s authority in terms of  its financial management? [you 
can answer more than one] 
F planning for school`s budget 
 F managing fund which is given by the government  
 F changing budget allocation  
 F managing teachers` salaries 
 F managing fund which is come from parents  
 F I don`t know 
F others (describe):   
______________________________________________ 
                                          
_________________________________________________ 
 
6. In your opinion, what is the school`s authority in terms of staff management ? 
[you can answer more than one] 
F principal`s recruitment  
 F teachers` recruitment  
 F administrative staff recruitment  
 F teachers performance evaluation 
 F teachers professional development 
      F I don`t know 
F others (describe):   
______________________________________________ 
                                          
_________________________________________________ 
  
7. In terms of curriculum management, what kind of authority do you think that 
schools can  exercise ? [you can answer more than one] 
F teaching methods  
 F teaching materials  
 F curriculum development  
 F textbooks choice  
 F graduation examination  
      F I don`t know 
F others (describe):   
______________________________________________ 
                                            
8. How do you think the parents and the community participate in education ? 
[you can answer more than one] 
F managing funds which comes from parents  
 F maintaining school infrastructure (street, school yard etc.) 
 F participating in teaching and learning process  
 F undertaking extra-curricular activities 
 F coordinating out-school activities (recreation, tours etc.) 
 F supplying school facilities  
F others (describe):   
______________________________________________ 
                                          
_________________________________________________ 
 
9. Regarding the school committee, please thick the appropriate answer that 
applies to you. 
        Yes     No  Don’t know 
  
A. The school committee is an independent  F      F       F 
body which is not under school 
organisation  
B. The school committee members are   F           F        F 
appointed by the principal 
C. The school committee roles are different  F            F        F 
from BP3 (Badan pembantu 
Penyelenggara Pendidikan = similar 
to Parents and teachers association)  
D. The school committee has the right to  F      F        F 
control educational implementation in 
the school 
E. The school committee approval is needed F     F        F 
for the implementation of school 
budget plan and school 
development plan 
 
10. To what extent would you agree with the view that SBM has been a good 
thing for your school? 
F Agree   F Unsure   F Disagree 
 
11. What do you see as the main benefits of SBM?  
F Teacher feel part of more democratic decision-making  
 F School has control over own resources 
 F There is a feeling of ownership 
 F School able to develop environment to suit students 
 F Community and parents more involved in school  
F others (describe):   
______________________________________________ 
                                            
_________________________________________________ 
 
12. What do you see as the main costs of SBM? [you can answer more than one] 
  F Time for, and quality of, teaching diminished 
 F Extra duties incurred were not trained for 
      F Lack of resources and funds 
      F Teacher morale lowered 
F others (describe):   
______________________________________________ 
                                          
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
13.  To what extent has your role changed as a result of the move to SBM? 
          F  To a large extent    
          F  To some extent    
          F  Not at all    
 
 
14. Please rate the aspect of school based management that applies to you. Please 
thick the appropriate answer. 
         Agree     Unsure    Disagree 
A. It has promoted more effective management         F            F F  
of the school 
B. It has improved decision making         F            F F  
 
C. Significantly increased community involvement  F           F F  
in school decision-making 
  
D. It has significantly improve school – community F           F F  
relations 
E. It has promoted a more effective teaching        F           F F  
 
F. It has significantly improved the quality         F           F F  
of student learning  
G. It has promoted more freedom in              F           F F  
deciding the methods of teaching 
and curriculum planning for 
teachers 
 
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your 
cooperation. 
If you have any general comments to add, please write down on this page. 
 
 __________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________ 
B. Basic Information [Principals] 
1. What is your gender? 
  F female   F male 
 
2. Which is your age group? 
  F 20 - 24   F 25 - 29 
  F 30 – 34   F 35  - 39  
F 40 - 44   F 45 - 50 
F 51 - 55   F more than 56 years 
 
3. How long have you been a principal (years)? 
F less than 2 years  F 2 - 3 
  F 4 – 5   F 6 - 8  
F more than 8 years 
 
4. How long have you been a principal in this school (years)? 
F less than 2 years  F 2 - 3 
  F 4 – 5   F 6 - 8  
F more than 8 years 
 
5. What is your highest educational qualification?    
F Diploma II   F M.Ed 
  F Diploma III  F Ph.D 
F undergraduate (B.Ed)  
B. Basic Information [Teachers] 
1. What is your gender? 
  F female   F male 
 
2. Which is your age group? 
  F 20 - 24   F 25 - 29 
  F 30 – 34   F 35  - 39  
F 40 - 44   F 45 - 50 
F 51 - 55   F more than 56 years 
 
3. How many years have you been teaching? 
F less than 2 years  F 2 - 4 
  F 5 – 9   F 10 - 15  
F 11 - 14   F 15 - 20 
F more than 20 years 
 
4. Which subject matter are you teaching predominantly? ……………. 
 
5. What is your highest educational qualification?    
F Diploma II   F M.Ed 
  F Diploma III  F Ph.D 
F undergraduate (B.Ed)  
 
6. Which grades are you  teaching at present? 
F 1   F 2   F 3 
 
7. Which of the following describes your present position in school? 
F permanent teacher   F non permanent teacher     F Contract teacher 
 
 
B. Basic Information [School Committee Members] 
1. What is your gender? 
  F female   F male 
 
2. Which is your age group? 
  F 20 - 24   F 25 - 29 
  F 30 – 34   F 35  - 39  
F 40 - 44   F 45 - 50 
F 51 - 55   F more than 56 years 
 
3. Have you been a member of the BP3? 
F Yes    F No 
     If you answer yes, for how long?.......   
 
4. How long have you been a member of the School Committee?  
F less than 6 months  F 6 months – 11 months  
  F 1 year – 1,5 years  F more than 1,5 years  
 
5. What is your highest educational qualification?    
F Diploma II   F M.Ed 
  F Diploma III  F Ph.D 
F undergraduate (B.Ed)  
 
6. From which representative groups are you from?  
F parents    F school staff 
  F alumni    F community figure 
F non-governmental organisation F local government official  
F others, please specify:……. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Interview questions 
1. How important is the issue of school based management (for your school)? 
Please explain. 
2. From your point of view, what kinds of authority have to be devolved to 
school in terms of school based management? Please explain. 
3. School based management has been a central focus to administer school in 
the autonomy era, why do you think that the government chose this kind of 
policy? 
4. What kinds of support from the district level has helped (to your school) to 
implement school based management?  
5. What kind of relationship have you established between district-school-
community in terms of school based management? 
6. How do you think the parents and community will be involved, 
(particularly in your school) ?  
7. According to the Ministry of  National Education decree (Kepmendiknas 
044/U/2002) each school has to establish a school committee. Can you 
give me the process used to appoint the school committee in your school? 
8. What is your opinion about the role that is given to the school committee 
based on the regulations? Do you think those roles will empower teachers, 
parents and community? 
9. What are the current constraints to practicing school based management 
(in your school)? 
10. What potential resources can improve the implementation of school based 
management (in your school)?    
 
Notes: words in bracket aimed particularly to participants at school level (principals, teachers and 
school committee members) 
Appendix 3 
 
Appendix I of the MoNE decree Number 044/U/2002  
 
A. Guidelines for Formation of Education Council 
 
I. Definition, Name and Scope 
(1)  Education Council is a body which provides a place for societal 
participation to increase quality, equity and efficiency of educational 
management in each district. 
 
(2) Name of the organization is appropriated with local needs and condition 
such as Education Council, Education Assembly or others agreed names. 
 
(3) Scope of educational levels are pre-school education, schooling system 
and out-of-school education. 
 
II. Positions and Characteristic 
(1) Position of Education Council is in a district. 
 
(2) The characteristic of this body is autonomous, and doesn’t have any 
hierarchical relationship with local government agency. 
 
III. Aims 
Aims of Education council are: 
(1) Facilitating  and channeling of societal aspiration and initiative in order 
to make policy and educational programs. 
 
(2) Increasing responsibility and active participation from all layers of 
society in education implementation. 
 
(3) Creating ambience and conditions for transparency, accountability, and 
democracy in quality education implementation and service.   
 
IV. Roles and Functions 
      Roles of the Education Council are: 
(1)  As an advisory agency in deciding and implementing educational policy. 
 
(2) As a supporting agency in terms of financial, thinking and labor in 
educational implementation. 
 
(3) As a controlling agency in terms of transparency and accountability in 
educational implementation and outcomes. 
 
(4) As a mediator between government (executive) and local parliament 
(legislative) with society. 
 
 
      Functions of the Education Council are: 
(1)  Increasing society’s attention and commitment to quality educational 
implementation. 
 
(2) Conducting cooperation between society (individual/organization) with 
government and local parliament in terms of quality educational 
implementation. 
 
(3) Receiving and analyzing aspirations, ideas, demands and educational 
needs that are proposed by society. 
 
(4) Giving inputs, advice and recommends to local governments/local 
parliament about: 
      a) educational policy and programs; 
      b) local performance criteria  in educational sector; 
      c) criteria for educational worker, in particular teacher/tutor and     
          principal; 
      d) criteria for education facility; and 
      e) other things which are involved in education; 
 
5) Motivating parents and society to participate in education for increasing 
quality and equity in education. 
 
6) Conducting evaluation and supervision to educational policy, programs, 
implementation and outcome. 
 
V. Organization 
     (1). Membership of Education Council 
            a. Education Council membership come from: 
     1) Elements of the society: 
         a).  Non-Governmental Organization in Education; 
         b).  Society prominent figure; 
                    c).  Education figure; 
                    d). Foundation who manages educational institution (school, out of 
school, Islamic school, Islamic boarding school) ; 
                    e).   Business sector/industry/professional association; 
                    f).   Education professional organization; 
                    g).  School Committee  
           
               2). Elements of bureaucracy/legislative can be involved as members of  
                    Education Council (maximum 4-5 people) 
 
            b.  Maximum members of Education Council are 17 (seventeen) people 
and total members should be an odd number. 
 
 
 
 
 
     (2)  Management of Education Council 
            a. At least has 
                1). Chairman 
                2). Secretary 
                3) Treasurer 
            b. Management chosen only by members. 
            c. Chairman position holder not to come from local government and 
parliament elements. 
 
(5)  Statutes and Rules of Organization 
a. Education Council is required to have Statutes and Rules of 
Organization. 
b. In the Statutes,  at least have: 
      1).  Name and location; 
      2).  Foundation, aims and  activities; 
      3).  Membership and management; 
      4).  Rights and Obligations of members and management; 
      5).  Financial; 
      6).  Work mechanism and meetings; 
      7).  Changing of Statutes and Rules of Organization and 
organizational dispersal. 
 
VI. Forming Education Council 
      (1).  Forming principles 
              The principles to form Education Council have to apply: 
a. transparent, accountable and democratic 
b. as a partnership for local government 
 
      (2) Forming Mechanism 
              a. Forming of  preparation committee 
                   1). Head of district and/or society  forms a preparation committee. 
The committee numbers are at least five people, consists of  
educational practitioner (such as teachers, principal, educational 
management) and educational observer (non-government 
organization in education, prominent figure, religious figure, 
business sector and industry). 
   
                   2). Preparation committee’s task is to prepare the formation of 
Education Council, which conducts: 
a) Organize socialization forum to the public  (which includes 
Education Assembly of local vocational education, District 
Committee, Out-of-Education Committee) about Education 
Council that are stated in this decree. 
b) Creating a criteria and identified members’ candidates based 
on public aspiration. 
c) Selection of candidate members based on public aspiration. 
d) Publish nominations of the members to the public. 
e) Creating people’s names who are selected; 
f) Facilitating  the choice of Education Council management 
and membership 
g) Giving Educational Council management and  members to 
the head of district 
 
b.  Preparation committee is dissolved when  head of district has 
stipulated Education Council 
 
           (3)  Stipulating Education Council formation 
                  Education Council  stipulates for the first time with a decree from 
head  of district, afterward it is regulated by Statutes and Rules of 
Organization. 
 
VII. Inter-organization arrangement 
The arrangement between Education Council with Local Government, 
Local Parliament, Education District Office and School Committees is 
coordinative. 
 
VIII. Closing 
(1) The formation of Education Council can be regulated by local 
legislation which have relationships with educational management in 
that district. 
 
(2) The formation of Education Council can be facilitated by:  Secretariat 
for  Developing Education Council and School Committee, address 
Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education, Gedung E 
5th floor, Jendral Sudirman street, Senayan, Jakarta, phone (021) 
5725613, 5725608, fax (021) 5725608, website www.depdiknas.go.id, 
email dpkp2002@yahoo.com 
 
B. Example of relationship model between Education Council and other 
Institutions at district level (alternative 1). 
 
 
Head of District Education Council Local  Parlianment 
Education 
District Office 
School Committees 
 
 
Legend:                             Instructive relationship 
 
                                          Coordinative relationship 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Example of relationship model between Education Council and other 
Institutions at district level (alternative 2). 
 
 
Head of District 
Education Council 
Local  Parliament 
Education 
District Office 
School Committees 
Government 
Secretariat 
Education 
Commission 
 
 
 
Legend:                             Instructive relationship 
 
                                          Coordinative relationship 
 
 
 
 
D. Example of organization structure for Education Council. 
 
 
Legend:                             Instructive relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education Council 
Chairman 
Members 
Treasurer Secretary 
Appendix  II of the MoNE decree Number 044/U/2002  
 
A. Guidelines for Formation of School Committee 
 
I. Definition and Name  
(1)  School Committee is an autonomous body which provides a place for 
societal participation to increase quality, equity and efficiency of 
educational management in each educational institution which are 
involved  in pre-school education, schooling system or out-of-school 
education. 
 
(2) Name of the organization is appropriated with local needs and condition 
of each educational institution such as School Committee, Education 
Committee, Out-of-School Education Committee, School Council, 
School Assembly, Madrasah Assembly, Kindergarten Committee or other 
agreed names. 
 
(3) BP3, School Committee and/or School Assembly that are already 
established can widened it’s function, roles and membership according to 
this guidelines. 
 
II. Positions and Characteristic 
(1) Position of School Committee is in an educational institution. 
 
(2) School Committee can be established in one educational institution, or a 
number of institutions at the similar level, or in a number of institutions 
in various levels but which are within a relatively short distance, or 
educational institutions which are managed by the same organization, or 
because of other considerations 
 
(3) The characteristics of this body is autonomous, and doesn’t have any 
hierarchical relationship with government agency. 
 
III. Aims 
Aims of School Committee are: 
(1) Facilitating  and channeling societal aspirations and initiatives in order to 
make operational policy and educational program in one educational 
institution. 
 
(2) Increasing responsibility and active participation of all layers of society 
in education implementation in educational institution. 
 
(3) Creating ambience and condition for transparency, accountability, and 
democratic in quality education implementation and service in 
educational institution.   
 
 
 
 
IV. Roles and Functions 
      Roles of the School Committee are: 
(1)  As an advisory agency in deciding and implementing educational policy 
in educational institutions. 
 
(2) As a supporting agency in terms of finance, thinking and labor in 
educational implementation in educational institutions. 
 
(3) As a controlling agency in terms of transparency and accountability in 
educational implementation and outcomes in educational institution. 
 
(4) As a mediator between government (executive) and society in educational 
institutions. 
 
      Functions of the School Committee are: 
(1)  Increasing society’s attention and commitment to quality educational 
implementation. 
 
(2) Conducting cooperation between society 
(individual/organization/business sector/industry sector) with 
government, in terms of quality educational implementation. 
 
(3) Receiving and analyzing aspirations, ideas, demands and any other 
educational needs that are proposed by society. 
 
(4) Giving inputs, advice and recommends to educational institution about: 
      a) educational policy and programs; 
      b) school budget plan; 
      c) performance criteria for educational institution; 
      d) criteria for education worker; 
      e) criteria for education facility; and 
      f) other things which involved in education; 
 
5).  Motivating parents and society to participate in education for increasing 
quality and equity in education. 
 
6). Collecting money from the society to fund educational implementation in 
educational institution. 
 
7). Conducting evaluation and supervision to educational policy, programs, 
implementation and outcome in educational institution. 
 
V. Organization 
     (1). Membership of School Committee: 
            a. School Committee membership come from: 
     1) Elements of the society: 
         a).  Parents; 
         b).  Societal prominent figure; 
                    c).  Education figure; 
                    d).  Business sector/industry. 
                    e)   education workers professional organization; 
                    f).  alumni representative; 
                    g).  student representative.  
           
               2). Elements of teacher council, foundations/management of 
educational  institution,  Rural Advisory Board can be involved as a 
member of  Education Council (maximum 3 people) 
 
            b.  Number of members of School Committee has a minimum of 9 (nine) 
people and the total members should be an odd number. 
 
     (2)  Management of Education Council 
            a. At least has 
                1). Chairman 
                2). Secretary 
                3) Treasurer 
            b. Management chosen only by it’s members. 
            c. Chairman’s position is not be hold by head of educational institution. 
 
(6)  Statutes and Rules of Organization 
a. School Committee is required to have Statutes and Rules of 
Organization. 
b. In the Statutes  at least have: 
      1).  Name and location; 
      2).  Foundation, aims and  activities; 
      3).  Membership and management; 
      4).  Rights and Obligation of members and management; 
      5).  Financial; 
      6).  Work mechanism and meetings; 
      7).  Changing of Statutes and Rules of Organization and 
organizational dispersal. 
 
 
VI. Forming School Committee 
      (1).  Forming principles 
              The principles to form a School Committee have to apply: 
c. transparent, accountable and democratic 
d. as a partnership of educational institution 
 
      (2) Forming Mechanism 
              a. Forming of  preparation committee 
                   1). Society and/or head of educational institution forms a preparation 
committee. The committee numbers are at least five people, 
consists of educational practitioner (such as teachers, principal, 
educational management) and educational observer (non-
government organization in education, prominent figure, religious 
figure, business sector and industry) and parents. 
   
 
 
                   2). Preparation committee ‘s task is to prepare the formation of 
School Committee,  conducts: 
a).  Organize socialization forum to the public  (which includes 
members and management of BP3, School Assembly and 
School Committee that already existed) about School 
Committee that are stated in this decree. 
b)  Creating a criteria and identified members’ candidates based 
on  public aspiration. 
c)  Selection of candidate members based on public aspiration. 
d) Publish nominations of the members to the public. 
e) Creating people’s names who are selected; 
f) Facilitating  the choice of School Committee management 
and membership 
g) Giving School Committee management and  members to the 
head of educational institution. 
 
b.  Preparation committee is dissolved when  School Committee is  
      established. 
 
           (3)  Stipulating School Committee formation 
                  School Committee  stipulates for the first time with a decree from 
head   of educational council, afterward it is regulated by Statutes and 
Rules of Organization. 
 
 
VII. Inter-organization arrangement 
        The arrangement between School Committee with educational institution,  
        Educational Council and others institution who has responsibility bin terms 
of educational management with School Committees in  other educational 
institutions is coordinative. 
 
 
VIII. Closing 
(1)   In the formation of School Committee, head  of educational 
institution can be consulted with district government.  
 
(2)   The formation of School Committee can be regulated by local decree  
       which have relationship with educational management in that district. 
 
(3)   The formation of School Committee can be facilitated by: Secretariat 
for Developing Education Council and School Committee, address 
Directorat General of Primary and Secondary Education, Gedung E 
5th floor, Jendral Sudirman street, Senayan, Jakarta, phone (021) 
5725613, 5725608, fax (021) 5725608, website 
www.depdiknas.go.id, email dpkp2002@yahoo.com
 
B. Example of relationship model between School Committee and other 
Institutions. 
 
 
Legend:                             Coordinative relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education Council  
School Committee 
Educational 
Institution 
Other Institutions 
C. Example of Organization Structure of School Committee in one 
Educational Institution. 
 
 
 
 
Legend:                             Instructive relationship 
 
                                          Coordinative relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School Committee 
Chairman 
Members 
Treasurer Secretary 
Resource Person 
D. Example of Organisation Structure of One School Committee in several 
Educational Institutions. 
 
 
 
 
Legend:                             Instructive relationship 
 
                                          Coordinative relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairman 
 
Vice Chairman 
Members 
Treasurer Secretary 
Resource Person 
Appendix 4 
 
Summary of Mataram District Budget year 2004. 
Appendix I of Mataram District Regulation number 9/2004. 
 
 
No 
 
Description 
Budget 
before 
adjustment  
Budget after 
adjustment 
Amount 
changes 
1 Incomes    
1.1 Local tax 17,104,583,150 17,104,583,150 - 
1.2 Subsidy from the 
central 
government 
191,584,706,315 191,584,706,315 - 
1.3 Other incomes 9,434,596,978 9,434,596,978 - 
 Total Incomes 218,123,886,443 218,123,886,443 - 
2 Expenses    
2.1 Local personnel 69,738,132,548 72,085,975,040 2,347,842,492
2.2 Public services 141,976,963,203 144,278,824,529 2,301,861,326
2.3 Capital expenses 10,317,114,800 11,100,114,800 783,000,000
2.4 Other expenses 804,036,933 853,445,055 49,408,112
 Total  Expenses 222,836,247,485 228,318,359,425 5,482,111,940
 Surplus/(Deficit) (4,712,361,041) (10,194,472,981) (5,482,111,940)
Note: amount in Indonesia’s rupiahs (1 US$ equal to 10,000 rupiahs) 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Mataram District Budget 2004 for Education and Culture Sector  
(Note: amount in Indonesia’s rupiahs; 10,000 rupiahs equal to US $ 1) 
 
No Description Project costs Targets Purposes 
1 Building refurbishment and 
classroom rehabilitation for junior 
secondary schools 
23,790,000,000 Whole district To accommodate students 
who finish primary 
schooling  
2 Erecting new senior secondary 
schools 
6,800,000,000 Three new state secondary 
schools 
To accommodate students 
who finish junior 
secondary schooling 
3 Building new classrooms 950,000,000 Seven new classroom - 
4 Buildings refurbishment 2,525,000,000 Thirteen schools Improving educational 
activities 
5 Build school fence 100,000,000 Two schools - 
6 Program for improving 
educational services 
2,365,338,100 Whole district Improving capacity of 
teachers, principals and 
educational staff 
7 Supplying educational equipment 2,111,250,000 Whole district Improving educational 
quality 
 
 
No Description Project costs Targets Purposes 
8 Support for final examination at 
primary school level 
250,000,000 200 schools To make final examination 
running well  
9 Support for mid-term test  750,000,000 159 schools To make mid-term 
examination running well 
10 Support for new student entrance  80,000 32 schools To make new students 
entrance process running 
well 
11 Support for primary school 
teachers who pursue two years 
university education 
150,000,000 45 primary school teachers To improve teachers 
educational qualification 
12 Incentive for teachers who have 
overload teaching hours 
250,000,000 65 primary and junior 
secondary teachers 
To pay primary and junior 
secondary teachers who 
have overload work 
13 Support for printing and 
distributing final examination of 
primary and junior secondary level 
100,000,000 200 schools  To make final examination 
have fund for printed 
exam papers 
14 Support for primary school and 
junior secondary teachers who 
pursue bachelor degree  
100,000,000 40 primary or junior 
secondary school teachers 
To improve teachers 
educational qualification 
15 Training for school committee 75,000,000 200 school committee 
members 
To improve school 
committee members 
quality  
No Description Project costs Targets Purposes 
16 Support for kindergarten teachers 
who pursue two years university 
education  
100,000,000 40 kindergarten teachers To improve teachers 
educational qualification 
17 Scholarship for secondary school 
students  
110,160,000 306 secondary school 
students 
To motivate students who 
do not have good 
achievement 
18 Scholarship for students who came 
from poor economic background 
900,360,000 2501 students  To make the students not 
drop out from schools 
19 Incentive for non-permanent staff 
at secondary school level 
240,000,000 200 staff  Improving non-permanent 
staff income 
20 Supporting students subsidy 
program at sub-district offices  
15,000,000 1 activity  To support financially 
sub-district offices in 
students subsidy program 
21 Incentive for teachers at private 
schools  
720,000,000 600 teachers at private 
schools  
Improving private schools 
teachers income 
22 Youth and student cultural activity 300,000,000 8 activities Improving creativity and 
appreciation to art and 
culture  
23 Supporting art groups activity at 
schools 
300,000,000 40 art groups  Funds for supporting art 
activities at school  
 
 
No Description Project costs Targets Purposes 
24 Art training  140,000,000 40 people  Funds for supporting art 
activities 
25 Competition for local song 
composition 
20,000,000 - Improving creativity for 
local song composition  
26 Support for culture activities at 
local, regional and national level  
30,000,000 30 people  Supporting people who 
will attend local, regional 
and national competition  
27 Training for specific local art 
(kepembayunan) 
20,000,000 80 people  Improving and developing 
specific local art 
(kepembayunan) 
28 Writing Competition about 
traditional values  
30,000,000 80 people  Improving traditional 
values  
29 Comparative study at other 
historical unit in Indonesia 
40,000,000 15 people Improving knowledge 
about historical values 
30 Supporting for historical 
conservation and museum  
100,000,000 5 groups Improving knowledge 
concerning museum and 
historical conservation 
31 Traveling to other historical and 
cultural sites in Indonesia 
50,000,000 25 people Improving culture 
appreciation  
32 Socialization of Law 5/1992 
concerning Museum and Historical 
Artifacts   
60,000,000 200 people Improving understanding 
about Law 5/1992 
 No Description Project costs Targets Purposes 
33 Documenting historical oral 
literature and culture  
50,000,000 1 program  Documentation for 
historical and cultural data 
34 Program for supporting secondary 
level and out of school education: 
1. Selecting and developing youth 
exchange program between 
provinces. 
2.  Scout activities for primary and 
secondary school levels 
3. Race walking competition   
4. Sport equipment  
5. Program for improving literacy  
6. Training for flag raising 
ceremony on independence day 
and Mataram city day 
7. Sport and art competition at 
primary school level 
25,000,000
25,000,000
205,000,000
294,000,000
23,000,000
75,000,000
352,450,000
 
 
1 activity 
 
3 activities 
 
3 activities 
 
200 people 
2 activities 
 
 
 
Preparation for flag raising 
ceremony on Indonesian 
independence day 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 
 
School Budget year 2003/2004 from one state secondary school 
that participated in site studies. 
(Note: amount in Indonesia’s rupiahs; 10,000 rupiahs equal to US $ 1) 
 
I. Income 
 
 
No. 
 
Year 
Number of 
students 
Students who 
are exempt to 
pay fees 
Students who 
required to pay 
school fees 
1 10 280 28 252 
2 11 240 24 216 
3 12 240 24 216 
 Total 760 76 684 
 
1. School fees, based on: 
     a. Head of education district office number: 422.4/632/B/Dik/2001 
     b. Mataram mayor circular letter number: 420/526/Kesra/2001 
 
     684 students x 12 months x 17,500  143,640,000 
 
2. Donation 
 
      684 students x 12 months x 27,500  225,720,000 
 
    Total incomes         369,360,000   
 
II. Expense 
 
1. Subsidy for school staff            152,874,000 
2. Supporting teaching and learning   59,508,000 
3. Students activities     29,754,000 
4. School Committee    10,773,000 
5. Fees to coordination team     3,591,000  
6. School Operational costs            112,860,000 
 
   Total expenses         369,360,000   
 
 
 
 
III. Description 
 
1. Subsidy for school staff 
     1.1 Subsidy for Principal, Vice principals and head of administration staff 
           -  Principal    1 x 12 x 240,000 2,880,000 
 - Vice principals   4 x 12 x 100,000 4,800,000 
 - Head of administration staff  1 x 12 x  100,000 1,200,000 
 
     1.2 Subsidy teachers who responsible for other activities 
           -  Trainer of Students unions  6 x 12 x 70,000 5,040,000 
 - Trainer of extracurricular activities 14 x 12 x 70,000        11,760,000 
 - Home room teachers   19 x 12 x  70,000      15,960,000 
           -  Coordinators    5 x 12 x 70,000 4,200,000 
 - Curriculum     3 x 12 x 70,000           2,520,000 
 - Infrastructure   1 x 12 x  70,000           840,000 
 - Public relations   1 x 12 x  70,000           840,000 
 - Teacher as duty officer  6 x 12 x  60,000        4,320,000     
 
     1.3 Incentive  
            -  Based on teaching hours          742 x 12 x 3,000          26,712,000 
 -  Cashier     1  x 12 x 70,000             840,000 
 -  Payroll officer   1 x 12 x  50,000             600,000 
            -  Permanent Administration staff 6 x 12 x 70,000 5,040,000 
 
     1.4 Transportation  
            - Principal             1 x 12 x 120,000         1,440,000 
 - Vice Principals   4 x 12 x 70,000         3,360,000 
 - Head of administration staff  1 x 12 x  70,000    840,000 
 - Teachers             51 x 12 x 60,000           6,720,000 
 - Permanent Administration staff 6 x 12 x 60,000 4,320,000 
 - Home visit          392,000 
 - Transport for sport competition    5,500,000 
 
1.5 Uniform for teachers and administration staff 
85 x 150,000  12,750,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Supporting teaching and learning 
    2.1 Teaching and learning   
 - Mid-term examination  2 x 5,000,000           10,000,000 
 - Preparation for final examination    3,000,000 
 - Written test       4,000,000 
 - Practice test       3,000,000 
 - Science laboratory experiment    2,000,000 
 - Language laboratory      1,000,000 
 - Enhancing for year 12 students’ academic            15,000,000 
            - Psychology test for grade 11 students   240 x 15,000    3,600,000
 - Relief teachers      1,500,000
 - Teachers’ professional development   5,000,000 
  
    2.2 Teaching equipments  
 - Maintenance for curriculum materials              3,000,000 
 - Books for library and teachers’ library   4,000,000 
 - Classroom equipment     2,000,000 
 - Markers, erasers and ink for white boards   2,408,000 
 
 
3. Students activities  
     - Student unions                2,000,000 
 -  Training for flag raising ceremony group      500,000 
 - School health service (UKS)    1,454,000 
 - Scout           500,000 
 - Outdoor activities group        500,000 
 - English club          500,000 
 - Sports group       1,000,000
 - Student research group     4,000,000 
 - Student religious groups     4,000,000 
 - School magazine         500,000 
 - Art and music         500,000 
 - School birthday       3,000,000 
 - Year 12 farewell ceremony     1,800,000 
 - New students entrance activity       500,000 
 - Religious day ceremony     1,000,000 
 - Mathematics and science Olympics in Mataram  3,500,000 
 - Mathematics and science Olympics outside Mataram 4,500,000 
     
  
4. School Committee  
     - School Committee meeting expenses             2,733,000 
 -  School Committee annual meeting               3,500,000 
 - Fees for  Principal association    1,500,000 
 - Students’ cards   760 x 4000  3,040,000 
 
5. Fees to Coordination team     3,591,000  
 
6. School Operational costs 
      -  Fixed expenses   12 x 200,000  2,400,000 
 -  Electricity bill   12 x 300,000  3,600,000 
 -  Water bill    12 x 100,000  1,200,000 
 -  honorarium non-permanent teachers and extra hours  
   for permanent teachers based on teaching hours   
     269 x 12 x 8,500        27,438,000 
-  Non-permanent administrative staff   
10 x 12 x 210,000       25,200,000 
- Gardener     5  x 12 x 210,000       12,600,000 
- Security     2  x 12 x 210,000         5,040,000 
- Night guards    2 x 12 x 210,000          5,040,000 
- Transportation for non-permanent teachers 
     8 x 12 x 50,000         4,800,000 
- Transportation for non-permanent administrative staff 
     19 x 12 x 50,000        11,400,000 
- Drinking water for teachers and staff     3,400,000 
- Maintenance costs for building and garden     2,642,000 
- Newspapers subscription       1,500,000 
- Garbage collection fees  12 x 50,000       600,000 
   
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 7.1 Teachers’ basic information (n=57) 
 
Q1 Gender:  Male                           Female 
34 (60%)                    23   (40%) 
 
Q2  Age group 
25-29        35-39        40-44         45-50       51-55      > 55         Average 
   2                15            24               12             2             2           42  years 
 
Q3 Total years teaching  
< 2               2-4           5-9           10-14        15-20      > 20         Average  
  1                  3               1               24             16           12        14.4 years 
 
Q4  Teaching subject  
Maths  Sciences   Soc. Scie.   Lang.    Sport   Art   Religion  Counseling 
 6              13               13            13           2        2         5                3 
 
Q5 Class taught1  
   year 10 (I)         year 11 (II)         year 12 (III) 
      28                      28                      33  
 
Q6 Teacher positions 
Permanent teacher        non-permanent teacher          contract teacher 
          55                                       1                                       1 
 
Q7 Highest educational qualification 
3 year diploma                Bachelor degree 
4                                     53 
 
Notes: 1 many teachers taught more than one grade 
Appendix 7.2 School Committee Members’ basic information (n=21) 
Q1 Gender:    Male                        Female 
18 (86%)                  3  (14%)            
 
Q2  Age group 
35-39            40-44            45-50           51-55           > 55          Average 
   1                    4                   7                  3                  6             47 years 
 
Q3 Had been member of BP31  
     Yes                                 No 
   12  (57%)                       9  (43%) 
 
Q4  Total time as committee members (months) 
  <  6                6-11                12-18             > 18              Average  
     4                    6                       7                  4                12.5 months 
 
Q5 Highest educational qualification 
Bachelor degree               Master degree 
   18   (86%)                          3  (14%) 
 
Q6 Which representative group represented 
Parents              Society                  School staff          Others2 
  11                         3                               4                      3 
 
Notes: 1 previous organization before school committee, equal to parent-teacher organization 
                2  local government officials and alumni 
 
 
Appendix 7.3 Sources of SBM information 
Q1 Information sources about SBM1 
 
Principals:              document of SBM regulation2           5 
      N = 5                education district office                     4 
              others (TV and internet)                    1 
 
Teachers:               principal                                           47 
    N = 57               school meeting                                  41 
             education district office                    21 
             other teachers                                   14 
             newspaper                                         10 
             document of SBM regulation2          10 
             others                                                  7                          
              (Education council, TV, Internet, radio) 
 
School                    principal                                            16 
Committee             school meetings                                16 
    N = 21               document of SBM regulation2            9  
              education district office                      8 
              others                                                  8 
              (Education council, teachers, newspaper, radio) 
 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
              2  The ministry of national education decree no 044/U/2002 
 
Appendix 7.4 Authority devolved to school  
Q4 What kinds of authorities do you think that can be given to school?1 
 
Principals:          school development plan                       5 
     N= 5             managing school facilities                      5 
         staff management                                    5 
         generating other resources                      5 
         budget allocation and management        4 
         student management                               4 
         teachers training                                     3 
         curriculum management                        2 
 
Teachers:           managing school facilities                     44 
     N = 57          budget allocation and management        41 
         school development plan                        38 
         student management                               33 
         curriculum management                         29 
         staff management                                   25  
         teachers training                                    25                         
         generating other resources                     24 
 
School               school development plan                          16 
Committee         managing school facilities                       14 
   N= 21             budget allocation & management            12  
         student management                                10 
         generating other resources                       10 
         teachers training                                      10 
         curriculum management                           9    
         staff management                                     8 
 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
 
 
Appendix 7.5 Schools authority in terms of financial management 
 
Q5 What kinds of authorities in terms of financial management do you think 
that can be given to the schools?1 
 
Principals:          planning for school’s budget                   5 
     N= 5             managing fund from parents                    5 
         managing  fund from government            4 
         changing budget allocation                      2 
         managing teachers salary                         1 
 
Teachers:           planning for school’s budget                    53 
     N = 57          managing fund from parents                     44 
         managing  fund from government             37 
         changing budget allocation                       17 
         managing teachers salary                            7 
         I don’t know                                              1      
 
School               planning for school’s budget                     21 
Committee         managing fund from parents                     20 
      N= 21         managing  fund from government              14  
        changing budget allocation                        10 
        managing teachers salary                            2 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
 
Appendix 7.6 Schools authority in terms of staff management 
 
Q6 What kinds of authorities in terms of staff management do you think that 
can be given to the schools?1 
 
Principals:          administrative staff recruitment                5 
     N= 5            teacher performance evaluation                 5 
        teacher professional development              3 
        teacher recruitment                                     2 
        principal recruitment                                  1 
 
Teachers:           teacher professional development            42 
     N = 57         teacher performance evaluation                41 
        administrative staff recruitment                28 
        principal recruitment                                 18 
        teacher recruitment                                   15 
        I don’t know                                               5      
 
School               teacher performance evaluation                16 
Committee         teacher professional development            14 
      N= 21         administrative staff recruitment                  8 
         teacher recruitment                                     4 
         principal recruitment                                  1 
         I don’t know                                              1     
 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
Appendix 7.7 Schools authority in terms of curriculum management 
Q7 In terms of curriculum management, what kind of authority do you think 
that schools can be exercised?1 
 
Principals:          teaching methods                                    4 
     N= 5              curriculum development                         4 
          textbook choice                                       4 
          teaching materials                                   3 
          graduation examination                           2 
 
Teachers:           teaching methods                                    49 
     N = 57          teaching materials                                   44 
         graduation examination                           40 
         curriculum development                         37 
         textbook choice                                       33 
 
School               teaching materials                                   14 
Committee         curriculum development                        14 
      N= 21          teaching methods                                    11 
         textbook choice                                       10 
         graduation examination                            9 
                 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
 
Appendix 7.8 Parents and community involvement in school 
 
Q8 How do you think parents and community participate for school?1 
 
Principals:          supplying school facilities                       5 
     N= 5              managing fund comes from parents        4 
          maintaining school facilities                   4 
          participating in teaching and learning     3 
          undertaking extra-curricular activities    1 
          coordinating out-of-school activities      1 
 
Teachers:           supplying school facilities                      50 
     N = 57          maintaining school facilities                   33 
         participating in teaching and learning     25 
         managing fund comes from parents        21 
         coordinating out-of-school activities       16 
         undertaking extra-curricular activities     12 
 
School               supplying school facilities                       17 
Committee        maintaining school facilities                    15 
   N= 21             managing fund comes from parents         11                 
                          coordinating out-of-school activities         9 
         participating in teaching and learning        9 
         undertaking extra-curricular activities       7 
                 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
 
Appendix 7.9 Participants’ view about School Committee  
Q9a  School Committee is an independent body? 
                                   Yes                 No                  Don’t know 
Principal                       2                     3                           - 
Teachers                     21                   35                          1 
School Committee        8                   13                           - 
Q9b School Committee members were decided by principal? 
                                   Yes                 No                  Don’t know 
Principal                       1                    4                          - 
Teachers                      7                   45                          5 
School Committee       2                   18                          1 
Q9c School Committee roles is different from BP3? 
                                   Yes                 No                  Don’t know 
Principal                        4                    1                          - 
Teachers                      41                  10                         6 
School Committee       17                    4                          - 
Q9d School Committee has right to control educational implementation? 
                                   Yes                 No                  Don’t know 
Principal                       5                    -                           - 
Teachers                     56                   1                          - 
School Committee      21                    -                          - 
Q9e School Committee approval is needed for school budget? 
                                   Yes                 No                  Don’t know 
Principal                       5                    -                          - 
Teachers                     48                    5                         4 
School Committee      21                    -                          - 
 
 
 
Appendix 7.10 Benefits and constraints of SBM policy in school 
Q11 What do you see as the main benefits of SBM?1 
 
Principals:          school has control over own resources           4 
     N= 5            there is a feeling of ownership                         4 
        school able to develop environment                 4 
        community and parents more involved             4 
        part of more democratic decision-making         3 
 
Teachers:           part of more democratic decision-making      48 
     N= 57          school has control over own resources            47 
        there is a feeling of ownership                         42 
        school able to develop environment                38 
        community and parents more involved            33 
        others                                                                 1 
 
School               community and parents more involved            18 
Committee:        there is a feeling of ownership                         17 
   N= 21            school able to develop environment                  14 
        part of more democratic decision-making          13 
                         school has control over own resources               13 
                
Q12 What do you see as constraints to support SBM?1 
 
Principals:          lack of resources and funds                              3 
     N= 5            time for, and quality of, teaching diminished     - 
        extra duties incurred were not trained for           - 
        difficult to find resolution                                   - 
         
Teachers:           lack of resources and funds                               28 
     N= 57          time for, and quality of, teaching diminished     17 
        extra duties incurred were not trained for            8 
        difficult to find resolution                                     4 
        others                                                                     2  
 
School               lack of resources and funds                               11 
Committee:        extra duties incurred were not trained for         10 
   N= 21            difficult to find resolution                                   4 
                          more time waste in meetings                              3 
Notes: 1 respondent can answer more than one choice 
 
Appendix 7.11 Participants’ attitude toward SBM policy and practices  
Q14a  It has promoted more effective management of the school 
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       5                      -                           - 
Teachers                     49                     8                           - 
School Committee      21                     -                           - 
Q14b It has improved decision making? 
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       5                      -                           - 
Teachers                     54                     3                           - 
School Committee      20                     1                          - 
Q14c Significantly increased community involvement in school decision 
making 
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       4                      -                          1 
Teachers                     31                    14                       12 
School Committee      16                     3                          2 
Q14d It has significantly improve school-community relations 
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       4                      1                          - 
Teachers                     48                     9                           - 
School Committee      21                     -                           - 
Q14e It has promoted a more effective teaching 
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       4                      1                          - 
Teachers                     43                   14                          - 
School Committee      18                     3                           - 
Q14f It has significantly improved the quality  of student learning  
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       5                      -                          - 
Teachers                     37                   20                          - 
School Committee      17                    4                           - 
Q14g It has promoted more freedom in deciding the methods of teaching 
and curriculum planning for teachers 
                                 Agree              Unsure               Disagree 
Principal                       3                      -                          2 
Teachers                     38                   14                          5 
School Committee      11                     6                          4 
 
 
 
 
